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Abstract 
The supposed fact of reasonable disagreement plays a crucial role in standard 
accounts of political liberalism. The standard account posits reasonable 
disagreement as arising primarily from the supposed fact that, in at least some 
circumstances, people can permissibly respond in different ways to the same 
evidence. That is to say, the standard account presupposes permissivism: It is 
possible that more than one doxastic attitude towards a proposition is rationally 
permissible, given a body of evidence. In this thesis, I shall show that the standard 
account is mistaken in presupposing permissivism by arguing for Uniqueness: 
Given a total body of evidence at most one doxastic attitude is rationally 
permissible. I shall argue for this by first rehearsing White’s two objections to 
permissivism and showing that, at the very least, they show that an intrapersonal 
version of Uniqueness is true. That is to say, at most one doxastic attitude is 
justified for a given agent given a total body of evidence. I shall then present 
different accounts of permissivism consistent with intrapersonal uniqueness and 
show that none of these accounts are successful. If my argument is successful, the 
standard account of political liberalism may have to be revised. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
The standard version of political liberalism consists of two claims. The first claim is 
that there is a public justification requirement according to which the exercise of 
political authority is legitimate only if it is publicly justifiable. The second claim is that 
only liberal political authority is publicly justifiable since it is the only type of political 
authority that does not appeal to views, such as sectarian religious or moral 
doctrines, that would be subject to reasonable disagreement. Epistemic 
permissivism is the claim that people with the same total body of evidence can 
rationally disagree. In this thesis, I shall argue firstly that the standard version of 
political liberalism presupposes epistemic permissivism and secondly that 
permissivism is false. A consequence of this is that certain important moral claims 
that political liberals standardly take to be subject to reasonable disagreement are 
not. If so, then the standard account of political liberalism is in need of revision. In 
order to evaluate these two claims, I shall, in this chapter, explain what I mean by 
the terms “political liberalism” and “epistemic permissivism”.  
1.1 The Standard Account of Political Liberalism 
We can more easily understand the term political liberalism if we examine what I 
take to be a core claim: Laws based on controversial moral or religious doctrines 
are illegitimate because such doctrines are subject to reasonable disagreement. 
Implicit in this claim is a public justification requirement according to which: 
Public Justification Requirement: The exercise of political authority is 
legitimate only if it is publicly justifiable. 
I shall first clarify a few terms. By the exercise of political authority, I refer to the 
action of a state. Such state actions include coercive laws and policies, like those 
which prohibit the construction of mosques in a city, those which prohibit murder or 
those which set a minimum wage, and also to non-coercive laws like marriage and 
contract laws1. Similarly, pronouncements made by political leaders may also be 
covered by this principle. For instance, if a public official were to declare that certain 
religious beliefs were necessary for good citizenship, political liberals would 
                                                          
1
 HLA Hart (1964) has noted that contract and marriage law are non-coercive. Violation of 
these laws only results in the contract or marriage being nullified. However, according to 
Hart, nullity is not a sanction. While sanctions are typically undesirable and it is the threat of 
this undesirable consequence which creates the coercive character of some laws, nullity can 
often be seen as neutral or even desirable. Even if laws which define marriage as only 
between a man and a woman are not themselves coercive, political liberals may 
nevertheless think they are illegitimate if they are not publicly justifiable. 
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consider that statement illegitimate since we generally regard it as not being publicly 
justifiable in a pluralistic society.  
There are other versions of the public justification requirement in which the 
justificandum is different. For instance, according to Rawls’s Liberal Principle of 
Legitimacy (Rawls 1993: 137), only the constitution of a polity needs to be publicly 
justifiable. The exercise of political power is legitimate only if it is in accordance with 
such a constitution. On this version of the principle, the constitution may prescribe a 
procedure which is publicly justifiable, but that procedure need not pick out laws or 
policies which themselves are publicly justifiable. To take another example, Gaus’s 
Deliberative Public Justification Principle requires what he calls “bona fide rule[s] of 
social morality” (Gaus 2011: 27) to be publicly justifiable. While the public 
justification requirement, as I have specified it, takes laws or policies as the 
justificandum, the question of exactly what the justificandum for public justification 
is, does not matter. What is important is that public justification of the justificandum 
depends on the epistemic justification of certain relevant beliefs. While, I shall 
explain how this can be in the case where laws and policies are the relevant 
justificanda, this should apply equally well to any other plausible candidate 
justificandum.  
By publicly justifiable is meant the following: 
Basic Public Justification: The exercise of political authority is publicly 
justifiable only if it is justifiable to each reasonable person subject to 
it. 
There are two key terms which require clarification, “justifiable to” and “reasonable 
person”. With regards to the core political liberal claim, little has been said, in the 
literature, about what reasonable disagreement amounts to. I shall, later in this 
chapter, defend an interpretation of “reasonable disagreement” as “rational 
disagreement between reasonable persons”. This, as I shall argue, is the most 
defensible interpretation of the requirement that each reasonable person have 
epistemic access to the reasons that justify a law2. In what follows, I shall first clarify 
the term “reasonable person” before addressing how “justifiable to” relates to 
“reasonable disagreement”.  
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 To be clear, the claim that reasonable disagreement is rational disagreement between 
reasonable persons is not part of the standard account of Political Liberalism. 
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1.1.1 The Reasonable and the Rational 
In the standard version, “Reasonable person” is a term that demarcates the 
constituency to whom justification is owed. The fact that a given law is not justifiable 
to unreasonable persons does not undermine the legitimacy of the law. This 
justificatory constituency has been defined in various ways. For instance, according 
to Rawls and Jonathan Quong, a reasonable person is willing to, firstly, propose and 
honour fair terms of cooperation. Secondly, a reasonable person is able to 
recognise what Rawls calls the “burdens of judgment” and to recognise their 
consequences (Rawls 1993: 49; Quong 2010: 37-38). I shall explain what the 
burdens of judgment are later in the discussion on rational disagreement. There are, 
of course, alternative accounts of a reasonable person. These accounts add or 
subtract from the content of reasonableness, thus, respectively narrowing or 
widening the constituency of justification. While there are important issues raised by 
the choice of the conception of reasonableness3, the question of exactly which 
conception of reasonableness is appropriate is not of concern in this thesis. All that 
is needed is to take note of the claim that reasonableness picks out a constituency 
to whom justification is owed. It is justification among this constituency which 
matters for legitimacy. Justification of laws to persons who are not being reasonable 
is irrelevant with regards to satisfying the public justification requirement. 
To clarify this point, it may seem as if there is an assumption here that some people 
are always reasonable and some people are always unreasonable. However, this is 
not the case: justification is addressed to persons when they are being reasonable. 
If, for instance, being reasonable is about being willing to propose and abide by fair 
terms of cooperation provided that others are as well, then an agent is part of that 
constituency, insofar as the demands she makes on others are consistent with this 
willingness. Suppose she is currently not willing to propose and abide by fair terms 
of cooperation because she believes that laws should conform to her account of 
religious truth: Her demand that she be permitted to construct a house of worship in 
a given plot of land could still be reasonable because she could consistently make 
such a demand even if she were willing to propose and abide by fair terms of 
                                                          
3
 See for instance the argument advanced by Estlund (1998) that an over-inclusive 
conception of reasonableness opens up the public justification requirement to a self-defeat 
objection because the public justification requirement would itself not be justifiable to all 
reasonable persons. On the other side of the issue is Bajaj (2017) who argues that some 
under-inclusive conceptions of reasonableness, where being reasonable involves accepting 
the public justification requirement, risk being ad-hoc. 
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cooperation. In making this demand, we can treat her as being reasonable. A law 
forbidding the building of houses of worship of her religious denomination would be 
illegitimate, because it would not be justifiable to her even if she were willing to 
propose and abide by fair terms of cooperation. By contrast, suppose she also were 
to demand that people of other religions not practice theirs. She could not 
consistently make this demand if she were to be willing to propose and abide by fair 
terms of cooperation. Therefore, the fact that laws guaranteeing religious freedom 
are not justifiable to her does not make them illegitimate. This illustrates the way in 
which the account of reasonable persons is an idealisation. The constituency of 
justification is not people as they actually are, but people as they would be if they 
were being reasonable (Larmore 2008; Quong 2010). 
In the standard version, the word “reasonable” has been differentiated from the 
word “rational”. For Rawls 1993: 48-51), being rational pertains to an agent 
exercising her capacities to a) weigh her final ends and projects against one another 
and revise them in light of their importance to her as well as b) to choose and 
pursue the various means that will achieve said ends. Rawls distinguishes being 
rational from being reasonable, which as I have mentioned, refers primarily to a 
disposition to engage in fair social cooperation (ibid). In this thesis, my use of the 
term “rational” is purely epistemic and hence is orthogonal to Rawls’s distinction 
between the rational and the reasonable. In particular, by a rational belief, I mean 
one which is supported by the agent’s evidence. Correspondingly, a rational 
disagreement is one in which both disagreeing parties’ respective beliefs are 
rational. For instance, a religious extremist might be rational in Rawls’s sense of the 
term by being able to pursue the means to her ends and acting on the basis of the 
values she accepts. However, insofar as she is willing to pursue violent means to 
her ends, she is not reasonable. Moreover, insofar as her extreme beliefs do not fit 
her evidence, she is not rational in the way I shall be using the term in this thesis. 
This is not to say that “reasonable”, especially as applied to disagreement, is a 
purely epistemic notion, rather it is a political idea which contains epistemological 
elements (ibid: 62).  While political liberals have in general been vague about what 
these epistemological elements are, I will later defend the claim that the epistemic 
component of reasonableness refers to epistemic rationality. That is to say, 
reasonable disagreement is rational disagreement between reasonable persons. 
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1.1.2 The “Justifiable To” Relation and Epistemic Access  
To clarify what is meant by “justifiable to”, a law L being justifiable to an agent Alice 
involves two senses of justification. The first is the law being justified by practical 
reasons. For instance, one may think that what justifies laws against murder is that 
murder is wrong or that what justifies a social safety net is that such a policy would 
stave off the worst effects of poverty. Associated with these practical reasons are 
propositions, which can be moral or non-moral. For instance, the claims that murder 
is wrong or that we ought to alleviate the worst effects of poverty are moral 
propositions. The claim that a guaranteed minimum income changes the distribution 
of wealth in certain ways is a non-moral proposition. Both types of propositions can 
be associated with reasons to enact, abolish or enforce certain laws and policies.  
The second sense of justification is epistemic: In order for L to be justifiable to Alice, 
the practical reasons which justify L must be epistemically accessible to her. Little 
has been said about what this access condition involves; Larmore’s (2015) and 
Gaus’s (2011) accounts of political liberalism suggest that, at the very least, Alice 
having access to a reason R involves her being epistemically justified in believing 
that P, the proposition associated with R. More recently, Peter (2018) has argued 
that the propositions associated with the reasons which justify political decisions 
should be justifiably believed by each reasonable person. Later in this chapter, I 
shall defend the claim that being epistemically justified in believing that P is 
necessary and sufficient in having access to the reason, R. For now, it is sufficient 
to note that an agent must have some level of epistemic access to the practical 
reasons that justify a law, in order for that law to be justifiable to her.  
1.1.3 Reasonable Disagreement and the Consensus and Convergence Models 
of Public justification 
Broadly speaking, there are two ways in which laws can come to be publicly 
justifiable: a consensus model and a convergence model. On the consensus 
model4, there is some set of practical reasons R which both justifies a law L and 
which is accessible to all reasonable persons. By contrast, proponents of the 
convergence model (Gaus 2011; Vallier 2011; Bajaj 2017) argue that on any 
sufficiently inclusive account of reasonableness, the set of reasons that are 
accessible to all reasonable persons is too small to justify any law. On the 
convergence model, they propose that laws tend to be publicly justifiable because 
                                                          
4
 See Rawls (1993), Estlund (1998), Quong (2010) and Larmore (2008; 2015) and as 
proponents of this view. 
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they can be justified by more than one set of reasons R1, R2… Rn and at least one 
or other of R1 to Rn is accessible to any given reasonable person. For instance, a 
law preventing one person from enslaving another could be justified because 
slavery produces lots of misery, because slavery involves the subordination of one 
person to another, or because it violates a natural right to liberty. On the 
convergence view, at least one or other, but not necessarily the same one, of these 
reasons is epistemically accessible to all reasonable persons.  
Despite the disagreements between proponents of consensus and convergence 
models of public justification, they will both agree on how laws fail to be publicly 
justifiable. The central instances of a failure of public justifiability involve cases in 
which there are certain reasons R1 to Rk which justify a law L, but R1 to Rk are not 
accessible to all reasonable persons. Instead, some other reasons Rk+1 to Rn are 
accessible to some reasonable persons. However, Rk+1 to Rn do not, either 
individually or in conjunction, justify L. Hence, on any plausible model of public 
justification, laws fail to be publicly justifiable because not all reasonable persons 
have epistemic access to the reasons that can justify those laws. 
It thus makes sense to think of reasonable disagreement about a proposition as 
disagreement between reasonable persons that arises from a lack of access to that 
proposition. For instance, if, for a reason R and the associated proposition P, having 
epistemic access to R means being epistemically justified in believing that P, 
reasonable disagreement about P refers to epistemically justified or rational5 
disagreement about P. Provided that lacking epistemic justification for P is sufficient 
to deprive an agent of access to R, if two reasonable persons rationally disagree 
about P, at least one of them lacks access to R.  
1.1.4 Reasonable Disagreement and the Burdens of Judgment  
Summing up so far, I have described how, on the public justification requirement, 
publicly justifiable laws can be justified on the basis of practical reasons which are 
epistemically accessible to all reasonable persons. Failures of public justification 
occur because one or more reasonable persons are unable to access these 
reasons. Given the role reasonable disagreement is supposed to play in 
undermining public justification, I have stipulated that reasonable disagreement is 
disagreement that arises from a lack of epistemic access to these reasons. 
Approaching this from the other direction, we might ask how reasonable 
                                                          
5
 I shall use epistemically justified and rational interchangeably. 
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disagreement might arise. According to Rawls, people reasonably disagree because 
of what he calls the burdens of judgment. The burdens of judgment describe the 
“many hazards involved in the correct (and conscientious) exercise of our powers of 
reason and judgment in the ordinary course of political life” (Rawls 1993: 55-56). 
The aim of any satisfactory account of these burdens is to show that disagreement 
caused by these burdens does not impugn the reasonableness of the disagreeing 
parties. Rawls provides an admittedly non-exhaustive list of these burdens: (ibid: 
56) 
“a. The evidence – empirical and scientific – bearing on the case is 
conflicting and complex and thus hard to assess and evaluate. 
b. Even where we agree fully about the kinds of considerations that 
are relevant, we may disagree about their weight, and so arrive at 
different judgments. 
c. To some extent, all our concepts, and not only moral and political 
concepts, are vague and subject to hard cases; and this 
indeterminacy means that we must rely on judgment and 
interpretation (and on judgments about interpretations) within some 
range (not sharply specifiable) where reasonable persons may differ. 
d. To some extent (how great we cannot tell), the way we assess 
evidence and weigh moral and political values is shaped by our total 
experience, our whole life up to now; and our total experiences must 
always differ. Thus, in a modern society with its numerous offices 
and positions, its various divisions of labor, its many social groups 
and their ethnic variety, citizens’ total experiences are disparate 
enough for their judgments to diverge, at least to some degree, on 
many, if not most, cases of any significant complexity. 
e. Often, there are different kinds of normative considerations of 
different force on both sides of an issue and it is difficult to make an 
overall assessment. 
f. Finally, as we note in referring to Berlin’s view (V:6.2), any system 
of social institutions is limited in the values it can admit so that some 
selection must be made from the full range of moral and political 
values that might be realised. This is because any system of 
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institutions has, as it were, a limited social space. In being forced to 
select among cherished values, or when we hold to several and must 
restrict each in view of the requirements of the others, we face great 
difficulties in setting priorities and making adjustments. Many hard 
decisions may even seem to have no clear answer.” (ibid: 56-57) 
These listed burdens are supposed to represent the more obvious sources of 
reasonable disagreement. Other political liberals either endorse Rawls’s list or offer 
a similar account. For instance, Larmore’s list includes, with reference to the first 
and fifth burdens, the complexity of an issue; as with the fourth burden, different 
background experiences; and, as with the sixth burden, the fact that we are 
sometimes forced to choose one value over another as reasons why reasonable 
people can rationally disagree (Larmore 2015: 69). Gaus’s account of rational 
disagreement invokes the fact that we have limited cognitive resources as a source 
of reasonable disagreement (2011). As I shall argue in Chapter 5 this relates to the 
complexity of many questions in the following way: More complex questions require 
more cognitive resources from an agent in order for her to avoid making mistakes. 
Since people have limited cognitive resources, questions whose complexity 
exceeds the available cognitive resources will be subject to blameless errors in 
reasoning. Reasonable disagreement arises from such blameless errors.  Thus 
Gaus’s account also posits the complexity of an issue as being a cause of 
reasonable disagreement. 
Summing up, I have presented what I take to be the standard account of political 
liberalism. On the standard account, illiberal laws are illegitimate because they 
cannot be publicly justified as they are based on sectarian moral or religious 
doctrines: propositions which are subject to reasonable disagreement. Reasonable 
disagreement about these doctrines makes it the case that not all reasonable 
citizens have epistemic access to the reasons that would justify these illiberal laws. I 
have also presented how political liberals tend to account for reasonable 
disagreement: the burdens of judgment.  
1.2 Rational vs Blameless Disagreement between Reasonable Persons 
In my exposition of the standard account of political liberalism, I have left exactly 
what is meant by “epistemic access” and “reasonable” unspecified. This is primarily 
because political liberals have been vague in their accounts of what is meant by 
reasonableness.  
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For instance, this ambiguity can be found in the way Rawls and many others 
following him have presented the idea of reasonable disagreement: The exercise of 
human reason under conditions of freedom is supposed to lead inevitably to 
widespread disagreement about moral, religious and political doctrines6 (Rawls 
1993: xxvi; Larmore 2008: 140; Vallier 2011: 261; Gaus 2011: 2). There are many 
ways in which we might interpret the phrase “exercise of human reason”. On a 
narrow interpretation, an agent exercises her capacity to reason only if she reasons 
in a way that would lead her to being epistemically justified in the attitude she would 
end up with once she finished reasoning. On this narrow interpretation, the 
disagreement produced by the exercise of human reason is rational disagreement. 
There is a wider interpretation according to which an agent exercises her capacity to 
reason so long as she is sincere and conscientious in her effort to find the truth. As 
long as both disagreeing agents are sincere and conscientious7, then their 
disagreement is blameless8. 
Whatever “reasonable” means, it must have some epistemic component. My 
concern in this section is to defend the view according to which “reasonable” entails 
epistemically rational. As mentioned before, in order for a law or policy to be 
justifiable to a person, the practical reasons R which justify that law must be 
epistemically accessible to her. Reasonable disagreement is disagreement which 
arises from some reasonable persons lacking epistemic access to R. Therefore, the 
                                                          
6
 Plausibly, accepting a doctrine need not just be a matter of believing certain propositions. 
For instance, it may also involve adopting certain sorts of practical stances or outlooks. 
Nevertheless, I shall take it that on any plausible account of what a doctrine is, believing or 
being prepared to believe some set of core propositions is a necessary part of accepting a 
doctrine. My concern in this thesis is purely with this propositional aspect of doctrines. 
7
 Certainly, there are other sources of this ambiguity.  As Freeman notes (2007: 345-346), 
Rawls claims that the reasonableness is not an epistemological idea, but a political one with 
epistemological elements (1993: 62). The question that I am attempting to address in this 
section is what exactly this epistemological component consists in. Nothing that Rawls says 
rules out the possibility that the epistemic component of reasonableness just is epistemic 
rationality.  
8
 See, for instance Quong (2010: 295-296) who supposes that reasonable doctrines need 
not be well supported by the evidence. Quong’s interpretation of reasonableness seems to 
involve a wider interpretation of what it means to exercise the capacity for reasoning. See 
also Jonch-Clausen and Kappel (2015: 377-378) who take beliefs to be rational, in a certain 
sense, if the agent believes that those beliefs are supported by her evidence. While Jonch-
Clausen and Kappel use the term rational to describe said beliefs this is not the same sense 
of rationality I use in this paper. Rationality, as I use it refers to what the evidence actually 
supports and not merely to what the agent believes the evidence supports. After all, it seems 
all too possible to have false or badly formed beliefs about what the evidence supports. 
Moreover, true beliefs that are formed on the basis of what the evidence is merely believed 
to support, even when combined with some suitable external condition like safety could not 
be knowledge. Therefore Jonch-Clausen and Kappel’s account of rationality is more akin to 
blameless belief than rational belief. 
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question of how to define reasonable disagreement depends on our conception of 
epistemic access and vice versa. Let me explain. 
Suppose that the following account of access is correct. 
Rational: A practical reason R is epistemically accessible to an agent 
if and only if it would be epistemically rational9 for her to believe the 
associated proposition P. 
  According to Rational, for someone to lack access to R, it would have to be the 
case that it is not rational for her to believe that P. If it were rational for her to 
believe that P, she would have access to R. If, instead10, it was rational for the agent 
to suspend judgment about P or disbelieve P, then she would not have access to R. 
Since reasonable disagreement is disagreement that arises from some people 
lacking epistemic access to R, if Rational is the correct account of access, then it is 
reasonable to suspend judgment about P or disbelieve P only if it is rational to have, 
respectively, either of those doxastic attitudes towards P. Since a disagreement is 
reasonable only if it would be reasonable for each of the disagreeing parties to have 
their respective beliefs, disagreement is reasonable only if it is rational. 
There is an inverse relationship between the account of access and the account of 
reasonableness. If epistemic access needs to be very robust, it is easier to fall short 
of such access and hence easier for disagreement to count as reasonable. To see 
why this is the case, consider an account of access that is more robust11 than 
Rational. 
Blameless: A practical reason R is epistemically accessible to an 
agent if and only if a) it would be epistemically rational for her to 
                                                          
9
 In this thesis, I shall be using the terms epistemically rational and epistemically justified 
interchangeably. More specifically, I do not distinguish between rationality, warrant, 
entitlement and justification. By rational or justified, I refer to whatever property a true belief 
must have in addition to some external condition like safety in order for it to count as 
knowledge. 
10
 For simplicity of presentation, I am assuming that if one doxastic attitude is rational for an 
agent, no other attitude is rational for her. The argument presented in this section does not 
depend on this assumption. Furthermore, I shall defend this assumption later in Chapter 3. 
11
 While weaker accounts of epistemic access are logically possible, they do not seem 
particularly plausible and therefore are not salient. Suppose an agent had epistemic access 
to R whenever she had at least some evidence for P. Then even if she ought to believe not-
P because her total body of evidence favoured not-P, a law that was justified by R would be 
justifiable to her. This generates the wrong result, whereby, if for a given question of whether 
P, there is evidence on both sides of the issue, then both R and not-R are accessible to the 
agent. If anything, when there is evidence on both sides of the issue, it should render P 
subject to reasonable disagreement. Accounts of access weaker than Rational will inevitably 
reach the wrong result in at least some cases. 
11 
 
believe that the associated proposition P and b) she could only fail to 
believe that P by reasoning so badly as to be blameworthy in her 
reasoning. 
Blameless is a more robust account of epistemic access than Rational. If Rational is 
true, then if an agent is rational in believing that P she necessarily has access to R. 
However, this need not be the case if Blameless was true instead. Consider the 
following case 
Immigration: One reason, R, for relaxing immigration restrictions is 
that it would help migrants without imposing significant costs on 
natives and we should help others if we can do so with only 
negligible cost to ourselves. Associated with this practical reason, R 
are two propositions. One is a normative proposition which claims 
that we ought to help others if we can do so at little cost. The second 
proposition is that relaxing immigration restrictions would help 
migrants without imposing significant costs on natives. Suppose it is 
rational for an agent, Alice to believe that relaxing immigration 
restrictions would not cause native workers to lose their jobs. It would 
be rational for Alice to believe this because it is supported by her 
evidence. However, the evidence is very complicated and her 
cognitive abilities are limited. Therefore, she could also blamelessly 
but not rationally believe that relaxing immigration restrictions would 
cause native workers to lose their jobs.  
In this situation, according to Blameless, Alice lacks epistemic access to R. Since 
reasonable disagreement is disagreement that arises from lacking access to that 
reason, if Alice blamelessly believed that relaxing immigration restrictions would 
cause natives to lose their jobs, her belief would be reasonable. By contrast, if 
Rational was the correct account of access, then since Alice has epistemic access 
to R, her blameless belief that relaxing restrictions would cause natives to lose their 
jobs would not be reasonable.  
On the other hand, if it was rational for Alice to believe that relaxing immigration 
restrictions would cause natives to lose their jobs, then under both Rational and 
Blameless, she lacks access to R. Therefore, on both accounts of access her belief 
would be reasonable. This should make clear that a more robust account of 
epistemic access corresponds to a weaker account of reasonable disagreement. 
Disagreements that count as reasonable under Rational would also count as 
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reasonable under Blameless. However the reverse is not necessarily true. 
Correspondingly, we should expect that cases in which an agent has access to the 
reason under Blameless should also count as ones in which she has access under 
Rational. Suppose an agent, Betty’s, evidence supports the proposition that relaxing 
immigration restrictions would not cause locals to lose jobs. Suppose further that 
her evidential situation is such that she could not blamelessly believe otherwise. 
Then, even according to Blameless, she has epistemic access to R. It follows 
trivially that since it is rational for her to believe that relaxing restrictions would not 
cause locals to lose jobs, she also has epistemic access under Rational.  
Summing up, there is an inverse relationship between the account of epistemic 
access and the account of reasonableness. As I shall explain later on in this 
chapter, permissivism is the claim that rational disagreement is possible even when 
people share the same total body of evidence. Permissivism is relevant to the 
question of reasonable disagreement only if reasonable disagreement entails 
epistemically rational disagreement. Therefore, as I have mentioned before, in this 
thesis, I shall defend a corresponding account of epistemic access in which being 
justified in believing that P is both necessary and sufficient for having epistemic 
access to the associated reason R. That is to say, the view I shall be defending in 
this section is Rational whereas the view that I shall be arguing against will be 
Blameless. As mentioned earlier, the account of reasonable disagreement that 
corresponds to Rational is rational disagreement between reasonable persons. 
Likewise, the account of reasonable disagreement that corresponds to Blameless is 
blameless disagreement between reasonable persons.  
In setting up a distinction between blameless beliefs and rational beliefs, I need to 
explain how it is that an agent’s beliefs fail to be rational, but can still be blameless. 
There are a number of ways this might come about. For instance, there might be 
some cases which, perhaps unknown to her, are more complicated and her usual 
amount of effort does not result in beliefs which fit her evidence in those cases. 
Alternatively, her cognitive capacities might be impaired by illness or old age in 
ways that make it inappropriate to blame her when she responds inappropriately to 
her evidence. Depending on the account of blameless belief, there could be 
significant variation in which beliefs and hence which disagreements count as 
blameless. Given that my argument should succeed regardless of the account of 
blameless belief, I shall not commit myself to any single account of blamelessness. 
Whatever the account of blameless belief, the account of reasonableness as 
blamelessness is logically weaker than the account of reasonableness as rationality. 
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The reason for this is that when someone’s beliefs are rational, they are necessarily 
blameless as there is nothing to be blamed for. We can thus divide blameless 
beliefs into two types: Those which are both blameless and rational and those which 
are blameless but not rational. As such, the discussion will focus on merely 
blameless beliefs, beliefs which are blamelessly but not rationally held.  
Correspondingly, the discussion will focus on merely blameless disagreements, 
disagreements in which, both parties’ beliefs are blamelessly held and at least one 
of the parties’ beliefs is merely blamelessly held.  
The question that concerns us is: which conception of reasonable disagreement is 
the most defensible? I shall argue that political liberals have decisive reason to take 
reasonable disagreement to be rational disagreement between reasonable persons. 
The three reasons for this claim are as follows: The first reason is that on any other 
account of reasonable disagreement, the normative requirement that people be 
epistemically reasonable becomes incoherent. The second reason is that on such 
weaker accounts of reasonable disagreement, far too many doctrines are subject to 
reasonable disagreement and this would make it impossible to publicly justify liberal 
laws. The third reason is that the normative significance of these weaker accounts 
of epistemic reasonableness is questionable. I shall hereby present each of these 
objections in turn. 
The first objection to reasonable disagreement as epistemically blameless 
disagreement between reasonable persons is that on any more robust account of 
epistemic access like Blameless, the corresponding normative requirement that 
people be reasonable becomes incoherent. First, I shall explain what I mean by the 
normative requirement to be reasonable. When we are attempting to justify a law to 
others, and they fail to accept the reasons that we provide even though we think 
they ought to, we are inclined to demand of them that they be reasonable. This 
presupposes that there is some normative requirement to be reasonable such that 
when everyone is being reasonable, they will endorse laws and policies which will 
be acceptable to and accepted by others insofar as they too are being reasonable. 
The intuition here is that reasonable disagreement would not be normatively 
significant unless it was the case that people ought to be reasonable. Supposing 
that the public justification requirement therefore seems to have a correlative duty to 
be reasonable, this raises the further question as to what the content of this duty is. 
As I have mentioned before, it is plausible that there is an epistemic aspect to being 
reasonable. For instance, if a climate change denialist were to object to some 
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sensible climate policy on the supposed grounds that, according to her, there is no 
anthropogenic global warming we might rightly regard her as unreasonable on the 
basis that denying climate change is sufficiently epistemically bad that her rejection 
of climate change policy cannot be counted as reasonable. We might similarly 
regard creationists, Holocaust deniers and other sorts of conspiracy theorists 
(Cassam 2016) as unreasonable too. The thought here is that apart from the other 
commitments associated with being reasonable, people also have an obligation to 
be epistemically reasonable in accepting moral and non-moral beliefs. It is these 
beliefs, subject to the other constraints of reasonableness, which people would 
accept if they were being epistemically reasonable which determine whether they 
have access to sufficient practical reasons to accept a law. If Rational is the correct 
account of access, being epistemically reasonable requires being epistemically 
rational. After all, it is only when all otherwise reasonable persons are epistemically 
rational, will they all accept all and only those laws which are justifiable to them. By 
contrast, if Blameless is the correct accounts of access, the normative requirements 
of reasonableness are weaker. Reasonable persons only need to have beliefs 
which are blamelessly formed in order to accept all and only those laws which are 
justifiable to them. My claim is that accounts of access like Blameless are 
objectionable because there is something incoherent about this weaker conception 
of reasonableness. 
My claim relies on the intuition that normative requirements and permissions 
supervene on reasons. Satisfying these normative requirements involves 
responding adequately to these reasons (Parfit 2011; Scanlon 2013). Just as we 
can divide up our normative requirements into fact-relative, evidence-relative or 
belief-relative requirements, we can also divide up our reasons into fact-relative, 
evidence-relative or belief-relative reasons. The fact that the glass contains petrol 
and not whiskey is a fact-relative reason for Alice not to drink it. Correspondingly, 
Alice has a fact-relative normative requirement not to drink the liquid in the cup. 
Suppose, however, that she justifiably believes, on the basis of her evidence, that it 
is whiskey. Then, she has an evidence relative normative permission to drink the 
liquid in the cup. Each type of normative requirement or permission supervenes on 
the corresponding type of reasons. What is involved in being reasonable is 
responding to one’s evidence-relative reasons. The weaker accounts of epistemic 
reasonableness are incoherent because they seem to issue conflicting demands. I 
shall explain why with the following.  
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Suppose Blameless is the correct account of epistemic access. Then, as long as 
someone’s beliefs are blamelessly formed, they are epistemically reasonable. 
Consider the case in which there is some proposition P that is supposedly subject to 
reasonable disagreement only because some people blamelessly believe not-P 
even if it would have been rational for all of them to believe that P. If being 
blameless in your beliefs is sufficient to be epistemically reasonable, then, when 
everyone is being reasonable, some people would have a reasonable, but not 
rational belief that not-P. Since, by assumption, they are being reasonable, it would 
be inappropriate to demand of those that believe not-P that they should be 
reasonable.  
However, this seems to conflict with the intuition that when people are not 
responding rationally to their evidence, it is appropriate to demand that they respond 
better. Suppose Alice has a merely blameless belief that not-P and that it would be 
rational for her to believe P given her evidence. In demanding that Alice respond 
properly to her evidence, we are not demanding that she comply with some fact-
relative obligation that binds her regardless of her epistemic situation. The demand 
is that she should respond to the epistemic reasons that she has available to her. 
Therefore, the demand is evidence-relative and is binding on her because of her 
epistemic situation. Therefore, if merely blamelessly believing is sufficient for being 
epistemically reasonable, we seem to be both claiming that when she has a merely 
blameless belief, she has satisfied all the evidence-relative normative requirements 
that apply to her and that there are evidence-relative normative requirements she 
has failed to satisfy. This is inconsistent. Any similarly weak account of 
reasonableness will be subject to the same objection. On these accounts, one can 
simultaneously claim that the requirements of reasonableness have been satisfied 
and that there are further normative requirements that have not been satisfied. 
Given that these weaker accounts of reasonableness yield inconsistent claims 
about whether the normative requirements of reasonableness are satisfied, then the 
only account of reasonableness which does not is one whereby reasonable 
disagreement is rational disagreement between reasonable persons. 
One way to respond to the above argument is to claim that there need not be any 
conflict. While it is appropriate to demand that people be rational when they are not, 
this demand is distinct from a demand that they be reasonable. Therefore, or so the 
response could go, while it would be inappropriate to demand that people be 
reasonable when they already are, demanding that they be epistemically rational is 
not inappropriate because being rational is a distinct requirement from being 
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reasonable. When someone is reasonable, it does not follow that she has satisfied 
all her evidence-relative normative requirements, only, that she has satisfied those 
that pertain to being reasonable. However, it is not incoherent to say that Alice has 
satisfied all the evidence-relative normative requirements that pertain to being 
reasonable, but has not satisfied other evidence-relative normative requirements. 
However, this response raises the question as to exactly which reasons a person is 
being responsive to when she has a merely blameless belief. If her belief that not-P 
is merely blameless, this means that she has failed to respond adequately to her 
epistemic reasons and there are excusing conditions surrounding that failure that 
makes her ineligible for blame. If this is right, then any proposition that is only 
merely blamelessly acceptable to an agent cannot be associated with an evidence-
relative practical reason for her.  
This means that when an agent rejects a law on the basis of practical reasons, of 
which some of the associated propositions are only merely blamelessly accepted, 
she is not, at least with regard to those merely blamelessly believed propositions, 
responding to her evidence-relative reasons. At best, she is responding to only 
some of her evidence-relative reasons. These reasons would be that subset of her 
practical reasons, the associated propositions of which she can rationally accept, 
given her evidence. Moreover, insofar as she would not reject the law if she had 
responded to all her evidence relative reasons, the reasons she failed to respond to 
are stronger than the reasons she ended up responding to.  
To see why, let us reexamine the Immigration case. Suppose that Alice rejected a 
law that reduced immigration restrictions because she merely blamelessly believed 
that reducing immigration restrictions would cause locals to lose their jobs. If she 
had rationally believed, given her evidence, that relaxing immigration restrictions 
would not cause locals to lose their jobs, she would have supported the law. This 
can be the case only because the reasons in favour of the law are stronger than the 
reasons against the law. After all, if the reasons she did not respond to were 
weaker, then she would have, all things considered, reason to reject the law. But if 
she had all things considered reason to reject the law, then she would reject the law 
even if all her beliefs were rationally formed. While such a case is certainly possible, 
the focus in this section is on laws an agent rejects only because she merely 
blamelessly forms some belief. In such cases, not only has she failed to respond to 
at least some of her reasons any reasons she may have responded to are weaker 
than the reasons she did not respond to.  
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Moreover, there could be some situations in which all the propositions associated 
with the putative reasons that an agent cites when she rejects a law are merely 
blamelessly accepted. In such a case, there are no evidence-relative reasons she 
can be said to have responded to in rejecting that law. Nevertheless, if blamelessly 
believing a proposition is sufficient to make that belief reasonable, then since she 
can blamelessly accept those propositions, she would count as lacking access to 
the reasons that would justify the law. Hence she would count as reasonably 
rejecting that law. If there are no reasons that she can be said to have responded 
to, then epistemic reasonableness does not present any normative demands for her 
to fulfil.  
To elaborate, given that normativity supervenes on reasons, we might say that an 
agent, Alice, ought to be epistemically reasonable if and only if she has decisive 
reason to be epistemically reasonable. If being epistemically reasonable amounted 
to being rational, then we can understand the claim that Alice ought to be rational as 
saying that she has decisive reason to believe what her reasons require her to 
believe. The claim that Alice ought to rationally form beliefs is made true by the 
existence of epistemic reasons available to her. The property of being rational 
“latches on” to these epistemic reasons. If being epistemically reasonable amounted 
to being blameless in forming one’s beliefs, then the claim that she ought to 
blamelessly form beliefs is not made true by anything since blamelessly forming 
beliefs, as such, does not necessarily involve responding to any reasons. It is true 
that if Alice does respond correctly to her epistemic reasons, she will, in addition to 
being rational, also be blameless in her beliefs, but this connection is merely 
accidental. If Alice has a merely blameless belief, she has not responded properly to 
her epistemic reasons. Unlike being rational, there are no reasons for the property 
of being blameless to “latch on” to. Therefore, there cannot be a normative 
requirement that is satisfied by merely blamelessly forming beliefs. This means that 
a merely blamelessly formed belief is not a reasonable belief. Therefore, reasonable 
disagreement has to be rational disagreement between reasonable persons.  
The second objection to reasonable disagreement as blameless disagreement is 
that on such an account, far too few laws can be publicly justified. Enoch presents 
an objection (2017: 148-149) that nearly every proposition, especially those that 
would play a role in justifying laws, is subject to blameless disagreement. If so, then 
for any law, there could be someone who blamelessly rejects the practical reasons 
that justify the law. If reasonable disagreement is blameless disagreement, then no 
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law can be justified to everyone because all laws are justified on the basis of 
doctrines that are subject to reasonable disagreement.  
To be clear, Enoch’s objection is too strong. While it is true that most propositions 
are subject to blameless disagreement, it may still be true that some blameless 
disagreements are not reasonable because they are inconsistent with other non-
epistemic requirements of reasonableness: for instance, the commitment to fair 
terms of cooperation that are mutually acceptable. The claim here is that the 
acceptance of some substantive normative commitments is constitutive of being 
reasonable. Therefore, blamelessly rejecting these commitments ipso facto makes 
one unreasonable. If this reply to Enoch’s objection is successful, the ubiquity of 
blameless disagreement does not unacceptably reduce the set of publicly justifiable 
laws to nil because some epistemically blameless disagreement is still 
unreasonable. 
Nevertheless, we might still preserve a core part of Enoch’s objection. Suppose, for 
the sake of argument, that accepting some core liberal values like freedom and 
equality is constitutive of being reasonable. These values which are nevertheless 
fairly abstract are not in and of themselves policy recommendations. Further 
inferential steps are needed to connect liberal laws and policies to liberal values. It 
is still possible for people who accept these abstract liberal values to blamelessly, 
but not rationally, believe that some illiberal and authoritarian laws are just. If this is 
right, then it may still be difficult to publicly justify many core liberal laws protecting 
personal liberties.  
For instance, the laws that ban same-sex marriage (SSM) are considered by most 
liberals12 to be a core instance of illiberal laws. We can take this to mean that 
morally reasonable persons could not rationally disagree about whether SSM 
should be legal. However, some morally reasonable persons may, perhaps because 
they live in very conservative regions and have access only to conservative media, 
blamelessly believe that SSM should not be legal. They may blamelessly fail to infer 
that such a ban is not acceptable to other reasonable persons or that it is 
inconsistent with the reciprocal and equal freedom of everyone. Therefore, laws that 
recognise SSM would not be justifiable to them and hence not be publicly justifiable.  
Similarly, many liberal laws which can be rationally inferred from liberal values may 
be blamelessly rejected by some reasonable persons. If reasonable disagreement is 
                                                          
12
 See for instance, Lister (2016) for a defence of laws recognising same sex marriage on 
public reason grounds. 
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blameless disagreement between reasonable persons, then these liberal laws are 
not publicly justifiable. This result is significantly less likely if reasonable 
disagreement was rational disagreement between reasonable persons instead. 
Therefore, epistemic reasonableness should be rationality and not blamelessness. 
The third objection to the account of reasonable disagreement as blameless 
disagreement between reasonable persons is that on such an account, reasonable 
disagreement lacks normative significance. Reasonable disagreement is 
normatively significant in a way that mere disagreement is not. The fact that a given 
disagreement about a proposition is reasonable makes it inappropriate to use it as a 
reason to justify laws. Mere disagreement about a proposition, however, does not 
make justification of laws on the basis of that proposition inappropriate. As such, we 
might say that reasonable disagreement ought to elicit deference from others about 
whether to endorse a law. 
One commonly cited reason as to why we should defer to others’ reasonable 
rejection of a given law or policy is out of respect for their capacity to respond to 
reasons (Rawls 2001; Boettcher 2007; Freeman 2007; Larmore 2008; 2015; Gaus 
2011; Wall 2016). However, when disagreement is merely blameless, it is possible 
that at least one agent is not responding to any of her reasons. At the very least, 
she is not responding to all the epistemic reasons that she epistemically ought to 
respond to.  Therefore deferring to someone who merely blamelessly rejects a law 
cannot be a way to respect their capacity to respond to reasons. Blameless 
disagreement, even if between reasonable persons, therefore lacks the kind of 
normative significance that political liberals think reasonable disagreement should 
have. 
In fact, if reasonable disagreement is normatively significant because we should 
respect people’s capacity to respond to reasons, then reasonable disagreement 
must entail rational disagreement. The fact that we ought to defer to others’ 
rejection of a law or policy only when their rejection is consistent with them being 
reasonable suggests firstly that what is being respected is at least in part their 
capacity to be reasonable and secondly that this is the capacity to appropriately 
accept or reject laws and policies on the basis of good reasons. If the capacity we 
are respecting is not the capacity to be reasonable, then there is no reason why we 
should defer to their rejection when it is or could be reasonable but not otherwise. 
Likewise, if the capacity we are respecting is not the capacity to appropriately 
accept or reject laws and policies, then it would be unclear as to why we ought to 
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defer to someone’s rejection of laws and policies, but not defer to them on all their 
beliefs and projects. It follows from this that reasonableness involves the disposition 
to respond adequately to one’s (evidence-relative) reasons about which laws and 
policies to accept or reject. It turns out that an agent’s evidence-relative reasons are 
simply those propositions which are supported by her evidence. That is to say, they 
are propositions that she would be rational in believing, given her evidence. Merely 
blameless beliefs cannot be associated with evidence-relative reasons; they lack 
the relevant sort of connection to an agent’s evidence. It seems, therefore, that 
reasonable disagreement must be rational disagreement between reasonable 
persons.  
Summing up, I have presented three objections to the conception of reasonable 
disagreement as blameless disagreement between reasonable persons. If any of 
these objections are successful, then reasonable disagreement must be rational 
disagreement between reasonable persons. It is only if reasonable disagreement 
implies rational disagreement, is it possible that the standard account of political 
liberalism presupposes permissivism. The reason for this is that permissivism is a 
claim about when rational disagreement is possible. If, on the standard account, 
reasonable disagreement did not entail rational disagreement, then questions about 
when rational disagreement is possible would be irrelevant to political liberalism. 
1.3 Permissivism 
As noted earlier, a central concern of the thesis is to show that the standard account 
of how reasonable disagreement arises presupposes epistemic permissivism, 
according to which people who share the same total body of evidence can rationally 
disagree. More specifically, 
Permissivism: Given a total body of evidence and proposition 
possibly more than one doxastic attitude towards the proposition is 
rationally justified.13 
By doxastic attitude, I mean something like a belief, disbelief or suspension of 
judgment. This way of cashing out our doxastic attitudes is particularly coarse 
grained; it presupposes that there are only three attitudes we might take towards a 
                                                          
13
 As many authors on this topic have noted, many epistemological theories like van 
Fraassen’s Voluntarist Epistemology, various types of Epistemic Conservatism, Foley/James 
style instrumentalism, Rawlsian reflective equilibrium, orthodox Bayesianism and 
coherentism require permissivism to be true (White 2005; Kelly 2010; Ballantyne and 
Coffman 2011; Schoenfield 2014).  
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proposition. We might think that this conception of doxastic attitudes does not 
adequately reflect our actual belief forming practices. We might think that people 
believe more or less strongly and similarly may strongly, moderately or even weakly 
disbelieve a proposition. This is a somewhat more fine-grained division of our 
mental life. Many epistemologists14 are willing to go even further and represent our 
doxastic attitudes in terms of precise probabilities. While there is disagreement 
about the best conception of doxastic attitudes, nothing I argue for in this thesis 
depends on any specific account being true. However, in order to simplify the 
presentation of my arguments, I shall, where appropriate, employ the coarse 
grained account, according to which, there are only three attitudes we might take 
towards a given proposition. In some parts of the thesis which I shall flag, the 
discussion will be better served by using a more fine grained conception of doxastic 
attitudes. In those instances, I shall employ the more fine-grained account instead. 
I stipulate that people disagree about a proposition whenever they have different 
doxastic attitudes towards it. This is most obvious in the case in which Alice 
believes that P while Betty disbelieves P. For instance, theists, who believe that 
God exists, certainly disagree with atheists, who disbelieve that God exists. 
Similarly, it seems that Alice and Betty would disagree if one of them believed that P 
while the other suspended judgment about P. It is plausible to think that theists and 
atheists both disagree with agnostics too. If we were to employ a slightly more fine 
grained account of doxastic attitudes, we can imagine that someone who strongly 
believed that P would also count as disagreeing with someone who only moderately 
believed that P. Imagine the following situation: 
Bungee Cord: Alice and Betty are both arguing about how safe a 
given bungee cord is. For instance, suppose Alice is nearly certain it 
is safe while Betty is only moderately confident. Alice and Betty’s 
argument involves pointing to evidence like the track record of safety 
for using this type of cord, its physical appearance and specifications.  
If they both counted as agreeing about the safety of the cord, their argument would 
not make sense. However, their argument does not seem pointless. It is potentially 
momentous, in that Betty might decide not to purchase that cord because she is 
only moderately confident that it is safe, whereas she may buy it if she is nearly 
certain that it is.  
                                                          
14
 For instance, Bayesians and all other formal epistemologists. 
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We might think that with even more fine grained accounts of doxastic attitudes, 
people who have attitudes that are infinitesimally close to each other would still 
count as disagreeing. However, this point requires some argument as it seems 
initially counterintuitive. For instance, Alice may have a confidence that P of 0.75 
while Betty has a confidence of 0.76. In such a situation, it is extremely unlikely that 
such differences in doxastic attitudes could warrant any argument between them. 
Moreover, normal human agents do not seem equipped to distinguish their doxastic 
attitudes to such a precise degree. It might therefore seem absurd to suppose that 
they disagree.  
The claim that Alice and Betty agree depends on the intuition that they cannot 
disagree if their doxastic attitudes are so similar as to be indistinguishable from 
each other. However, indiscriminability of doxastic attitudes does not entail 
agreement. To see why, we merely need to consider a few more cases. Suppose 
another agent, Celia, has a confidence of 0.77 that P, Darla has a confidence of 
0.78 and so on all the way to Zelda who has a confidence of 1 that P. Notice that 
indiscriminability is not transitive. Alice’s attitude is indiscriminable from Betty’s and 
Betty’s is indiscriminable from Celia’s and so on all the way to Zelda. At some point 
Alice’s attitude is discriminable from a third person’s attitude even if both Alice and 
the third person’s attitudes are indiscriminable from someone whose attitude is in 
between the two. At the very least, Zelda’s attitude is obviously discriminable from 
Alice’s. After all, being perfectly confident that P is very different from supposing that 
there is a 1 in 4 chance that P is false. However agreement is transitive. If Alice 
agrees with Betty, Betty with Celia, Celia with Darla all the way to Zelda, then Alice 
must agree with Zelda. However, if Alice has a confidence of 0.75 and Zelda a 
confidence of 1, then they do not agree. Therefore, there has to be at least one 
instance in the chain whereby one agent disagrees with another agent even though 
their doxastic attitudes are indistinguishable from each other. However, if we think 
that, for instance, Mary who has a confidence of 0.87 disagrees with Nina who has 
a confidence of 0.88, then consistency requires us to also think that Alice disagrees 
with Betty, Betty with Celia and so on. After all, there is no reason to think that Alice 
agrees with Betty but Mary does not agree with Nina when Alice’s attitude is as 
close to Betty’s as Mary’s is to Nina’s. Therefore, Alice cannot agree with Betty no 
matter how arbitrarily close to each other their doxastic attitudes are. They agree if 
and only if they have identical doxastic attitudes. 
With this account of disagreement, we can note that permissivism does not claim 
that rational disagreement is possible on any question no matter how complete your 
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evidence is. The claim is more modest, namely, that there are at least some cases 
in which rational disagreement is possible given the same evidence. This is 
because if permissivism were true, there could be cases in which two people who 
have the same evidence could have different doxastic attitudes towards a 
proposition and both would still be rational. If permissivism were false, then if two 
people who have the same evidence disagree, then at least one of them must be 
irrational.  
1.4 Chapter Summaries 
One of the central aims of this thesis is to demonstrate that the standard account of 
political liberalism presupposes permissivism. I shall do this by showing that the 
burdens of judgment, which are invoked to explain reasonable disagreement in the 
standard account, presuppose permissivism. In the first part of this argument I shall 
explain what it means to have and share evidence; in the second, I shall explain for 
each of the listed burdens of judgment, how each burden presupposes that people 
can reasonably disagree even when they have the same evidence. These 
arguments will be presented in the Chapter 2. 
In the rest of the thesis, I shall argue that permissivism is false by showing that the 
uniqueness thesis, the negation of permissivism, is indeed true. 
Uniqueness: Given a total body of evidence and proposition, at most 
one doxastic attitude towards that proposition is the rationally justified 
one. 
In Chapter 3, I shall initially distinguish between intrapersonal and interpersonal 
uniqueness. Intrapersonal uniqueness is the claim that given the evidence, at most 
one doxastic attitude towards a proposition would be rational for a given agent. This 
would be compatible with permissivism because even if intrapersonal uniqueness 
were true, different attitudes could be uniquely justified for different agents even if 
they all share the same total body of evidence. Interpersonal uniqueness would 
make the stronger claim in that the doxastic attitude which is justified, given the 
evidence, would be the same for all agents.  
I shall then argue that any plausible account of permissivism will be consistent with 
intrapersonal uniqueness even if not with interpersonal uniqueness. This will involve 
arguing that any theory which violates intrapersonal uniqueness is open to Roger 
White’s (2005; 2014) Arbitrariness Objection and his Evidence Pointing Problem 
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which I shall present. According to the Arbitrariness Objection, if my evidence were 
permissive and made more than one doxastic attitude permissible for me, then 
choosing an attitude by flipping a coin would be just as good as reasoning on the 
basis of my evidence. However, since flipping a coin is an arbitrary and irrational 
way to form beliefs, so also must reasoning on the basis of permissive evidence. 
According to the Evidence Pointing Problem, the metaphysics of evidential support 
preclude any body of evidence from, at the same time, supporting a proposition to 
different degrees. That is to say, evidential support is unidirectional. If evidential 
support were unidirectional, then uniqueness (at least in its intrapersonal version) 
must be true.  
I shall subsequently present and address two objections to intrapersonal 
uniqueness. The first is Meacham’s objection to the arbitrariness objection 
according to which arbitrariness as such is, contra White, independent of questions 
of uniqueness or permissiveness. The second consists of a series of 
counterexamples in which people can justifiably have any doxastic attitude towards 
a proposition because those propositions are self-fulfilling. 
After defending intrapersonal uniqueness, I shall present what I take to be the most 
plausible version of permissivism. On Schoenfield’s version of permissivism which is 
consistent with intrapersonal but not inter-personal uniqueness, what is 
epistemically rational for a person to believe is not only dependent on her evidence, 
but also on what epistemic standards she holds. This claim is not only consistent 
with the second burden of judgment, it goes a bit further: People can rationally 
disagree about a proposition given the same total body of evidence if and only if 
they can permissibly disagree about the weight of various evidential considerations. 
This makes the question of whether permissivism is true depend on whether people 
can permissibly have different epistemic standards. I shall describe two variations of 
this how this might be possible. On the first variation, agents can permissibly 
choose between multiple epistemic standards. I call this view intrapersonal 
permissivism about epistemic standards. On the second variation, there is one 
epistemic standard that is suited for each agent but different standards may be best 
suited for different agents. I call this view intrapersonal uniqueness about epistemic 
standards. 
In the remaining chapters, I shall argue that given that intrapersonal uniqueness is 
true, so is interpersonal uniqueness. In the Chapter 4, I shall argue that White’s 
Arbitrariness Objection and the Evidence Pointing Problem can be extended against 
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intrapersonal permissivism about epistemic standards. In the first of two parts of this 
chapter, I shall rehearse Bob Simpson’s extension of the Arbitrariness Objection to 
epistemic standards. The argument, roughly, is that if, for an agent more than one 
epistemic standard would have been rational for her to adopt, then reasoning from 
the evidence on the basis of her own epistemic standard is still arbitrary. In the 
second part of the chapter, I shall argue that the same metaphysical considerations 
that make evidential support unidirectional also make it impossible that more than 
one epistemic standard is rationally permissible for an agent. If the two arguments in 
this chapter succeed, we can conclude that people can permissibly disagree about 
the strength of various evidential considerations only if some other burden of 
judgment is in play. This leaves the second variation of permissivism which is 
consistent with intrapersonal uniqueness about standards.  
In each of the next three chapters, I address one version of permissivism consistent 
with intrapersonal uniqueness about standards.  That is to say, I shall present and 
object to versions of permissivism according to which the standard which is most 
suited for any given agent depends on some feature of the agent, like her cognitive 
capacities, her epistemic values or her prior credences. 
In the Chapter 5, I shall discuss the view according to which the epistemic standard 
that is appropriate for an agent depends on her cognitive capacities. I shall present 
Simpson’s exposition of this view and show that it ultimately depends on the claim 
that epistemic standards can be lowered if one’s cognitive capacities are limited. I 
then show how this claim is implicit in Rawls’s first, third and fifth burdens of 
judgment and is present more explicitly in Gaus’s account of rational disagreement. 
I shall then argue that any conception of rationality in which epistemic standards can 
be lowered in this way has more implausible implications than the alternative. If my 
argument is successful, epistemic standards cannot be lowered because people 
have limited cognitive resources. It follows that epistemic standards cannot vary on 
the basis of differing cognitive capacities. 
In Chapter 6, I shall discuss a version of permissivism according to which the 
epistemic standard which is most appropriate for an agent depends on how she 
values the twin epistemic goals of acquiring truths and avoiding falsehoods. This 
version of permissivism aligns with one way of interpreting the fourth burden of 
judgment. The thought here is that as per the fourth burden, one of the ways in 
which people’s different backgrounds can cause them to rationally disagree is by 
causing them to have different attitudes to epistemic risk and different ways of 
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valuing the twin epistemic goals.  I shall argue that on any such version of epistemic 
instrumentalism, all except a few ways of valuing the two goals, result in committing 
the agent to two different likelihoods about the proposition in question and are 
hence, impermissible. Moreover, all of the permissible valuations generate the same 
epistemic standard. Therefore, even if there are different permissible ways of 
valuing these goals, they do not license different epistemic standards. 
In Chapter 7, I shall discuss a version of permissivism according to which the 
epistemic standard that an agent ought to adopt depends on her pre-existing 
beliefs. This aligns with the second way in which the fourth burden can be a source 
of rational disagreement: People’s different backgrounds might cause people to 
rationally disagree by causing them to have different initial beliefs. This version 
relies on some sort of epistemic conservatism. I shall present what I take to be the 
standard version of epistemic conservatism and present some considerations in its 
favour and show why it is ultimately implausible. I shall then discuss attempts to 
weaken Standard Conservatism, and show that on any version of conservatism that 
is weak enough to avoid the costs of Standard Conservatism, no permissive case 
can be constructed. In addressing these three versions of permissivism, I shall have 
demonstrated that there is no plausible epistemological theory according to which 
people ought to adopt different epistemic standards. If this is resolved, then 
permissivism is false. 
In Chapter 8, the concluding chapter, I shall summarise the main arguments in the 
thesis, flag certain unresolved issues and propose avenues for further research. 
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Chapter 2: The Burdens of Judgment and Permissivism 
Background 
Permissivism is the claim that more than one doxastic attitude about a proposition 
can be rationally permissible given a particular total body of evidence. I will take it to 
be the case that people disagree whenever they have different doxastic attitudes 
towards the same proposition. Uniqueness, or the negation of permissivism, as 
such, does not imply that people cannot rationally disagree, only that people who 
have the same total body of evidence cannot rationally disagree.  As alluded to 
earlier, the standard version of political liberalism attributes the existence of rational 
disagreement among morally reasonable persons to the burdens of judgment. My 
aim in this chapter is to show that the burdens of judgment, as standardly specified, 
imply permissivism. Insofar as the burdens of judgment or anything like them 
presuppose permissivism, if my argument in subsequent chapters against 
permissivism is successful, then the standard version of political liberalism is not 
tenable. 
In order to show that the burdens of judgment presuppose permissivism, I intend to 
show that the burdens are most plausibly interpreted as implying that rational 
disagreement can arise from sources other than the possession of different 
evidence. In approaching this, I shall first explain what I mean by people sharing or 
having the same evidence, and then, for almost all of the listed burdens, show that 
each burden implies that rational disagreement can arise even when people share 
the same evidence with respect to a proposition. First, I shall explain what I mean 
by sharing evidence. 
Permissivism is a principle that has been traditionally invoked in peer disagreement 
debates: When two epistemic peers who disagree encounter each other, can they 
continue rationally disagreeing or should their beliefs converge? The conciliationist 
view, according to which disagreeing peers’ doxastic attitudes ought to converge, 
has been defended on the grounds that uniqueness is true. If at most one doxastic 
attitude is justified given the evidence, then it cannot be rational for both parties to 
maintain their beliefs in the face of disagreement (van Inwagen 2010; Kelly 2010). If, 
on the other hand, permissivism is true, this opens up the possibility that 
disagreeing epistemic peers need not converge in their attitudes. Uniqueness and 
permissivism become relevant to the peer disagreement debate only if epistemic 
peers are defined as sharing a total body of evidence and being equally competent 
at evaluating it (Lackey 2010; Kelly 2010; Matheson 2018). While many authors in 
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the peer disagreement literature do define epistemic peers as sharing a total body 
of evidence, little has been said about what this means. 
2.1 Evidence 
By the term evidence, I mean anything that could bear, one way or another, on the 
proposition at hand and which is accessible to the agent. This is compatible with 
different views about what counts as evidence. On some views15, evidence is 
propositional, whereas on other views, subjective experiences lacking propositional 
content can also count as evidence (Conee and Feldman 2008). For ease of 
presentation, most of the cases I present will involve propositional evidence, but, 
that is not to be taken to mean that I endorse any particular conception of evidence 
as being necessarily either propositional or non-propositional. I do, however, take 
evidence to be mental (Ibid) and carry some positive epistemic status. Thus, 
material I have not read would not be counted as evidence if I have not read that 
report. By positive epistemic status, I mean that not just any belief or mental state 
counts as evidence. It may be that only knowledge (Williamson 2000), or justified 
beliefs (Conee and Feldman 2008), or beliefs formed through a reliable process 
(Comesana 2010; Goldman 2011) count as evidence. While nothing I discuss in this 
thesis hangs on which positive epistemic status makes any given mental state count 
as evidence, I shall, unless otherwise stated, treat E as evidence for an agent if she 
knows that E. This usage in this thesis is not meant to commit myself to the claim 
that only factive mental states are evidence; only that some factive mental states, 
perhaps in addition to non-factive mental states, do count as evidence. 
A key clarification of the “bears on” relation is appropriate here. An agent may be 
said to possess a body of evidence E even if, in a manner of speaking, E is not 
evidence for her.  On some elocutions, E is evidence about a proposition P for an 
agent only if coming to know that E could in some possible situations give her a 
reason to revise her doxastic attitude towards P. However, I shall define the “bears 
on” relation more loosely: E bears on P if and only if coming to know that E could in 
some situation give someone a reason to revise her doxastic attitude towards P. 
Therefore, to say that an agent, Alice possesses a body of evidence E regarding P 
is to say that she knows that E and that coming to know that E could in some 
situations give someone, not necessarily Alice, reason to revise her doxastic 
attitude towards P. I shall explain this with the following example: 
                                                          
15
 See Timothy Williamson (2000: 184). 
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Biblical Geology: John and Mary both know that a literal reading of 
the Bible dates the age of the earth as being less than 10 000 
years16. For illustrative purposes, let us suppose that we can assign 
a number between -1 and 1 to the strength of a consideration. When 
the strength of a consideration is less than 0, it counts against the 
proposition and when it is more than 0, it counts in favour. Suppose 
that John thinks that the strength of biblical considerations is 0.1 
while Mary thinks that it is 0. This eventually leads them to take 
different doxastic attitudes towards the proposition that the earth is 
more than 10 000 years old.  
Assuming for the sake of argument that John’s weightage of biblical considerations 
is rationally permissible, then, in a certain manner of speaking, the Bible is evidence 
about the age of the earth for John. By that same measure, it would seem that the 
Bible is not evidence about the age of the earth for Mary. However, this sense of 
being evidence need not be the most appropriate for our purposes. According to my 
definition, the Bible bears on the age of the earth if and only if there is someone, in 
this case John, for whom there is some situation where learning what the Bible says 
gives him some reason to believe that the earth is less than 10 000 years old. 
Correspondingly, Mary knows that the Bible claims that the earth is less than 10 000 
years and as per assumption, what the Bible says bears on the proposition in 
question.  
This results in the counter-intuitive claim that the Bible is part of Mary’s body of 
evidence that pertains to the age of the earth even when she justifiably takes it to be 
irrelevant. On the other hand, given our concern for whether evidence is shared, this 
way of cashing out evidence is compatible with intuitive claims about when two 
people share a body of evidence. For instance, to claim that John and Mary do not 
share evidence implies that one of them does not know or is not in a position to 
know what the Bible says about the age of the earth. This is clearly false. They both 
know what the Bible says; it is merely that one of them does not think what the Bible 
says is relevant. Therefore, it seems as if we must conclude that the Bible is part of 
Mary’s evidence even if there is no situation in which knowing what the Bible says 
gives her a reason, one way or the other, to revise her beliefs about the age of the 
earth. Moving forward, in discussing what it means for two people share a body of 
                                                          
16
 The claim here is only that they know that the Bible says that it is less than 10 000 years 
old, not that they are justified in believing that it is less than 10 000 years old on the basis of 
the Bible. 
30 
 
evidence, I shall implicitly presuppose that evidence regarding a proposition is a 
mental state possessed by the person and which, in some possible situation, could 
give someone a reason to revise their doxastic attitude towards that proposition.  
As mentioned earlier, one key concern, in this chapter, is to account for what it 
means for evidence to be shared, or for two people to have the same piece of 
evidence. As such, evidence must, in principle, be shareable and, where questions 
of uniqueness or permissivism are at stake, shared. However, if evidence refers to 
some kind of mental state, what does it mean to share a mental state? As an initial 
definition, I shall propose that two people, John and Mary, share a body of evidence 
E if and only if John has a body of evidence which is sufficiently similar to a body of 
evidence possessed by Mary. By sufficiently similar, I mean the following: 
Sufficiently Similar: One person’s, John’s, body of evidence E1 is 
sufficiently similar to another person’s, Mary’s, body of evidence E2 
with regards to a proposition P if and only if a) the set of doxastic 
attitudes towards P it would be rational for John to adopt, given E1, is 
identical to the set of attitudes towards P it would be rational for him 
to adopt, given E2 instead and b) the set of attitudes towards P it 
would be rational for Mary to adopt, given E2, is identical to the set of 
attitudes towards P it would be rational for her to adopt, given E1 
instead. 
There are two things we may notice about the above definition. The first is that 
sufficiently similar bodies of evidence are not identical. The second notable feature 
is that bodies of evidence are individuated according to which doxastic attitudes 
they rationalise. I shall explain and defend each feature in turn. Let us first consider 
the non-identity of similar evidence. Notice that given Sufficiently Similar, even if E1 
and E2 are sufficiently similar, if John were to acquire E2 in addition to E1, it is 
possible that he may learn something new and thereby acquire additional reasons 
to believe one way or the other about P. Consider the following case: 
Raven: John observes that 50 ravens are black. Mary observes that 
an entirely different set of 50 ravens are black. John forms a high 
degree of confidence in the proposition that all ravens are black on 
the basis of his observation. Mary forms a slightly lower degree of 
confidence in the proposition that all ravens are black. 
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John’s and Mary’s bodies of evidence are sufficiently similar to each other. If John 
had Mary’s evidence instead, he would be just as rational in forming the same 
doxastic attitude he currently holds in response to his current evidence. The reason 
for this is that either way, he has observed 50 black ravens. However, if he had 
acquired Mary’s evidence in addition to his own, he would have an even higher 
degree of confidence that all ravens are black because he would have now 
observed 100 black ravens. Nevertheless, even though each agent’s body of 
evidence is distinct, the two are sufficiently similar for each to be considered as 
sharing the body of evidence with the other. 
Our goal in attempting to provide an account of shared evidence is to account for 
how rational disagreement is possible. No explanation as to how John and Mary can 
rationally disagree can appeal to the fact of different bodies of evidence. After all, 
both have only observed 50 black ravens. There is no reason why the fact that the 
ravens they observed were different should make a difference to which attitudes are 
rationalised by the evidence. It follows then that any explanation for how they could 
rationally disagree is going to be identical to the explanation that would be called for 
if they had observed the same set of ravens. Therefore, we should treat two people 
as sharing evidence even when their evidence is not identical. 
As mentioned earlier, the second notable feature of Sufficiently Similar is that 
bodies of evidence are individuated according to which attitudes they rationalise. 
Two bodies of evidence are sufficiently similar as long as they rationalise the same 
distribution of doxastic attitudes over each agent possessing said evidence. Little 
has been said about how to individuate bodies of evidence. Where evidence is 
propositional, this lack of discussion is understandable as a reductive account of 
shared evidence is readily available. John and Mary share the same body of 
evidence E if and only if they both know that E or justifiably or reliably believe that E. 
Thus, there seems to be a clear sense in which propositional evidence can be 
shared. Things are less clear cut for non-propositional evidence like perceptual 
experience.  
I shall present two reductive accounts of sharing non-propositional evidence and 
show that neither account captures all our intuitions about when we share a body of 
evidence. The first account is that people share a body of perceptual evidence if 
and only if they have identical perceptual experiences. On the second account, 
people share a body of evidence if and only if they have perceptual experiences of 
the same object. I shall address each account in turn. 
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The claim that people share evidence if and only if they have identical perceptual 
experiences is implausible because it is under-inclusive. We can easily imagine 
situations in which people have non-identical perceptual experiences, but have the 
same body of evidence. Consider the following case: 
Stopwatch: John and Mary are measuring the period of a pendulum 
with a stopwatch. John is standing to the left of Mary and they are 
both looking at the stopwatch that she is holding. As such, the 
stopwatch is slightly to the right of the centre of John’s visual field, 
while it is left of centre in Mary’s visual field.  
In Stopwatch, both John and Mary can clearly see the reading on the stopwatch and 
therefore have the same evidence about the period of the pendulum. Considering 
that people can have the same body of evidence when their perceptual experiences 
are slightly different, we might attempt to weaken our definition by claiming that 
people share a body of (non-propositional) evidence if and only if their perceptual 
experiences are highly similar to each other. However, two highly similar perceptual 
experiences might count as the same body of evidence with respect to one 
proposition, but not another. Consider the following case: 
Chipped Workbench: The workbench that John and Mary are using 
for their experiment is chipped. Coincidentally, Mary is holding the 
stopwatch in such a way that the watch blocks John’s view of the 
chip on the workbench but not Mary’s. Therefore only Mary can see 
that the workbench is chipped.  
In Chipped Workbench, the two visual experiences which counted as the same 
evidence about the period of the pendulum count as different bodies of evidence 
when the proposition is about whether the workbench is chipped. This suggests that 
there is no fixed degree of similarity between two perceptual experiences which 
suffices to make them count as the same body of evidence. If so, then there is no 
general explication of non-propositional evidence in terms of the content of 
perceptual experience. 
According to the second reductive account, people have the same evidence if and 
only if they have a perceptual experience of the same object. As with the first 
reductive account, we can imagine cases where two people have perceptual 
experiences of the same object, but they clearly have different bodies of evidence. 
Consider the following case: 
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Cat/Jacket: There is an object in the garden which both John and 
Mary are looking at. John and Mary are standing some distance from 
each other. Due to the way the light hits the object relative to John’s 
position, it looks like a cat to John. Due to the way the light hits the 
object relative to Mary’s position, it looks like a fur jacket to her. If 
Mary were standing in John’s position, the object would look like a 
cat to her. Likewise if John were standing in Mary’s position, it would 
look like a jacket to him. 
In Cat/Jacket, we see that even though John and Mary both have a visual 
experience of the object, they have different evidence. After all, there is no 
other way to explain why the object would have looked like a cat instead of a 
jacket to Mary if she had been standing where John was.  
Summing up, I have presented two reductive definitions of shared evidence 
and shown that both accounts fail to account for some of our intuitions about 
when we share evidence. To be clear, I am not claiming that there is no 
metaphysical reduction of the notion of evidence to perceptual experience, 
only that no reductive definition of shared evidence is easily available. If this 
is right, then, given that Sufficiently Similar adequately captures our 
intuitions about when two people share a body of evidence, we are now in a 
position to specify when people share a total body of evidence: 
Total Evidence Sharing: Two people, Mary and John, share a total 
body of evidence regarding a proposition P if and only if all the 
evidence John has regarding P is sufficiently similar to all the 
evidence regarding P that Mary has.  
Here, Total Evidence Sharing relies on Sufficiently Similar to define what it means 
when the piece of evidence one person has is the same as a piece of evidence 
another person has.  
Permissivism is the claim that given a total body of evidence, more than one 
doxastic attitude towards a proposition can be justified. That is to say, two people 
who share a total body of evidence can rationally disagree about a proposition. This 
is ensuing from the thought that people can rationally disagree about a proposition 
only if more than one doxastic attitude towards it is justified. On the standard 
account of political liberalism, reasonable disagreement is attributed to the burdens 
of judgment. They are causes of disagreement which do not impugn the 
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reasonableness of the disagreeing parties. The following six causes are cited by 
Rawls (1993), namely: that the evidence is difficult to assess, that people disagree 
about the weight of various considerations, that the concepts we use are subject to 
vagueness, that we have different background experiences, that moral questions 
are complicated with considerations on both sides of the issue and that people 
function in a limited social space. In the previous chapter, I argued that reasonable 
disagreement was rational disagreement between reasonable persons. As such, 
showing that the standard account of political liberalism presupposes permissivism 
requires, first, providing an account of what it means to share a total body of 
evidence and, secondly, showing how most of the burdens of judgment specify 
conditions for rational disagreement that are compatible with the disagreeing parties 
sharing the same total body of evidence with regards to the proposition in question. 
Having clarified what it means for two people to share a total body of evidence, I 
shall now proceed to examine each of the listed burdens, in turn, in order to show 
that at least four of the six burdens attribute rational disagreement to some factor 
other than having different evidence. If rational disagreement is attributable to 
something other than having different evidence, then when those burdens affect the 
judgment of disagreeing parties, people can rationally disagree even if they had the 
same total body of evidence. 
2.2 The First Burden 
Consider the first burden of judgment: 
“a. The evidence – empirical and scientific – bearing on the case is 
conflicting and complex and thus hard to assess and evaluate.” (ibid: 
56) 
The implicit claim of the first burden is that if the evidence bearing on a case is hard 
to assess and evaluate, agents who have that evidence may permissibly disagree, 
that is, take different doxastic attitudes towards the same proposition.  
To elaborate, consider a body of evidence consisting of a hundred propositions, P1 
to P100. Suppose that two agents, Alice’s and Betty’s total body of evidence 
consists of P1 to P100 because they each know all these propositions. Suppose, 
further, that some of these propositions represent polling data from surveys which 
suggest that candidate A will win the upcoming elections. Other propositions 
represent polling data from surveys which suggest that candidate B will win instead. 
Given the large number of propositions containing conflicting information, the 
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evidence can be considered conflicting and complex. According to the first burden, 
given the complexity of the evidence, there may not be any single correct way of 
putting together all this conflicting information. If so, then Alice could permissibly 
interpret her evidence as supporting the proposition that candidate A will win while 
Betty could permissibly interpret that same body of evidence as supporting the 
proposition that candidate B will win. 
It might be the case that in virtue of Alice and Betty being able to permissibly 
disagree given that they know P1 to P100, they may come to know different 
propositions. On some accounts of evidence, this might result in them having 
different bodies of evidence. For instance, if an agent’s evidence consists of 
propositions that she knows, since Alice and Betty now know different propositions, 
their total body of evidence differs17. However, we should not take this to mean that 
the evidence being difficult to assess is incompatible with people sharing a total 
body of evidence. At the time before they have made different inferences, Alice and 
Betty do have the same total body of evidence.  
Clearly then, according to the first burden, the difficulty of evaluating evidence could 
licence rational disagreement even when the disagreeing parties share the same 
total body of evidence. It follows that the claim made by the first burden is that 
permissivism is true, at least in part, because evidence can sometimes be difficult to 
assess.  
To see why, suppose that permissivism were false. Then consider again Alice and 
Betty’s situation in which the evidence regarding who will win the election was 
conflicting and complex and hard to evaluate. If permissivism was false, then it 
would not be rational for them to disagree. After all, uniqueness just is the claim that 
at most one doxastic attitude towards a proposition is justified given a total body of 
evidence. If the difficulty of evaluating the evidence makes it rational to disagree, 
then permissivism has to be true. 
As I explain at greater length in Chapter 5, the difficulty of evaluating the evidence 
can make rational disagreement possible only if whether a belief counts as rational, 
given the evidence depends on the agent’s cognitive capacities. Kornblith (1983) 
                                                          
17
 As Conee and Feldman (2008) note, if we count the propositions that we infer from our 
other evidence as evidence too, we end up double-counting what reasons we have to 
believe our target proposition. For instance, if my evidence consists of P and P entails Q 
which in turn entails R, inferring that Q from P does not give me an additional reason to 
believe R. This is a reason to suppose that propositions which we infer from our existing 
evidence are not themselves evidence.  
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and Rosa (2012; 2016) argue that we are permitted to not make otherwise 
obligatory inferences if we are too cognitively limited to make those inferences. 
People could rationally disagree given the same body of evidence if they were 
cognitively limited to different degrees. Only if some account like this is successful 
can the difficulty in assessing the evidence make disagreement rational.  
2.3 The Second Burden 
The second burden of judgment is more explicit about presupposing that reasonably 
disagreeing parties can share the same evidence.  
“b. Even where we agree fully about the kinds of considerations that 
are relevant, we may disagree about their weight, and so arrive at 
different judgments.” (Rawls 1993: 56) 
The second burden concerns situations in which disagreeing parties agree what the 
relevant considerations are, that is, situations in which disagreeing parties share the 
same total body of evidence with regards to a proposition and agree that these 
considerations matter. The considerations for and against a proposition, insofar as 
they are accessible to an agent, just are her evidence for and against that 
proposition. To see why, we can first note that plausibly any given piece of evidence 
regarding a proposition is a consideration for or against that proposition. It is unclear 
how something could be a relevant consideration, but not evidence. It follows that if 
people agree what the relevant considerations are, they share the same evidence.  
To see how this can be the case, consider the situation where they do not share the 
same evidence. Suppose two people, Mary and John have different bodies of 
evidence for a proposition P. Suppose John has evidence for P that Mary does not 
have. Then, this would be an additional consideration that John thinks bears on P 
but which Mary does not. This makes clear that any difference in our evidence 
creates differences in what we may permissibly take to be the relevant 
considerations. Therefore, if John and Mary permissibly agree on what the relevant 
considerations are, they have to have the same evidence. The second burden of 
judgment therefore implies that even in cases where people share the same total 
body of evidence, they could rationally disagree because they permissibly disagree 
about the strength of certain parts of their evidence. This certainly presupposes 
permissivism.  
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One question that might be asked is how two people who have the same total body 
of evidence could come to disagree about the strength of a given consideration. 
After all, it could be the case that even though two people share a given piece of 
evidence even when they disagree about how strongly it supports a proposition, 
they could disagree about the strength of the evidence only because their total body 
of evidence differs in some other respects. For instance, if John and Mary disagree 
about how important Biblical evidence is with regards to geological questions, they 
may turn out to share the Biblical evidence, but differ with regards to evidence about 
how reliable the Bible is. 
However, this need not be the case. On Schoenfield’s view (2014) people can 
permissibly disagree about the strength of their evidence because they have 
different epistemic standards. Epistemic standards consist of epistemic norms, 
which are rules and principles regarding when to form certain doxastic attitudes. On 
some epistemological accounts (Goldman 2010), epistemic norms are source 
authorisations which instruct the agent to treat some sources of information as 
reliable. For instance, John might accept a norm that tells him to treat the Bible as a 
reliable source of information, while Mary accepts a norm that tells her to treat the 
Bible as fictional. Other epistemic norms might say that the BBC, but not Fox News, 
is a reliable news source, or vice versa. On other accounts, they might be more 
general rules like “if it visually seems to you that P, believe that P” or “do not trust 
your intuitions about when someone is being sincere”. In general, epistemic norms 
will be rules of the form “if your evidence is E, form attitude A towards proposition 
P”. Any plausible account of permissivism will thereby provide some explanation as 
to how people can have different epistemic standards without having different 
evidence about which of the constituent norms are correct. In Chapter 3, I shall 
explain in greater detail how the claim that agents can have different epistemic 
standards addresses two powerful objections to permissivism: The Arbitrariness 
Objection and The Evidence Pointing Problem. If this is right, then the second 
burden of judgment represents not just one more specific cause of disagreement, 
but provides a framework by which other burdens of judgment generate rational 
disagreement. For instance, if, as per the first burden, limitations to cognitive 
capacities can make rational disagreement possible, it can do so only by making it 
permissible for people with different cognitive capacities to have different epistemic 
standards. Addressing whether the second burden of judgment can in fact cause 
rational disagreement would involve addressing whether any of the other burdens of 
judgment permit people to have different epistemic standards.   
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2.4 The Third Burden 
I shall now turn to the third burden according to which: 
“c. To some extent, all our concepts, and not only moral and political 
concepts, are vague and subject to hard cases; and this 
indeterminacy means that we must rely on judgment and 
interpretation (and on judgments about interpretations) within some 
range (not sharply specifiable) where reasonable persons may 
differ.” (Rawls 1993: 56) 
The third burden of judgment claims that people could come to reasonably disagree 
because the concepts that apply in a given case are vague and indeterminate. The 
thought here is that many of the predicates we apply in our ordinary language like 
old, tall or red are vague. For instance, Jeanne Calment, the longest lived person in 
recorded history, died at the age of 122 years18. When she died she was old. 
Presumably she was not always old. There was some time in the past when she 
was not old, and some time near the end of her life that she was. It is unclear, 
however, when she stopped being not old and became old. If she was old on her 
70th birthday, was she old the day before? What about the day before that? If we 
iteratively ask the question, we eventually reach a point when she was clearly very 
young. The concept of old, then, seems to have fuzzy edges that make it difficult to 
determine whether the predicate “is old” applies in certain borderline cases.  
Moreover, while there clearly are borderline cases, vagueness is iterative and the 
boundary between clear-cut cases and borderline cases is vague. Rawls’s claim 
with regards to the third burden is that in borderline cases, people can rationally 
disagree about whether a person at a given age is old because of the vagueness of 
the predicate, “is old”.  
One plausible account19 of vagueness is epistemic. On Williamson’s account 
(1994), the predication of every borderline case is either true or false. Vagueness 
arises because our capacities to determine whether a given predicate does apply to 
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 Williamson (1994) invokes the example of Rembrandt. However, Rembrandt died at the 
age of 63, and 63 does not necessarily seem old. This proves the point that the predicate “is 
old” is vague. 
19
 There are other accounts of vagueness like Subvaluationism (Hyde and Colyvan 2008; 
Corberos 2011), according to which, borderline cases are both true and false; and 
Supervaluationism (Fine 1975; Lewis 1982), according to which borderline cases are neither 
true nor false. The fact that moral questions tend to be difficult makes epistemicism a better 
explanation for vagueness when it comes to moral questions than for questions like whether 
someone is old or when something is a heap. 
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a case are limited. Williamson leaves open exactly which capacities are involved in 
failing to know whether a given predication of an object is true. It might, for instance, 
be that there is some property of oldness or thinness which we are able to perceive 
in clear-cut cases but not in borderline cases even when the property is present. 
Alternatively it might be more akin to our inability to determine if Goldbach’s 
conjecture, according to which every even number greater than 2 is the sum of two 
prime numbers, is true (ibid: 209-212). If the latter, then vagueness is, like with the 
first burden, a result of the evidence being too complicated to assess. As with the 
discussion of the first burden, this complexity is compatible with people sharing the 
same total body of evidence. On this interpretation, the claim made by the third 
burden is that even if everyone had the same evidence, the difficulty in interpreting 
the complex evidence generates rational disagreement about when a predicate 
applies to a borderline case.  
Even if the cognitive limitation is a matter of being unable to perceive oldness or 
thinness in borderline cases, it does not follow that people have different evidence 
about whether the predicate applies. As Williamson notes, vagueness exists even 
within a community of competent language users. Given that, according to 
Williamson, competent language users have a shared corpus of knowledge about 
when to use  the word thin or old (ibid: 211), we have good reason to think that a 
community of competent language users share a total body of evidence regarding 
the meaning of terms like thin or old as used in the community. The explanation for 
rational disagreement, then, is that this total body of evidence underdetermines the 
conclusion.  
One thought that might help explain how the evidence can underdetermine the 
conclusion is that limitations to our perceptual capacities mean that we can, in some 
circumstances, fail to perceive properties or only partially perceive them even when 
they are instantiated. Given that perceptual evidence is non-propositional, the 
information conveyed can itself contain a degree of imprecision because the 
property is only partially perceived. The thought, then, is that insofar as the 
evidence itself contains some degree of imprecision, there are some permitted 
precisifications of this evidence. Any conclusion that can be permissibly drawn from 
one of the permitted precisifications of the evidence is a rationally permissible 
inference from the evidence. Thus, on this interpretation of the third burden, even if 
two people share the same total body of evidence, as long as there is some degree 
of imprecision in the evidence itself, they can rationally disagree about the 
conclusion. Summing up, given an epistemic account of vagueness, rational 
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disagreement that pertains to conceptual vagueness is consistent with the 
disagreeing parties having the same total body of evidence.  
2.5 The Fourth Burden 
According to the fourth burden of judgment: 
“d. To some extent (how great we cannot tell) the way we assess 
evidence and weigh moral and political values is shaped by our total 
experience, our whole life up to now; and our total experiences must 
always differ. Thus, in a modern society with its numerous offices 
and positions, its various divisions of labor, its many social groups 
and their ethnic variety, citizens’ total experiences are disparate 
enough for their judgments to diverge, at least to some degree, on 
many if not most cases of any significant complexity.” (Rawls 1993: 
56-57) 
The fourth burden claims that people can rationally disagree because they have 
different backgrounds. One way to understand the effect of different backgrounds is 
to suppose that due to different life experiences, people acquire different evidence. 
This evidence might be object-level evidence. For instance, a climate scientist is 
more likely to encounter meteorological data than the lay-person. The evidence 
might also be higher-order evidence about whether an epistemic norm is correct. In 
the Biblical Geology case, someone like John who comes from a very conservative 
religious background might receive testimonial evidence that the Bible is a reliable 
source of information while someone like Mary, who is raised in a more secular 
environment or come from a different religious background will not receive such 
testimonial evidence. This might make it rational for people from religious 
backgrounds to attach greater weight to what the Bible says20. Even if permissivism 
is false, people can still rationally disagree if they have different evidence.  
However, causing people to acquire different evidence is not the only way in which 
having different backgrounds might bring it about that people rationally disagree. 
For instance, having different backgrounds might cause agents to value acquiring 
truths and avoiding falsehoods differently. Some people’s moral beliefs depend on 
certain religious claims. For instance, a conservative’s opposition to abortion in 
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 See, for instance, Goldman (2010) who argues that people might reasonably disagree if 
they get different evidence about which epistemic norms are correct. This type of reasonable 
disagreement is not the focus of this thesis because it involves people having different 
evidence. 
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nearly all circumstances might stem from the belief that God ensouls foetuses at the 
moment of conception. Two agents might disagree about the existence of God 
because they have been raised to have different attitudes towards epistemic risk. 
For instance, someone raised in a more sceptical background may require more 
evidence before they are prepared to believe a proposition. On the other hand, 
someone who has been raised in a way that inculcates credulity would 
correspondingly discount the consequences of having a false belief. These different 
ways of valuing various epistemic goals might license different epistemic standards 
and hence different doxastic attitudes even when the total body of evidence is the 
same. I shall address this possibility in Chapter 6.  
In addition, having different backgrounds may also cause people to have different 
prior doxastic attitudes towards the proposition in question. Along a similar vein of 
thought, Gaus (2011) suggests that the order in which an agent encounters 
evidence can affect which attitude towards a proposition she is justified in adopting. 
To illustrate, suppose that a body of evidence, E, can be split into two components 
E1, which supports the proposition P, and E2, which supports not-P. Gaus 
supposes that there might be a case where Alice encounters E1 first and comes to 
believe that P and then encounters E2. However, E2 is insufficient to shift her belief 
that P. By contrast, Betty encounters E2 first and believes that not-P and 
subsequently encounters E1 but E1 is insufficient to shift her belief that not-P. 
Gaus’s claim ultimately relies on a version of epistemic conservatism: Less 
evidence is needed to justify belief in a proposition if the agent already believes it 
than if the agent does not believe it. Therefore, according to the conservative, the 
same total body of evidence could be sufficient to justify belief in a proposition if an 
agent already believes the proposition but insufficient if she does not. I shall 
address this along with other versions of permissivism based on conservatism in 
Chapter 7.  In showing that conservatism could not ground any version of 
permissivism, I would have shown that people’s different backgrounds cannot give 
rise to rational disagreement by virtue of having merely started off with different 
beliefs even if have the same total body of evidence. 
2.6 The Fifth Burden 
According to the fifth burden of judgment: 
“e. Often there are different kinds of normative considerations of 
different force on both sides of an issue and it is difficult to make an 
overall assessment.” (ibid: 57) 
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The fifth burden of judgment is analogous to the first burden; except where the first 
burden is about the difficulty of judging the normative epistemic force of all one’s 
evidential considerations, the fifth burden is about the difficulty of judging the 
normative moral force of all the moral considerations. Recall that according to the 
first burden, the complexity of scientific and empirical evidence makes it difficult to 
assess the overall strength of one’s evidence. This difficulty licenses disagreement 
about the target proposition as rational. Similarly, according to the fifth burden, 
rational disagreement about a moral question is made possible because of the 
greater complexity of different moral considerations. To see the distinction more 
clearly, I shall present an instance of each type of question.  
An instance of the first burden in action is when trying to determine whether 
increasing the minimum wage exacerbates unemployment. The evidence regarding 
this is complex and conflicting. For instance, different ways of measuring 
employment co-vary differently with increases in the minimum wage21. This makes it 
difficult to judge overall whether the minimum wage policies have any effect.  
An instance of the fifth burden in action is when trying to determine whether abortion 
at a given stage in the pregnancy is permissible. There are a number of competing 
considerations on both sides of the issue. For instance, there is a question of 
whether the foetus can survive outside of the womb, and if it can, what interests it 
may have. At the other side of the issue is what burdens the woman may face if she 
carries the foetus to term, versus what risks she faces in removing the foetus 
without injuring it, versus any risks inherent in the abortive procedure. As per the 
fifth burden, these considerations make it difficult to judge whether abortion at a 
given stage is permissible. 
The contrast between the two burdens becomes clear if we note that in principle, 
there could be some issue which is not subject to the first burden but which is 
subject to the fifth. As we saw with regard to abortion, the difficulty in assessing 
whether it was permissible was a result of conflicting pro-tanto duties and 
permissions. On one side is a pro-tanto duty regarding the welfare of the foetus. On 
the other side is a pro-tanto permission to use defensive force against other beings 
which might threaten it. In principle, it is possible that the evidence we have for each 
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 For instance, David Card and Alan Krueger’s (1994) study using survey data from 
employers indicates that minimum wage increases have no statistically significant effect on 
unemployment. By contrast, David Neumark and William Wascher’s (1995) analysis of 
unemployment over the same time period and region using administrative payroll records 
showed unemployment was exacerbated to a statistically significant degree. 
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pro-tanto duty or permission is clear and not conflicting. For instance, the foetus 
may be at a late stage in the pregnancy and the statistical evidence clearly indicates 
that it is likely to survive with medical assistance outside the womb if extracted pre-
term. At the same time, statistical and diagnostic evidence might clearly show that 
there are significant risks to the expectant woman if she continues to carry the 
foetus to term or an attempt was made to extract it without killing it. Therefore, we 
can suppose that there are at least some cases in which the evidence is not 
conflicting with regards to each pro-tanto duty or permission. Therefore, in this case, 
the first burden is not playing a significant role in generating reasonable 
disagreement. However, even where the evidence is not conflicting, the existence of 
these conflicting pro-tanto duties and permissions still makes deciding whether 
abortion in the given case is permissible difficult. 
Having distinguished the fifth burden from the first burden, we are now in a position 
to see how the fifth burden also presupposes permissivism. The claim made by the 
fifth burden is that with many different moral considerations on both sides of an 
issue, it is difficult to make an assessment and that this makes rational 
disagreement possible. Notably, no mention is made of whether the disagreeing 
parties disagree about the strength of the various considerations. That is to say, 
according to the fifth burden, people would rationally disagree about a given moral 
issue even if they agreed about what the relevant moral considerations were and 
the relative strengths of these considerations. This would be the case as long as 
there were many considerations on both sides of an issue, making it difficult to 
make an overall assessment. If people agreed about the relevant moral 
considerations and their relative strengths, then their evidence has to be relevantly 
similar and hence can be taken to be shared. 
The point here, of course, is not that whenever there are multiple considerations on 
both sides of an issue, people share the same evidence. Rather, when people do 
not share the same evidence, we do not need to appeal to the fact that there are 
multiple considerations on both sides of a given issue in order to explain rational 
disagreement. Consider the following case: 
Kitten Torture: Sid was raised in an environment where he was not 
exposed to suffering in either in himself or in others22. Therefore, he 
does not know what suffering or pain is and does not know what 
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 Buddhist mythology describes Prince Siddhartha, the person who would eventually 
become the Buddha as having been raised shielded from any knowledge of pain and 
suffering. 
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torture is. Therefore, he does not know that torturing kittens for fun is 
wrong. Bud is acquainted with pain and therefore knows that torturing 
kittens for fun is wrong. 
Kitten Torture provides us with a case in which there are not many considerations 
on both sides of an issue. We can therefore take it that the fifth burden is not 
operative in this case. If someone knows what pain and suffering are, they should 
know that the intentional infliction of pain and suffering on a kitten for fun is wrong. 
This is therefore not a situation in which multiple considerations on both sides of an 
issue make an overall assessment difficult. Sid lacks evidence about pain and 
therefore does not know what it is, while Bud possesses said evidence. This 
difference in evidence is sufficient to explain rational disagreement between Sid and 
Bud about a moral question. Given that a difference in evidence is sufficient to 
explain rational moral disagreement when the fifth burden is not operative, the fifth 
burden must presuppose that disagreeing parties would disagree even if they did 
share the same evidence. That is to say, the fifth burden presupposes permissivism. 
We can now turn our attention to the sixth or last of the listed burdens of judgment.  
2.7 The Sixth Burden 
According to the sixth burden: 
“f. Finally, as we note in referring to Berlin’s view (V:6.2), any system 
of social institutions is limited in the values it can admit so that some 
selection must be made from the full range of moral and political 
values that might be realised. This is because any system of 
institutions has, as it were, a limited social space. In being forced to 
select among cherished values, or when we hold to several and must 
restrict each in view of the requirements of the others, we face great 
difficulties in setting priorities and making adjustments. Many hard 
decisions may even seem to have no clear answer.” (ibid) 
The sixth burden firstly concerns cases in which trade-offs between certain moral 
and political values must be made because no social institutional arrangement can 
fully realise (Berlin 1988) all of them. The key point to note here is that 
disagreement here is purely practical. It arises even when both parties share all the 
same normative beliefs. It is perhaps more accurate to call this, not a source of 
rational disagreement as such, but one of the circumstances of politics that gives 
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rise to practical conflict. As such, since our concern in this thesis is about 
epistemically rational disagreement, the sixth burden is of little concern.  
Summing up, I have clarified in this chapter what it means to share a total body of 
evidence and demonstrated that four of the six listed burdens of judgment 
presuppose permissivism. One burden, the sixth according to which “disagreement” 
arises because people have to make trade-offs between equally important goals, is 
completely irrelevant to rational disagreement as such and only one burden, the 
fourth, accounts for rational disagreement by appealing to different evidence. Even 
for this burden, of the three possible ways in which people’s differing backgrounds 
might generate rational disagreement, two of those ways are compatible with them 
having the same total body of evidence and hence presuppose permissivism. The 
burdens of judgment are specifications of when rational disagreement is possible. 
Insofar as they mostly presuppose permissivism, this gives us some reason to think 
that the standard version of political liberalism requires permissivism to be true. 
Moreover, recall that other political liberals like Larmore (2008), Gaus (2011) and 
Quong (2010) also regard the burdens of judgment or something very much like 
them as explaining the existence of rational disagreement about a great many moral 
and political matters. If the burdens, or anything like them presupposes 
permissivism, and permissivism is false, political liberalism, or at least the standard 
version of it is in trouble. My task in the rest of the thesis is to show that 
permissivism is in fact false.  
  
46 
 
Chapter 3: The Best Version of Permissivism 
Background 
In the second chapter, I showed that most of the burdens of judgment presuppose 
permissivism. In the remaining chapters, I shall hence show that permissivism is 
false by arguing for the uniqueness thesis according to which: 
Uniqueness: Given a total body of evidence and proposition, at most 
one doxastic attitude towards that proposition is the rationally justified 
one. 
Before I proceed to arguing for uniqueness, I shall clarify again the terms of doxastic 
attitude and evidence. In general, a doxastic attitude may refer, on a coarser 
grained account, to something like a belief, disbelief or suspension of judgment. On 
a maximally fine grained account, we may wish to represent doxastic attitudes in 
terms of credences or precise probability values. While not taking a stand on which 
is the right way to conceive of our doxastic attitudes, the arguments I shall be 
offering will be compatible with both coarser and finer grained analyses of doxastic 
attitudes.  
By the term evidence, I mean anything that could bear, one way or another, on the 
proposition at hand. This, as I have mentioned before is compatible with different 
views about what counts as evidence. Evidence may, for instance, be only 
propositional or ultimately non-propositional, or some mixture of the two. For ease of 
presentation, most of the cases I will be presenting will involve propositional 
evidence, but that is not to be taken to mean that I endorse any particular 
conception of evidence as being necessarily either propositional or non-
propositional. Evidence, as I have discussed previously, is evidence that is 
possessed by the agent and is therefore a mental state. In addition, as I have 
mentioned before, a mental state like a belief counts as evidence only if it carries 
some positive epistemic status like being justified, known or reliably formed. Nothing 
I will discuss in this thesis hangs on which positive epistemic status makes any 
given mental state count as evidence. 
Finally, I should emphasise that uniqueness, as I have specified, implies that there 
is at most one rational doxastic attitude which is permissible, given the evidence. I 
do not rule out the possibility that there might be cases where there is no fully 
rational response to the evidence. I also do not commit myself to the claim that 
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evidential reasons are the only reasons for belief. I do however commit myself to the 
claim that if there are non-evidential reasons, and if these pull in a different direction 
from evidential reasons, there may be no fully rational attitude to take given the 
evidence. 
Uniqueness can be contrasted with permissivism according to which: 
Permissivism: Given a total body of evidence and proposition, it is 
possible that more than one doxastic attitude towards that 
proposition could be rationally justified.23 
Correspondingly, we might call a case in which the body of evidence justifies more 
than one doxastic attitude towards a given proposition a permissive case. The 
uniqueness thesis can then be restated as the claim that there are no permissive 
cases. The general strategy for arguing for uniqueness is to show that supposing 
that a given case is permissive requires us to accept certain implausible claims. I 
will do this by drawing upon a distinction made by Kopec and Titelbaum between 
intrapersonal and inter-personal uniqueness (Kopec and Titelbaum, 2016). 
Intrapersonal uniqueness restricts the permitted range of attitudes for each person. 
That is to say according to intrapersonal uniqueness, if some doxastic attitude A1 is 
rational for Bob, then no other attitude is rational for Bob. But it may be that a 
different attitude A2 is rational for Adam. Inter-personal uniqueness is logically 
stronger in that if attitude A1 is rational for Bob, no other attitude is rational for Adam 
or, for that matter, anyone else, given a body of evidence. In order to show that 
reasonable disagreement about fundamental moral principles is not possible, I need 
to show that inter-personal uniqueness is the case.  
In this chapter, I shall argue that any plausible account of permissivism must be 
consistent with intrapersonal uniqueness. To start off with, I shall first present Roger 
White’s Evidence Pointing Problem (White 2014) and his Arbitrariness Objection 
(ibid) to permissivism. I shall then present Miriam Schoenfield’s response to White, 
in which she argues that the latter’s arguments only show that intrapersonal 
uniqueness is true. Schoenfield argues that rational disagreement is possible if 
people have different epistemic standards (Schoenfield 2014).  I shall briefly discuss 
an objection to the Arbitrariness Objection and an alleged counterexample to both of 
                                                          
23
As many authors on this topic have noted, many epistemological theories like van 
Fraassen’s Voluntarist Epistemology, various types of Epistemic Conservatism, Foley/James 
style instrumentalism, Rawlsian reflective equilibrium, orthodox Bayesianism and 
coherentism require permissivism to be true (White 2005; Kelly 2010; Ballantyne and 
Coffman 2011; Schoenfield 2014).  
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White’s arguments and argue that we can disregard them. This should show that 
the only plausible route to permissivism is Schoenfield’s by which people can 
permissibly respond differently to evidence if and only if they permissibly accept 
different epistemic standards. This is consistent with the claim made by the second 
burden of judgment, according to which, people can rationally disagree because 
they disagree about the strength of various evidential considerations. In Chapter 2, I 
interpreted this disagreement about the strength of evidential considerations to refer 
to having different epistemic standards. The argument in this chapter will show that 
having different epistemic standards is not just sufficient for rational disagreement 
given the same evidence, it is necessary as well. Given this conclusion, in 
subsequent chapters, I shall present different accounts of permissivism which are 
consistent with intrapersonal uniqueness and argue that each account nevertheless 
faces insurmountable problems. 
3.1 The Evidence Pointing Problem 
Two classical arguments for uniqueness were made by Roger White which take the 
form of two objections to permissivism. The first is the Evidence Pointing Problem 
while the second is the Arbitrariness Objection. The basic idea behind the Evidence 
Pointing Problem is that evidential support is unidirectional. 
“It cannot be that E supports P but also that it supports not-P. 
Whatever is evidence for P is evidence against not-P. If it could be 
that the evidence supports both P and not-P then apparently one 
could rationally hold both contradictory opinions at once. But that 
can’t be right.” (White 2014: 314) 
Schoenfield provides an analogy with a dial. Suppose there is a dial that indicates 
where the total body of evidence points to, then the dial can only point in one 
direction. If permissivism entailed that, in at least some cases, the dial pointed in 
more than one direction simultaneously, then permissivism cannot be true 
(Schoenfield 2014: 199-200). It might seem as if a body of evidence could point in 
more than one direction if part of the evidence supported P and part of the evidence 
supported not-P. However, it would be mistaken to think that the evidence 
supported both P and not-P just because parts of the evidence supported one or the 
other. Rather, if the parts of the evidence that supported P were, together, stronger 
than those parts which supported not-P, then the evidence as a whole supports P. If 
they were weaker, then the evidence as a whole would support not-P instead. And if 
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the conflicting components of the evidence were of equal strength, the evidence as 
a whole would neither support P nor not-P.  
White also argues that evidential support relations hold necessarily (White 2014: 
313). By this he means that if a body of evidence E supports a proposition P, then E 
necessarily supports P. He provides two arguments to support this claim. The first 
argument is that if evidential support relations are contingent, it would be unclear 
how one would be able to assess what the evidence supported (ibid: 314). The 
thought is that, suppose there is some body of evidence E, and there is a question 
of whether it supports a belief B. The only way to determine whether E supports B 
is, either if the support relation is necessary24 or if there is some further evidence E’, 
which would indicate whether E supports B. If the question of whether E supports B 
is neither apriori nor supported by other evidence, it is unclear how we can 
determine whether to believe B on the basis of E. If the question of whether E 
supports B depends on further evidence E’, we need to determine whether E’ 
supports the proposition that E supports B. This support relation, in turn must also 
either be necessary or depend on yet further evidence E’’. Eventually, either we run 
out of evidence, in which case we cannot determine whether to believe B on the 
basis of E, or we rely on some evidential support relation which is apriori. Hence, 
when assessing what one’s total evidence supports, the only way in which such an 
assessment is possible is if the support relation were necessary.  
The second argument White offers against the contingency of evidential support is 
the following: If the question of whether E supports B is determined by some 
contingent fact, then there are things that we may do which do not change the 
evidence, but which nevertheless change the fact about whether E supports B. In an 
example raised by White on climate change, he supposes that our evidence actually 
supports climate change. He argues that if this support is contingent, there may be 
things people could do to change whether the evidence supports climate change 
without changing the evidence or the climate. However, White argues that this 
seems absurd (Ibid). Since people cannot change whether it is rational to believe a 
proposition based on the evidence without changing the evidence, evidential 
support cannot be contingent.  
White’s claim that the evidential support relation is a necessary one is crucial to his 
argument for uniqueness. If the evidential support relation holds necessarily, and a 
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 Here, what White means by necessary is that true facts about whether E supports B are 
like mathematical and logical truths which need no further evidence and are entailed by any 
and even the null set of propositions.  
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body of evidence cannot support both a proposition and its negation at the same 
time, then if the evidence, E, supports a belief B for one person, it supports B for 
everyone who possesses that evidence. Since E supports B for everyone who has 
E, B, and only B is justified for everyone given that their total body of evidence is E. 
This last claim just is uniqueness.  
To be clear, the claim that evidential support is not contingent is controversial. 
Consider White’s two arguments for evidential support being necessary. White 
considers it unacceptable that people may not be able to assess whether their 
evidence supported a proposition or that people could change whether their 
evidence supported a proposition without changing the evidence. However, those 
who reject White’s necessity claim may be willing to accept these supposedly 
unacceptable implications. For instance, with respect to the first objection, 
externalists like Goldman are willing to accept that we might not be justified in 
believing that E supports B even when it really does (Goldman 2010: 202). On 
Goldman’s account, he only provides the truth conditions for when a belief is 
justified, not an instruction manual for how to acquire justified beliefs (Goldman 
1979: 90-91). Therefore, claiming that people could not figure out what they ought to 
believe on the basis of their evidence, if evidential support was contingent, is not an 
objection to the latter claim.  
With respect to the second objection, a reliabilist like Goldman could also accept 
that there are some circumstances in which we could change whether the evidence 
supports our belief without changing the evidence. Consider the following case: 
Seeing Red: Normally, when an object appears red to John, it 
actually is red. In world W1 John is currently looking at a red object. 
His evidence consists of his current experience of seeing an object 
that appears red to him as well as the cumulative of his previous 
confirmation of red-seeming objects to be in fact red. In world W2 
everything is the same, except that just as John looks at the red 
object his prankster friend Mary without John’s knowledge shines red 
light on a number of white objects just outside of John’s field of vision 
to make them appear red. 
In both W1 and W2, John has the same evidence. However, a reliabilist could 
plausibly claim that different beliefs are justifiable to John in W1 and W2. In W1, a 
reliabilist would say that John’s evidence does reliably indicate that the object that 
he is looking at is red. In W2, the reliabilist could deny this since inferring that an 
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object is red on the basis that it appears red, and that previous red-seeming objects 
have turned out to be red does not reliably indicate that a given red-seeming object 
is in fact red. If so, then the fact that evidence supports something different in W2 is 
the product of Mary’s actions. Therefore, it seems that reliabilists and other 
externalists about justification have reason to think that evidential support is not a 
necessary connection.  
The fact that the non-contingency of evidential support is a controversial claim is 
crucial, as Schoenfield’s defence of permissivism relies on the claim that evidential 
support is contingent. I shall discuss her account of permissivism later in this 
chapter. Before I do that, let me first present White’s Arbitrariness Objection to 
permissivism.  
3.2 The Arbitrariness Objection 
White argues that permissivism is arbitrary by presenting the following case which I 
shall summarise: 
Court Case: In a given court case, which I recognise as being 
permissive, the evidence supports both the guilty and not guilty 
verdicts. Perhaps I was told this by the epistemology oracle! Before 
coming to a conclusion by working through the evidence, I know that 
whichever conclusion I reach, I will have a justified belief. In that 
case, I could do equally well by swallowing one of two pills. One pill 
(GUILTY) will make me believe that the defendant is guilty while the 
NOT-GUILTY pill will likewise make me believe him not guilty when 
taken. In advance of reasoning about this permissive case, I know 
that reasoning correctly on the basis of my evidence is just as likely 
to yield me one verdict just as another. As far as the outcome is 
concerned, I would do no better than if I had randomly popped a 
belief inducing pill. In addition, I would save lots of time and effort. It 
would seem therefore, that as a permissivist, I should prefer popping 
a pill to reasoning based on the evidence. (White 2014: 315-316). 
However, it is arbitrary and hence irrational to form beliefs by popping a randomly 
chosen pill. It is always better, qua epistemic rationality, to reason on the basis of 
my evidence. Therefore, whenever I suppose that a given case is permissive, I am 
committed to seeing my reasoning on the basis of the evidence as irrational. 
Ballantyne and Coffman (2011: 9) reconstruct White’s argument more explicitly: 
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1. “If you come to believe that B is based on permissive evidence,  
then you think it’s possible that you rationally base the opposite 
belief on E. [By definition of ‘based on permissive evidence’] 
2. If you think it’s possible that you rationally base the opposite 
belief on E, then you should think B was formed in a way no more 
likely to yield a true belief than is arbitrarily choosing a belief 
(regarding B’s content). 
3. If you come to believe that B is based on permissive evidence, 
then you should think B was formed in a way no more likely to 
yield a true belief than is arbitrarily choosing a belief (regarding 
B’s content). [from (1)–(2)] 
4. If you should think B was formed in a way no more likely to yield 
a true belief than is arbitrarily choosing a belief (regarding B’s 
content), then B is irrational. 
5. If you come to believe that B is based on permissive evidence, 
then B is irrational. [from (3)–(4)]” (ibid) 
As mentioned earlier, insofar as an agent sees that she is in a permissive case, she 
is committed to regarding her reasoning on the basis of the evidence as arbitrary 
and hence irrational. The reason for this is that to view your reasoning as arbitrary is 
to view it as being driven by something other than the reasons available to you. This 
reconstruction of the argument by Ballantyne and Coffman can help us identify 
which premise any given reply to the Arbitrariness Objection rejects. Rejecting the 
conclusion, (5), most immediately requires rejecting either (3) or (4). Denying (4) 
involves asserting that, in at least some cases, it could be rational to arbitrarily 
choose a belief. I shall later, briefly discuss some counterexamples which purport to 
show that this is the case. As I shall make clear, these cases even if genuinely 
counterexamples to uniqueness, are not generalizable beyond very specific and 
narrow conditions. The more fruitful avenue to rejecting uniqueness is to reject (3). 
Rejecting (3) requires us to reject at least one of (1) or (2). As we can see from 
White’s Court Case, if I think that I could be equally rational in inferring the opposite 
of my current belief from the total evidence I have, deliberating on my evidence is 
no more likely to get me the correct answer than some arbitrary process. That 
leaves rejecting (1). In my discussion of Schoenfield’s account of permissivism, I 
shall show how she develops an account of permissivism, according to which it is 
not rational for me to believe the opposite of what I currently rationally believe, 
based on the same evidence. Having discussed White’s two main arguments for 
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uniqueness, I shall present Schoenfield’s account of permissivism and show how it 
addresses White’s arguments. 
3.3 Epistemic Standards 
Schoenfield agrees with White that a body of evidence cannot support both P and 
not-P at the same time. However, her reasoning here is that the evidence does not 
support any proposition simpliciter; rather it can only support some proposition or 
other relative to some epistemic standard, provided that the standard is consistent 
with the principles of rationality. By epistemic standard, she means the following: 
“[We] can just think of a set of standards as a function from bodies of 
evidence to doxastic states which the agent takes to be truth-
conducive. Roughly, this means that the agent has high confidence 
that forming opinions using her standards will result in her having 
high confidence in truths and low confidence in falsehoods.” 
(Schoenfield 2014: 199) 
We might think of epistemic standards as consisting of sets of epistemic norms. 
These norms may be something like “Believe that P if it seems to you that P and 
you have no defeaters for P” or they may say that “If you have experimental 
evidence with N samples showing result R, form attitude A towards P”. 
Schoenfield’s claim is that relative to a given standard, the evidence supports P, 
not-P or neither P nor not-P. It cannot support both. Schoenfield thus agrees with 
White that evidential support is unidirectional. She just denies that it is non-
contingent. Rather, in her view, the evidential support relation holds relative to the 
agent’s epistemic standards, provided that the standards do not violate what she 
calls the principles of rationality.  
For Schoenfield, the principles of rationality are substantive rational requirements on 
epistemic standards. Schoenfield (ibid) says little about the principles of rationality, 
but we may nevertheless fill in some of the gaps. We might think of these principles 
as general constraints on doxastic attitudes that said attitudes must conform to, if 
they are to count as being rational. For instance, if we think that doxastic attitudes 
are best represented in terms of credences, we might think that the principles of 
rationality would include a chance-credence principle similar to that of Lewis’s 
Principal Principle (1986). According to the Principal Principle, an agent’s credence 
in a proposition P must match her belief in the objective chance that P is true. In 
addition, we might also think that certain consistency and completeness constraints 
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apply. Hence an agent’s credences in P and not-P respectively must add to 1. 
Likewise, an agent’s credence in the disjunction of two propositions, P or Q, must 
equal the sum of her credences in P and Q respectively minus her credence in their 
conjunction, P and Q. Or, for more coarse grained attitudes, the principles of 
rationality might say that an agent must not believe both P and not-P at the same 
time. Perhaps more strongly, the principles might require that if and only if an agent 
believes that P she must disbelieve not-P. With regards to induction, it might say 
that given a sufficiently large sample size it is permissible to generalise and believe 
that all Gs are Fs. 
The exact content of these principles need not concern us for now, except to note 
that these principles constrain which epistemic standards agents may permissibly 
accept25. Any epistemic standard which recommends doxastic attitudes that violate 
these constraints is not one that could be permissibly adopted. However, while 
these principles are substantive constraints, they are, according to Schoenfield, 
nevertheless very general and therefore not so strong as to fix one standard as 
uniquely appropriate for everyone (ibid: 202). For instance, the principles of 
rationality might say that testimonial evidence is important without specifying exactly 
how important it is. Accordingly epistemic standards which instruct agents to ignore 
all testimony or contrariwise to completely trust all testimony regardless of how 
implausible the claim, could be ruled out as violating these principles of rationality. 
 However, if Schoenfield is correct, the principles of rationality are not so specific as 
to specify exactly how much we should weight testimonial evidence in a given 
situation. Different epistemic standards would prescribe different ways of weighting 
testimonial evidence in an agent’s deliberations. There may be many standards 
which abide by the broad constraints delimited by the principles of rationality and 
any doxastic attitude formed on the basis of such a standard is, on Schoenfield’s 
picture, rational. 
To further illustrate, suppose an agent, Sally’s, epistemic standard includes an anti-
inductive norm, according to which, she should be less confident that P will obtain in 
situation S, the more often she observes that P in similar situations. By complying 
with this norm, she becomes less confident that the sun will rise in the east the next 
day the more she observes that it has risen in the east in the past. Similarly, she 
becomes more confident that the next raven she sees will not be black the more 
black ravens she sees. She also becomes more confident that anti-induction will 
                                                          
25
 See Schoenfield’s footnote 16 on p216. 
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deliver a true verdict the more often it fails to deliver a true verdict in the past. 
Presumably, the principles of rationality include a principle which says something 
like “induction is a reliable way to form beliefs”. If so, then, on any plausible account 
of the principles of rationality, said principles would rule out any epistemic standard 
which included an anti-inductive norm. The mere fact that Sally accepts such a 
standard is insufficient to render the beliefs she forms on the basis of that standard 
rational. The proviso that epistemic standards not violate the principles of rationality 
places limits on what would be an acceptable standard for any given agent. Within 
those limits, facts about what the evidence supports are relative to the agent’s 
epistemic standards. It is therefore possible, on Schoenfield’s account for there to 
be multiple permissible epistemic standards. 
This makes clear how Schoenfield avoids the Evidence Pointing Problem. To draw 
on the analogy of the dial, Schoenfield is not claiming that the dial can 
simultaneously indicate both P and not-P. Instead there would be different dials; 
some would only point to P while others would point to only not-P. Each dial would 
represent an epistemic standard. Given each person’s epistemic standards, only 
one doxastic attitude towards a given proposition is justified on the evidence. 
However, given that people can permissibly hold different epistemic standards, they 
can still rationally disagree about a proposition, even if they have the same 
evidence.  
As we can see, Schoenfield’s account of permissivism is consistent with 
intrapersonal uniqueness. We can further see the appeal of Schoenfield’s account 
by noting how it addresses White’s Arbitrariness objection.  
The crux of White’s Arbitrariness Objection is that it would be arbitrary to form 
beliefs by randomly taking a pill. Schoenfield does not deny this. Her disagreement 
with White is about whether permissivists ought to think that forming a belief by 
reasoning on the basis of the evidence is better than randomly taking a pill. White 
believes that permissivists ought to think that reasoning on the basis of the evidence 
is no better than taking a pill, because by the agent’s own lights, she is just as likely 
to reach the truth as to believe a falsehood if she reasons from her evidence. 
However, on Schoenfield’s account, according to the agent’s own epistemic 
standards, reasoning on the basis of the evidence will be more likely to reach the 
truth, whereas randomly taking a pill is as likely to yield a true belief as a false one 
(ibid: 201).  
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The Evidence Pointing Problem and the Arbitrariness Objection are two powerful 
arguments for uniqueness. Schoenfield's account of permissivism provides a 
framework through which various epistemologies could address these arguments. 
Schoenfield deliberately says little about epistemic standards. This is so as to 
accommodate different accounts by which people’s epistemic standards could differ. 
She provides some examples: 
“Some people think of them as rules of the form “Given E, believe p!” 
Others think of them as beliefs about the correct way to form other 
beliefs. If you are a Bayesian, you can think of an agent’s standards 
as her prior and conditional probability functions. (ibid: 199)” 
Thus, for instance, when confronted with the Evidence Pointing Problem, the 
subjective Bayesian could say that given the priors she has, the evidence points to 
one conclusion, but that does not mean that people cannot have different priors. 
Similarly, when confronting the Arbitrariness Objection, the Bayesian could say that 
given her priors, there is only one way in which she can update her credences, 
given the evidence. That means that taking a random belief inducing pill would not 
necessarily result in the doxastic attitude she ought to have given her priors. We 
can see, therefore, that the subjective Bayesian endorses intrapersonal uniqueness, 
even if she does not endorse interpersonal uniqueness. Similarly, any permissive 
epistemology which can offer up a Schoenfield-style response26 to White’s 
arguments must be consistent with intrapersonal uniqueness. Permissivism can be 
successful only if there is some plausible account of how people may permissibly 
accept different epistemic standards.  
If I can show that no such account is plausible, then I would be able to demonstrate 
that if we accept intrapersonal uniqueness, we have good reason to accept 
interpersonal uniqueness. However, if permissivists can reject intrapersonal 
uniqueness, then they could rightfully reject interpersonal uniqueness, and arguing 
that intrapersonal uniqueness entails interpersonal uniqueness would be pointless. 
Therefore, before I show why interpersonal permissiveness is not consistent with 
intrapersonal uniqueness, I shall explore two objections to intrapersonal 
                                                          
26
 Ballantyne and Coffman (2011: 12) specify that any epistemology according to which 
some other factor apart from the evidence is necessary to fix what attitude towards a 
proposition is rational given the evidence will be permissive. Here too, intrapersonal 
uniqueness is not denied. While Ballantyne and Coffman do not explicitly mention epistemic 
standards, given the vagueness of what Schoenfield means by epistemic standards, we can 
think of the additional factors that Ballantyne and Coffman refer to as those features of the 
situation which license different epistemic standards. 
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uniqueness. The first objection is Meacham’s (2014) objection to the Arbitrariness 
Objection. The second involves two purported counterexamples to intrapersonal 
uniqueness; I shall then and argue that we can set aside cases like these.  
3.4 On the Irrelevance of Procedural Considerations to Permissivism 
Meacham’s counterargument to the Arbitrariness Objection is that the question of 
whether there are procedural constraints on epistemic rationality is orthogonal to the 
question of whether evidential support is permissive (Ibid: 1207-1208). After all, 
according to Meacham, someone could consistently affirm both that there is only 
one attitude supported by the evidence and that how people reach that attitude does 
not matter. Similarly, one could affirm that more than one attitude fits the evidence 
but also affirm that rationality requires that these attitudes be arrived at by a non-
arbitrary process (ibid). Meacham therefore denies that if an agent sees that her 
evidence is permissive, she is committed to seeing reasoning on the evidence as no 
better than forming beliefs by some arbitrary process.  
It is unclear, however, if Meacham’s argument works. Suppose an agent, Sally flips 
a coin to decide how to respond to her evidence. By luck, she happens to pick an 
attitude which uniquely fits her evidence. It would not be inconsistent for an 
impermissivist, someone who rejects permissivism, to retrospectively regard Sally’s 
doxastic attitude as rational just because it happens to fit her evidence. However, an 
impermissivist necessarily has to regard the prospect of deciding what to believe by 
flipping a coin as rationally suspect. The impermissivist believes that at most one of 
the attitudes picked by a coin would be rational. On the other hand, reasoning 
sufficiently well on the basis of the evidence will certainly result in a rational attitude. 
No arbitrary process could deliver such certainty to the impermissivist.  
A corollary to this is that any process which would yield attitudes that uniquely best 
fit the evidence would not be arbitrary. Suppose there was a pill that, if taken, would 
produce in the agent doxastic attitudes on a given topic which would fit her total 
evidence. Whatever else is wrong with taking the pill, it certainly is not arbitrary if we 
know in advance that the pill will produce attitudes which fit the evidence. Similarly, 
if an epistemology oracle were to reliably inform us which attitudes fit our evidence, 
then we would have strong reason to listen to the oracle. Therefore, while an 
arbitrary process might yield an attitude that fits the evidence, it could only do so as 
a matter of chance. Agents who accept uniqueness necessarily have at least 
instrumental reason to avoid arbitrary ways of arriving at doxastic attitudes.  
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Let us also consider the other half of Meacham’s argument. It is true that a 
permissivist could consistently affirm that a doxastic attitude is rational only if it is 
produced by a process of good reasoning, and believe that good reasoning alone 
does not fix which attitude an agent will arrive at when she deliberates on her 
evidence. However, the permissivist’s commitment to non-arbitrary processes 
seems under-motivated. This is not to deny that a procedural constraint on doxastic 
rationality is plausible. The point is that the permissivists seem to undermine the 
grounds for caring about procedural constraints.  
To see why, consider what I call Turri’s Court Case. 
Turri’s Court Case: Mansour is on trial for murder. The evidence 
against Mansour consists of four propositions which the jury know: 
  
P1: Mansour had a motive to kill the victim.   
P2: Mansour had previously threatened to kill the victim.  
P3: Multiple eyewitnesses place Mansour at the crime scene.  
P4: Mansour’s fingerprints were all over the murder weapon.  
A jury member, Improper, reasons in the following way: The tea 
leaves say that P1-P4 support a guilty verdict. P1-P4 are true. 
Therefore Mansour is guilty of murder (Turri 2010: 315-316). 
Intuitively, we are reluctant to call Improper’s belief rational even though her belief 
fits the evidence. This suggests that doxastic rationality requires more than just that 
one’s attitude fit the evidence, it also requires that it be arrived at in the right way. 
Nothing prevents a permissivist from having this intuition in response to this case. It 
is, however, unclear what could ground such a commitment for the permissivist.  
Consider that what seems to go wrong for Improper is that tea leaves are not an 
appropriate means of figuring out which attitudes fit a body of evidence. Improper 
seems to be lucky that she believes that her tea leaves tell her what the evidence 
actually happens to support. Suppose that an agent, Sally, were to encounter 
White’s court case where the belief that the defendant was guilty was just as 
rational on the evidence as the belief that he was not. Once Sally reasoned her way 
to the belief that the defendant was guilty, she would have to consider herself lucky 
that she arrived at the right belief (from her perspective) since she might just as 
easily have reasoned that the defendant was not guilty instead. It seems that Sally 
faces a dilemma: Either believing the defendant not guilty is just as rational a 
response to the evidence as believing that he is guilty in which case Sally must view 
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herself as being incredibly lucky for getting it right or she is not lucky and reasoning 
on the basis of the evidence would not have just as easily led her to the opposite 
belief. However on the second option the opposite belief is not as well supported by 
her body of evidence as her own. In that case she cannot view it as a permissive 
case. 
In this way, Sally’s belief formation method seems objectionable for the same 
reasons that Improper’s is. If Sally’s being lucky is not objectionable for 
permissivists, it is unclear how they could also similarly object to Improper’s 
reasoning. It follows, therefore, that permissivists seem to lack any reason to care 
about following procedural constraints when arriving at a belief. 
The permissivist might still reply that while in a given case, the permissivist might 
indeed be lucky if she gets the right answer by reasoning on the basis of the 
evidence in a permissive case, but not every case is a permissive case. If most 
cases were impermissive, then reasoning on the basis of the evidence can be 
expected to get you closer to the truth on average.  
However this reply is inadequate. Even if the permissivist has a reason to reason on 
the basis of the evidence in impermissive cases, she has no reason to do so in 
permissive cases. We might draw an analogy with act utilitarianism here. For the act 
utilitarian, the right action is the one that actually maximises the aggregate 
happiness. However, because it is difficult to calculate the aggregate happiness 
generated by each option every time the agent faces a choice, she may adopt rules 
of thumb that if followed can be expected to maximise aggregate happiness 
because attempting to calculate aggregate happiness for each decision would be 
counterproductive. Most of the time these rules of thumb prescribe the action which 
maximises aggregate happiness. However, the rule of thumb can sometimes 
prescribe the wrong act. The rule of thumb does not change what she ought to do, it 
just prescribes an effective decision procedure. Where the agent knows that the act 
prescribed by the rule of thumb does not maximise happiness, she ought to 
maximise happiness instead of following the rule. Similarly, while reasoning on the 
basis of evidence is better than flipping a coin on average, in permissive cases it is 
no better and may be worse than flipping a coin. If an agent knows that she is in a 
permissive case she has no reason to prefer reasoning on the basis of her evidence 
to flipping a coin in that particular case.  
The Arbitrariness Objection seems to go through as long as there are at least some 
cases whereby an agent can come to know that she is in a permissive case. In 
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those cases the agent is committed to believing that her reasoning on the basis of 
permissive evidence is irrational. However, permissive evidence is evidence which 
justifies more than one doxastic attitude towards a proposition. If reasoning on the 
basis of known permissive evidence is irrational, the evidence cannot justify more 
than one doxastic attitude towards a proposition. This means that, at the very least, 
there cannot be evidence that is known to be permissive. A consequence of this is 
that either there are no permissive cases, or all permissive cases are covertly 
permissive. If the first option is true, then permissivism is false. On the other hand, if 
the second option is true, people are rationally committed to being systematically 
mistaken about the nature of the practice they are engaged in. However, this seems 
implausible. As I will argue in the next chapter, this is implausible because it 
commits us to endorsing an error theory about rationality. 
Summing up, Meacham argued that the Arbitrariness Objection was mistaken 
because it seemed to make a procedural criticism which was orthogonal to the 
question of whether permissivism or uniqueness was true. I argued that the two 
issues were not completely orthogonal to each other. Impermissivists, I argued, had 
a ready reason to care about an intuitively plausible constraint on rationality. 
Permissivists, on the other hand did not seem to have any such reason as they 
were subject to the same luck as someone who did not reason well but nevertheless 
lucked upon an attitude that fit her evidence. Therefore, Meacham’s reply to the 
Arbitrariness Objection is not successful. 
3.5 Your Belief Makes It Real 
A second objection to intrapersonal uniqueness is a class of purported 
counterexamples to intrapersonal uniqueness. These counterexamples involve 
cases where the agent’s belief that P brings it about that P. Koppec (2014) and 
Drake (2017) each provide one such counterexample. In this section, I will discuss 
these counterexamples and show why they can be disregarded. Consider first 
Drake’s counterexample which I shall label ‘Positive Thinking’: 
Positive Thinking: Ian has a life threatening illness. “Suppose that Ian 
does not know whether P: he will survive the illness. He has only the 
following information about his prospects of survival: the illness could 
lead to his death, and if he does survive, the battle with the illness 
will render the quality of his remaining life extremely low. Knowing 
how grim his life might be after survival, Ian is genuinely torn as to 
whether he wants to survive at all. Indeed, Ian’s psychology is such 
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that he has no reason to think that he is more likely to end up 
believing that P rather than not P. But Ian does know that by 
believing that he will survive, he will in fact secure his survival; and 
he knows that if he believes that he will not survive, then he will not 
survive.” (Drake 2017: 4901) 
Drake argues that since Ian knows that whatever he believes will turn out to be true, 
he cannot permissibly suspend judgment. The only options remaining for Ian are to 
believe that he will survive or to believe that he will not. However, there is no reason 
to think that one of these options is more rational than the other. Moreover, there is 
no reason to think that either option is rationally impermissible. Drake thus 
concludes that both P and not-P must be rational for Ian (ibid: 4902-4903).  Kopec’s 
case, which I shall label ‘Mind Reader’, is somewhat more explicitly science-
fictional.  
Mind Reader: A patient is connected to a mind-reading device and 
knows that she is. There is a box on the table and next to the box are 
some cats. A neuroscientist tells her that she (the scientist) will place 
a cat in the box if the patient believes that the scientist will do so and 
leave it empty if she believes that the scientist will leave it empty 
instead (Kopec 2014: 405-406). 
Kopec’s argument here is similar to Drake’s. There is no reason not to believe that 
the cat will be put in the box as the belief is guaranteed to be true. The same can be 
said for the belief that the cat will not be put in the box. Suspending judgment, on 
the other hand, seems problematic when there is a guarantee that one’s belief will 
come out true (Kopec 2014: 406-407).  
Seeing how these cases handle the Arbitrariness Objection and the Evidence 
Pointing Problem is instructive. Suppose that both Ian and the patient were given 
the option of forming a belief by randomly taking a pill. It is hard to deny that 
deliberating on the evidence is no better than randomly taking a pill. Moreover, it is 
a given that randomly taking a pill would be arbitrary.  What the counterexample 
denies is the fourth premise in the Arbitrariness Objection: 
“If you should think B was formed in a way no more likely to yield a 
true belief than is arbitrarily choosing a belief (regarding B’s content), 
then B is irrational.” (Ballantyne and Coffman 2011: 9) 
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In such cases, choosing arbitrarily is not irrational because the truth of the belief is 
guaranteed regardless of its content. Where choosing arbitrarily is not irrational, 
deliberating on evidence cannot be irrational just because it is no better than 
choosing arbitrarily. 
Regarding the Evidence Pointing Problem, it is unclear what the evidence is 
supposed to be indicating. Either the evidence points at both P and not-P in this 
case or the evidence does not point at anything. The first option falsifies White’s 
claim that evidential support is unidirectional in all cases. The second option takes 
the issue of what the evidence points to off the table and hence makes the 
unidirectionality of evidential support irrelevant. Whatever we end up saying about 
these cases, it will address the Evidence Pointing Problem one way or another. 
Having seen how these self-fulfilling cases provide counterexamples against 
intrapersonal uniqueness, what can be said against them? The main thing to note is 
that these cases work precisely because they involve self-fulfilling beliefs. Suppose 
that we were to grant that self-fulfilling cases are permissive, this would tell us 
nothing about whether reasonable disagreement is possible in cases where our 
beliefs have no influence on the truth of the object of our beliefs. We do not think it 
true of our ordinary beliefs that our belief makes them true.  
Notice also, that in determining whether reasonable disagreement is possible, we 
would be equally well served by the following modification to the uniqueness thesis: 
Uniqueness(-): Given a total body of evidence and proposition, at 
most one doxastic attitude towards that proposition is the rationally 
justified one except when the agent’s doxastic attitude towards the 
proposition influences its truth value. 
Uniqueness(-) explicitly carves out an exception for self-fulfilling cases. If it is true, 
rational disagreement about the claims that could play a role in justifying laws and 
policies is still not possible since those issues do not involve self-fulfilling beliefs. 
We can even specify an intrapersonal version of uniqueness(-) according to which 
for any given agent at most one doxastic attitude is rationally justified except in self-
fulfilling cases.  Intrapersonal uniqueness(-) is equally well supported by the 
Arbitrariness Objection and the Evidence Pointing Problem. It is also the case that 
the exception is such a bizarre condition that our general judgments about epistemic 
matters take such exceptions for granted. We take for granted that when deciding 
what attitude to take towards a proposition, the proposition is true or false 
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regardless of which attitude we take towards it. Given this assumption, it makes 
sense to think of epistemic rationality as a matter of truth-tracking rather than truth-
making. Even though the assumption that the truth of a proposition does not depend 
on our believing it does not necessarily hold in all cases; it holds in the vast majority 
of cases. The odd cases where it does not hold are so rare that it seems mistaken 
to think of those cases as being governed by norms of epistemic rationality at all. If 
this is right, then we can drop the exception in uniqueness(-) and just assert 
uniqueness in either its interpersonal or intrapersonal versions. 
It seems clear then that intrapersonal uniqueness is true, at least in all the non-
trivial, non-science fictional cases. It follows that any plausible account of 
permissivism will have to endorse intrapersonal uniqueness27. More specifically, 
relative to an epistemic standard, there is at most one rational doxastic attitude to 
take with respect to a proposition, given the total body of evidence.  
As mentioned earlier in Chapter 2, Schoenfield’s claim that people can rationally 
disagree, given the same total body of evidence, because they have different 
epistemic standards explains how the second burden of judgment is a source of 
rational disagreement. Recall that according to the second burden of judgment, 
people rationally disagree because they differ in the weight they assign to the 
various considerations for or against a proposition. This was interpreted to mean 
that people rationally disagreed because they had different epistemic standards. As 
we have seen so far, in this chapter, any plausible account of permissivism must 
have some account of how people could have different epistemic standards. This is 
consistent with the claim made by the second burden of judgment. In fact, it is even 
stronger: People could rationally disagree about a proposition if and only if they 
could permissibly have different epistemic standards 
One of the central claims in this thesis is that the burdens of judgment, which 
specify the conditions that make reasonable disagreement possible, presuppose 
permissivism. In showing that permissivism is false, I show that the standard 
account of how reasonable disagreement is possible requires significant revision. 
Pursuant to this, I need to show that insofar as a burden of judgment presupposes 
permissivism, the disagreement caused by that burden is not rational. With regards 
to the second burden, given how the possibility of people having different epistemic 
standards is crucial to them rationally disagreeing, showing that the second burden 
                                                          
27
 In addition to Schoenfield, Ballantyne and Coffman (2011), Kelly (2014) and Meacham 
(2014) also endorse intrapersonal uniqueness. 
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is not a source of rational disagreement involves showing that people cannot have 
different epistemic standards. This raises the question as to how it is permissible for 
people to have different epistemic standards. 
Permissivists have two options available to them. The first option is that for any 
given agent, there are two or more epistemic standards which are equally well 
suited for her. The second option is that each person has only one epistemic 
standard that is most suited for her, but the standard that is most suited for one 
person, may not be the standard most suited for another. I shall argue in the next 
chapter that if permissivists take the first option, they can still be vulnerable to the 
Arbitrariness Objection and the Evidence Pointing Problem. In the subsequent 
chapters, I shall consider various proposals that are consistent with the second 
option and argue than none of them will work either. This will show that if 
intrapersonal uniqueness is accepted, we are required to accept inter-personal 
uniqueness as well.  
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Chapter 4: Intrapersonal Uniqueness about Epistemic Standards 
Background 
In Chapter 3, I argued that at least intrapersonal uniqueness is true. The two main 
arguments for this were the Arbitrariness Objection and the Evidence Pointing 
Problem. The permissivist’s reply to these arguments would be that at most one 
doxastic attitude is rational given the evidence relative to an epistemic standard, but 
people could have different epistemic standards. This reply mirrored Rawls’s 
second burden of judgment according to which people could rationally disagree 
about a proposition if they disagreed about the strength of an evidential 
consideration. People’s disagreement about the strength of a given evidential 
consideration can plausibly be thought of as reflecting their possession of different 
epistemic standards. In questioning how people could permissibly have different 
epistemic standards, two possible answers can be offered. The first of these 
answers, which I shall call intrapersonal permissivism about standards, is that for 
any given agent, more than one epistemic standard is rationally permissible for her. 
Thus on this view, an agent, Sally, who could permissibly make inferences on the 
basis of a standard S1 could also permissibly make inferences on the basis of S2. 
The alternative answer, which I shall call intrapersonal uniqueness about standards, 
is that for any given agent only one epistemic standard is rationally permissible for 
her. On this view, if Sally permissibly reasons on the basis of S1, then no other 
epistemic standard is appropriate for her. This, however, does not preclude that 
some other standard S2, but not S1, is appropriate for another agent, Susan. The 
subject of this chapter is the former view. I shall argue that both the Arbitrariness 
Objection and the Evidence Pointing Problem can be extended against 
intrapersonal permissivism about standards. If these arguments succeed, then the 
only viable accounts of permissivism are those which are consistent with 
intrapersonal uniqueness about epistemic standards. 
4.1 Extending the Arbitrariness Objection 
To recap, the crux of the Arbitrariness Objection was that if evidence was 
permissive, reasoning on the basis of evidence would be no better than forming 
beliefs by taking a random pill or flipping a coin. However, since these ways of 
forming beliefs are arbitrary, they are irrational. Forming beliefs on the basis of 
permissive evidence is therefore irrational. Schoenfield’s response was to argue 
that permissivists would not choose to arbitrarily form beliefs because beliefs 
formed by such processes may not be the ones justified by the evidence given their 
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own epistemic standards (Schoenfield 2014: 201).  This response seems to assume 
that the belief changing pill changes beliefs without changing a person’s epistemic 
standards. A natural way to extend the Arbitrariness Objection is to modify the case 
such that the pill does not change people’s beliefs without also changing people’s 
epistemic standards (White 2005). 
If the pill changed our beliefs by changing epistemic standards to one that is also 
just as rational, then we could not object to taking the pill on the grounds that the 
resulting belief violated our epistemic standards. After all, after taking the pill, our 
beliefs would still match our epistemic standards because we would have new 
standards. It seems as if permissivists should have no objection to taking the pill. 
However it is arbitrary to form beliefs by popping pills. It also seems arbitrary from 
an epistemic point of view to prefer our own standards just because they are our 
own or for any other non-epistemic reasons28.  
Schoenfield anticipates this objection and argues that the permissivist could still 
reject taking the pill as the new standards would, from her current perspective, be 
less truth-conducive than her current standards (Ibid). To be clear, since the 
permissivist thinks that her own standard is more truth-conducive than any other, 
her preference for her own standard is not arbitrary. However, it is unclear how the 
permissivist can think that one standard is more truth-conducive than any other and 
still think that all of these standards are equally permissible ones.  
One option, as Simpson (2017) notes, is to argue that one’s own standard is the 
most truth-conducive, but that others are good enough. However, as Simpson 
argues29, if there is some way in which standards which fall short of being the best 
are less truth-conducive than the best standard, it is hard to see why adopting those 
other non-best standards is not a mistake and therefore irrational. 
Schoenfield tries to clarify how one’s own standard could be more truth-conducive 
than others but yet still be as rational as some others: 
“We might cash this out by thinking that the principles of rationality 
are going to be general: they will be principles about what kinds of 
considerations count in favour of what kinds of hypotheses. But these 
sorts of general considerations are not sufficiently robust to pin down 
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 Simpson argued for this second aspect of arbitrariness in his response (2017) to 
Schoenfield. 
29
 Although Simpson makes this argument with respect to doxastic attitudes, the argument 
seems equally applicable to standards. 
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a unique doxastic state given by any body of evidence. So even if 
Sally and her friend both conform to these principles, their standards 
may differ with regard to how exactly they weigh the different 
considerations and thus, in any given case, Sally and her friend 
might rationally come to different conclusions.” (Schoenfield 2014: 
202) 
The thought here is that the principles of rationality are supposed to be substantive, 
but general constraints on rationality. They may include Lewis’s Principal Principle, 
or Kolmogorov’s probability axioms or general principles claiming that induction is 
reliable. They may tell us that some considerations matter, but fail to specify exactly 
how much they matter. For instance, they may say that induction is reliable, but fail 
to specify exactly how many instances we are supposed to observe before we are 
permitted to make a generalisation. Since the principles do not tell us how much 
weight ought to be given to any given consideration, any epistemic standard which 
employs these considerations satisfies these principles and is thus rational. Some 
ways of weighing these considerations are more truth-conducive than others, but 
the principles are too general to tell us which one is the most truth-conducive.  
There are two crucial claims that Schoenfield relies on. The first is that it is rationally 
permissible to pick any of the epistemic standards which comply with the principles 
of rationality. The second claim she makes is that Sally can simultaneously accept 
that there are different permissible ways of weighing the various considerations, and 
that her own epistemic standard is the most truth-conducive. 
I shall offer an objection pertaining to each claim. Regarding the first claim, I shall 
argue that if the principles of rationality are insufficient to fix on one epistemic 
standard, epistemic standards would seem to be arbitrary. Regarding the second 
claim, I shall argue that Schoenfield faces a dilemma: On the first horn of the 
dilemma, Sally believes that her own standard is the most truth-conducive, in which 
case she accepts uniqueness. .Alternatively,  she accepts that the truth-
conduciveness of different standards are either equal or incommensurable, in which 
case, her adoption of her own standard is vulnerable to the Arbitrariness Objection. I 
shall discuss each objection in turn. 
The first objection is that if we think that if the principles of rationality are so general 
and broad that they cannot fix on any one epistemic standard as best encapsulating 
them, then an agent’s selection of the more specific standard seems arbitrary. To 
see why this is the case, suppose that it is the case that the principles of rationality 
68 
 
are unable to pick out any given epistemic standard, but pick out a set of standards, 
{S1, S2} as being standards that comply with the principles, but there is no 
determinate criterion for picking one of them as better. S1 and S2 pick out attitudes 
A1 and A2 respectively in response to the evidence E. Suppose Sally chooses S1 
over S2. Either she has epistemic grounds, i.e. reasons related to epistemic 
rationality, to think that S1 is better, or she has non-epistemic grounds or she has 
no grounds to choose S1 over S2. Let us consider the last option first. 
4.1.1 Choosing For No Reason 
Suppose Sally chooses S1 over S2, but does so for no particular reason. This would 
seem to be a clear case in which Sally’s choice is arbitrary and therefore irrational. 
The permissivist might, at this point, reply that not all arbitrary choices are irrational, 
some may simply be a-rational, beyond rational assessment. After all, whichever 
standard is chosen, one is guaranteed to be in conformity with the principles of 
rationality and not choosing would violate the principles of rationality. The thought 
here is that by not accepting a standard, one is unable to form any attitudes 
whatsoever on the evidence even in simple cases and that should be a violation of 
the principles of rationality if anything is. If Sally has no choice but to choose one of 
S1 or S2, then it cannot be irrational for her to arbitrarily choose one or the other. 
Therefore it is permissible for her to plump for one set of epistemic standards. 
The permissivist’s reply to this extension of the Arbitrariness Objection depends on 
the principles of rationality not containing any symmetry principles. A symmetry 
principle is any principle that picks out some unique doxastic attitude whenever two 
or more doxastic attitudes towards a proposition or two or more alternative 
propositions are equally well supported by the evidence. Two candidate symmetry 
principles are salient here. The first is the principle of insufficient reason30. The 
principle of insufficient reason is a principle of reasoning that recommends that we 
treat evidentially symmetrical alternatives as equally likely. For instance, it requires 
that we suspend judgment about whether a coin will land heads if we know nothing 
about the coin. The reasoning is that if my evidence supports the proposition that 
the coin will land heads exactly as much as it supports the proposition that it will 
land tails, then each proposition is equally likely. Similarly, such a principle also 
requires us to assign a credence of 1/6 to a six sided die showing 4 when it lands. 
As with the coin toss, since my evidence supports the proposition that the die will 
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 See Howson and Urbach (2005) and Meacham (2014) for criticisms of the principle of 
insufficient reason. See White (2010) for a defence of the same. 
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show 4 as much as it supports the proposition that it will show 3 and so on, the 
likelihood of any one face showing must be the same as the likelihood of some 
other face showing. Therefore, I ought to have a credence of 1/6 that the die will 
show 4.  
Instead of the principle of insufficient reason, the principles of rationality might 
instead have what I call the Fuzziness principle.  
Fuzziness: If two or more precise doxastic attitudes, A1, A2 to An, 
towards a proposition are equally well supported by the evidence for 
an agent and no precise attitude is better supported, she ought to 
adopt a fuzzy or imprecise doxastic attitude ranging over A1 to An. 
Fuzziness instructs agents to adopt imprecise doxastic attitudes31 in order to match 
the lack of precision inherent in the evidence. For instance, if a credence of 0.7 and 
a credence of 0.8 are both well supported by the evidence, Fuzziness requires 
agents to adopt an imprecise credence of [0.7, 0.8] instead of either 0.7 or 0.8. The 
attitude [A1, A2] can be thought of as covering both A1 and A2 without specifically 
being either A1 or A2. 
If either the principle of insufficient reason or Fuzziness is correct, then the 
principles of rationality are always strong enough to pick out one epistemic standard 
as correct. I shall explain how this can be for each candidate symmetry principle.  
Consider, first, the principle of insufficient reason. If an agent, Sally, applies the 
principle of insufficient reason, instead of adopting epistemic standards S1 or S2, 
she should adopt an intermediate standard S*. Recall that an epistemic standard is 
constituted by epistemic norms and each epistemic norm is or entails a rule of the 
form “if your evidence is E, form doxastic attitude A towards proposition P”. By 
stipulation, S* picks out an attitude A* which lies between A1 and A2. The key 
assumption here is that there is a doxastic attitude A* that lies between A1 and A2. 
This assumption is most plausible if doxastic attitudes are represented by sharp 
credences. For instance, consider the following case: 
Impeachment: Susan and Sally are both considering whether Donald 
Trump should be impeached. Both of them watch the same 
programmes on Fox News and MSNBC. The credences 0.75 and 
0.76 are both equally well supported by Susan’s and Sally’s 
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 See White (2010) for a criticism of imprecise credences and van Fraassen (1990) and 
Chandler (2014) for a defence of imprecise credences. 
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evidence. Sally adopts a credence of 0.75 while Susan adopts a 
credence of 0.76. 
In principle, it seems that an agent could have credence 0.755 towards the 
proposition that Donald Trump should be impeached. If some intermediate credence 
is always available then there is, in principle, some epistemic norm which requires 
the agent to form the intermediate attitude 0.755 in response to her evidence. Since 
epistemic standards are constituted by epistemic norms, different combinations of 
epistemic norms will give rise to different epistemic standards. It follows, that if there 
is some intermediate doxastic attitude available to an agent, there is a 
corresponding epistemic standard which if adopted, would require the agent to 
adopt that intermediate doxastic attitude. In short, where doxastic attitudes are 
maximally fine grained, there is always an intermediate epistemic standard S* 
between two standards S1 and S2. To be clear, the mere existence of the 
intermediate standard S* does not suffice to make it preferable to the standards S1 
and S2. Rather, or so I shall argue, S* is preferable to S1 and S2 if the principle of 
insufficient reason is true. 
The reason for this is that epistemic standards encode assumptions about how to 
weigh conflicting pieces of evidence against each other. Applying the principle of 
insufficient reason requires us to moderate our confidence in these assumptions. 
This in turn will yield a standard that generates an intermediate doxastic attitude. I 
shall illustrate this point by returning to the Impeachment case. 
In Impeachment, Susan’s and Sally’s total body of evidence consists of two sources 
of information: Fox News and MSNBC. Suppose that we can score the 
trustworthiness of news stations from 0 to 10. Epistemic standard S1 encodes the 
assumption that MSNBC has a trustworthiness score of 8 and that Fox News has a 
score of 2. Given these trustworthiness scores, the appropriate credence for the 
proposition that Donald Trump should be impeached is 0.75. By contrast, S2 
encodes the assumption that MSNBC has a trustworthiness score of 9 and Fox 
News has a score of 1. Given these scores, the appropriate credence for the claim 
that Trump should be impeached is 0.76. However, both assumptions cannot be 
true and given uncertainty about which assumption is true, the principle of 
insufficient reason recommends that Sally assign the likelihood of each assumption 
being true a value of 0.5. The expected trustworthiness of a given News station is 
the trustworthiness of the station given the first set of assumptions multiplied by the 
likelihood of that assumption added to the trustworthiness given the second set of 
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assumptions multiplied by that assumption’s likelihood. The expected 
trustworthiness of MSNBC will be 8.5 and the expected trustworthiness of Fox News 
will be 1.5.  
Given these scores, the appropriate credence that Trump should be impeached is 
0.755. Since MSNBC advocates for Trump’s impeachment and is likely to present 
evidence that favours impeaching him, the more trust an agent places in MSNBC, 
the more confident she should be that Trump should be impeached. Likewise, since 
Fox News advocates against Trump’s impeachment and tends to present evidence 
that favours not impeaching him, the more trust an agent places in Fox News, the 
less confident she should be that Trump should be impeached. This implies that the 
credence that is appropriate given the expected trustworthiness of the respective 
news sources is in between the credences given S1 and S2 respectively. Since S* 
requires the agent to have credence 0.755 in the proposition that Trump should be 
impeached, Susan and Sally should employ epistemic standard S* instead. 
Summing up, epistemic standards consist of norms which govern belief formation at 
least in part by determining which considerations should matter more when they 
conflict with each other. This means that any epistemic standard must encode 
assumptions that explain why the considerations which the standard takes to be 
stronger are in fact stronger. If the principle of insufficient reason is applied, the 
agent applies an equal probability to each alternative assumption. The expected 
strength of each consideration will therefore be of an intermediate value as 
compared to the comparatively more extreme values encoded in the various 
assumptions. Correspondingly, the norms that these expected strengths encode will 
recommend an attitude that is intermediate between the ones recommended by the 
initial set of standards. Therefore, if the principle of insufficient reason is applied, 
agents should pick S* instead of S1 or S2.  
I have, so far, assumed that there is always some intermediate doxastic attitude 
available. However, on more coarse grained accounts of doxastic attitudes, it might 
seem less plausible that there is always some intermediate doxastic attitude. 
Suppose, for instance that in a given case, believing that P and suspending 
judgment that P were equally well supported by the evidence. If there was no 
intermediate attitude between believing and suspending judgment, then the principle 
of insufficient reason, if applicable, could not possibly require the agent to pick an 
intermediate epistemic standard S* because no such standard would be available. It 
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does not follow that the principle of insufficient reason has no application. To see 
why, consider the following variation on Impeachment. 
Impeachment II: Susan and Sally are both considering whether 
Donald Trump should be impeached. Both of them watch the same 
programmes on Fox News and MSNBC. The attitudes suspending 
judgment and belief are both equally well supported by Susan’s and 
Sally’s evidence. Sally adopts standard S1 and suspends judgment 
while Susan adopts standard S2 and believes that Trump must be 
impeached. 
Here, we can still score the trustworthiness of each news station between 0 and 10 
and as in Impeachment, Sally assumed that the trustworthiness of MSNBC and Fox 
News are 8 and 2 respectively. Likewise, Susan assumed that the trustworthiness of 
the news stations are 9 and 1 respectively. Given the principle of insufficient reason, 
each assumption is just as likely as the other at 0.5. This makes the expected 
trustworthiness of the stations turn out to be 8.5 and 1.5 respectively.  
Since there is no intermediate doxastic attitude, we cannot assume that each 
epistemic standard encodes very specific assumptions about the trustworthiness of 
each news station. Instead, we must suppose that there is some threshold such that 
Sally’s assumption falls at or below the threshold thus making suspending judgment 
appropriate for her. Likewise Susan’s assumption falls above the threshold thus 
making belief that Trump should be impeached appropriate for her. For instance, if 
the difference in the trustworthiness of the stations is 6 or below the agent should 
suspend judgment while if the difference in trustworthiness is more than 6, she 
should believe that Trump should be impeached. If the threshold is set at 6, then 
given that the expected difference in trustworthiness is 7, Sally and Susan should 
both adopt S2 and believe that Trump should be impeached. Wherever the 
threshold is placed, the expected difference in trustworthiness is going to fall on one 
side or the other of that threshold. Insofar as the principle of insufficient reason 
applies, Sally and Susan cannot permissibly believe just one of the assumptions; 
they must take them to be equally likely. If they do so, there is only one doxastic 
attitude which would be justified for them given the evidence. 
Summing up, even if there is no intermediate epistemic standard, when the principle 
of insufficient reason is applied, only one of those standards becomes permissible 
for the agents. Whereas the connection between the principle of insufficient reason 
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and the appropriate epistemic standard is somewhat indirect, the connection 
between Fuzziness and imprecise attitudes is simpler.  
To see why, suppose that Fuzziness is true instead. Consider Sally’s situation again 
in Impeachment. Fuzziness requires that her doxastic attitude should be imprecise 
[0.75, 0.76]. Therefore, instead of choosing S* an intermediate standard, she should 
choose an indeterminate standard S that picks out doxastic attitude [0.75, 0.76]32. 
Any other epistemic standard would violate Fuzziness.  
We started off with the claim that the principles of rationality had some amount of 
slack such that more than one epistemic standard was consistent with the 
requirements of those principles. As I have just argued, if either the principle of 
insufficient reason or Fuzziness is true, then the principles of rationality do not have 
any slack. The permissivist’s claim that there is more than one rationally permissible 
epistemic standard can go through only if both the principle of insufficient reason 
and Fuzziness are false. However, we have good reason to believe that at least one 
or the other is true.  
One key motivation for Fuzziness is the following intuition: If the principles of 
rationality, taken together with the evidence, are genuinely indeterminate to some 
degree, it is unclear why it would be epistemically permissible to be more precise 
than the evidence and the principles of rationality warrant. However, adopting either 
S1 or S2 would do precisely that. S1 and S2 each go beyond what the principles of 
rationality say in one way or another. S1 and S2 make claims about which 
considerations matter more, and how much more they matter. If Sally were to 
choose one or the other standard and hence choose between claims about which 
considerations matter more for no reason at all, doing so would be arbitrary and 
therefore irrational. 
In addition, there seem to be a number of cases in which our intuitions about which 
attitudes are appropriate presuppose that one or the other principle must be true. 
Consider, for instance, the following case: 
Urns: There are 11 urns in front of Sally, each with 10 balls inside. 
Each urn has a different mix of white and black balls including one 
urn in which all the balls are black and one in which all the balls are 
white. No two urns have the same number of black balls in them. 
Sally is unaware of how many black balls are in any given urn, but 
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 I’m indebted to Simpson’s discussion (2017) of Schoenfield’s argument for this point. 
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she knows that each urn has a different mix of black and white balls 
and that each urn has a total of 10 balls. Susan reaches into an urn 
and picks a ball. What should Sally’s confidence in the proposition 
that Susan will pick a black ball be? 
There are two potential answers to the question. One answer is that Sally 
should have an imprecise confidence of [0, 1] that the ball will be black. This 
is because she knows that the urn that Susan draws the ball from could 
have anywhere between 0 and 10 black balls. Given that Sally lacks 
information about how Susan is picking the urn or drawing balls from the urn, 
she knows that the objective chances that the ball will be black is anywhere 
between 0 and 1 and no objective chance is more likely than any other. 
Therefore, given some plausible chance-credence principle, Sally knows that 
any given precise confidence from 0 to 1 is equally well supported by the 
evidence. Therefore to account for this slack, Sally should adopt a maximally 
imprecise doxastic attitude. Notably a maximally imprecise attitude is 
justified for Sally only if Fuzziness or some principle that is very much like it 
was true. 
Alternatively, it might be the case that Sally should have a confidence of 0.5 
that Susan’s ball will be black. This is because across all the urns, exactly 
half the balls are black. Sally might reason that if Susan were to wave her 
arms in such a way as to randomly pick out an urn and randomly pick a ball 
from that urn, she would in effect be picking a ball randomly from a set of 
110 balls, half of which are black. If a confidence of 0.5 is required in the 
latter case, it must be also appropriate in the former as well. This is because 
Susan randomly waving her arms about cannot provide any information 
about whether the ball she picks will be black. Notice that Sally’s reasoning 
here vindicates the principle of insufficient reason. Given that each urn can 
contain anywhere between 0 and 10 balls, the expected number of black 
balls in a randomly selected urn is 5. This result can only be arrived at if 
Sally assigns an equal likelihood to selecting each urn and, for each urn, an 
equal likelihood of selecting each ball. Assigning equal likelihoods like this 
just is to apply the principle of insufficient reason.  
Notably, the question as to which doxastic attitude is permissible for Sally 
depends on which principle is true. If the principle of insufficient reason is 
true, then Sally should have credence 0.5 that the ball Susan picks will be 
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black. If it is false and Fuzziness true instead, she should have an imprecise 
credence [0, 1]. Either way, it is implausible that Sally could permissibly have 
any other credence about what colour the ball would be. However if both the 
principle of insufficient reason and Fuzziness are false, then there is no 
reason why one of those other doxastic attitudes would not be permissible. If 
the above is right, then either the principle of insufficient reason or Fuzziness 
must be true. If either of the principles is true, then there is no slack in the 
principles of rationality. As such there is no sense in which the principles of 
rationality run short and underdetermine which epistemic standard is 
permissible. If so, then agents cannot permissibly plump for one or other 
epistemic standard. 
4.1.2 Choosing for Practical Reasons 
Suppose that instead of choosing S1 for no reason at all, Sally chose S1 on 
practical or non-epistemic grounds. One possible type of practical consideration 
may be the stakes at hand. The views that I am alluding to are called 
contextualism33 and subject sensitive invariantism. On the contextualist account, 
whether an agent’s belief is justified depends on the context of the assessor. For 
instance, the question whether Sally’s belief that P is justified depends on whether 
the person making the assessment of Sally’s rationality is Susan or some other 
person Mark. Subject sensitive invariantism is the view that the question of whether 
an agent’s belief is justified depends on the context of that agent. Hence, the 
question of whether a belief that P is justified for Sally depends on Sally’s context. 
These views have been advanced primarily as a reply to sceptical worries raised by 
the possibility of evil demons, ‘brains in vats’ and painted donkeys. The thought 
here is that in the philosophy classroom, we have to take seriously the possibility 
that an evil demon is deceiving us about the external world and hence are not 
justified in our beliefs about the external world. However, outside the philosophy 
classroom, our context changes and we are justified in our ordinary everyday 
beliefs. While most of such attempts are targeted at knowledge, some recent 
versions of contextualism or subject sensitivity (Hambourger 1987; Wedgwood 
2008; Davis 2015) are about justified belief. A further distinction is between 
intellectualist versions in which the context of justification or knowledge attribution is 
determined by which alternatives are made salient in the conversation, and more 
pragmatist versions where the context of justification is determined by the practical 
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 See DeRose (1992) and Cohen (1999) for defences of contextualism about knowledge. 
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stakes at issue. For instance, Hambourger (1987) argues that that we are justified in 
asserting or believing that P, if we can prudently neglect the possibility of being 
wrong. Thus, generally when the consequences of being wrong are more severe, it 
would be prudent to neglect that possibility only if the probability of being wrong was 
really low. That is to say, that degree of evidential support required to justify belief is 
very high. Similarly if being wrong is of little consequence, then it would be prudent 
to neglect this possibility even if there was some significant probability of being 
wrong. Therefore, the amount of evidence needed to justify belief is proportionally 
lower.  
To see why, the following two cases can be compared34. The first one is called Low 
Stakes. 
Low Stakes: I wish to deposit a cheque, but there is no particular 
urgency with which I need to do so. I consider going to the bank 
today. My largely reliable but still imperfect memory tells me that the 
bank closes at 8pm tonight. On the basis of my recollection, I believe 
that the bank closes at 8pm tonight. 
Contrast this with the next case which I shall refer to as High Stakes: 
High Stakes: I wish to deposit a cheque, but I need the cheque to 
clear in the next 3 days. Therefore I need to deposit it before the 
bank closes today. My largely reliable but still imperfect memory tells 
me that the bank closes at 8pm tonight. On the basis of my 
recollection, I suspend judgment that the bank closes at 8pm tonight 
and check the internet again to confirm the opening hours. 
Plausibly, the higher stakes in High Stakes rightly makes me more cautious about 
coming to a belief on the basis of my imperfect memory. To be clear, I am not 
arguing for contextualism. Rather, my aim is to sketch out an at least half-way 
plausible account according to which practical considerations can affect which 
epistemic standards an agent may permissibly apply. The thought here is that 
contextualism about justification might ground some version of permissivism. 
Practical stakes could affect the relative extents to which an agent values acquiring 
truths and avoiding falsehoods or her degree of epistemic risk aversion. For 
instance, if the consequences of acquiring a false belief about a proposition are 
particularly dire, but the benefits of getting it right are relatively mild, it might be 
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 These cases are based on DeRose’s bank cases (1992). 
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more appropriate to have an epistemic standard which recommends suspending 
judgment given a body of evidence, than one which recommends belief in that 
proposition. As such, there might be practical stakes which give Sally reason to 
choose S1 over S2. Thus, Sally’s adoption of S1 here can be rationally permissible 
in the right circumstances. 
In response to this argument, I shall make the following objection: If Sally’s practical 
reasons, together with the principles of rationality are sufficient for S1 to be a better 
standard for her than S2, then, she cannot permissibly adopt S2 rather than S1. To 
see why this would be the case, suppose Sally’s practical reasons, together with the 
principles of rationality gave her sufficient reason to adopt standard S1 and also 
gave her sufficient reason to adopt S2 instead. Then her choice of using S1 rather 
than S2 would be arbitrary in the same way that it would have been if she had no 
reason to adopt S1 at all. Her practical reasons and the principles of rationality 
together would still have been too weak to fix S1 as the best epistemic standard for 
Sally. As would have been the case if Sally had adopted S1 for no reason, adopting 
S1 when her practical reasons are indeterminate between S1 and S2 require her to 
go beyond any reasons she has available to her. In doing so, she may as well have 
flipped a coin or popped a pill. Hence her use of epistemic standard S1 is arbitrary 
and therefore irrational.  
The only way this arbitrariness is avoided is if Sally’s practical reasons fix S1 as 
being best for her. Similarly, even if Susan’s practical reasons are different, the only 
way she can avoid the charge of arbitrariness in choosing S2 is if her practical 
reasons fix S2 for her. Note, however, if for each agent their practical reasons 
together with the principles of rationality fix which standard is appropriate for her, 
then more than one epistemic standard is not permissible for her. While this does 
not preclude all forms of permissivism, this does preclude versions of permissivism 
which are consistent with intrapersonal permissivism about standards. In the next 
chapter, I shall discuss versions of permissivism according to which for each agent, 
only one epistemic standard is rationally permissible. 
4.1.3 Choosing for Epistemic Reasons 
The above discussion about how practical reasons make Sally’s adopting S1 
permissible can also be extended to epistemic reasons. Firstly, we can rule out the 
possibility that these epistemic reasons do not fix S1 for Sally. If they did not, Sally’s 
choosing S1 over S2 would go beyond what her reasons permitted. To avoid 
making Sally’s choice arbitrary, these epistemic reasons must fix S1 for Sally.  
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Given that these reasons must fix S1 for Sally, either these reasons are available to 
Susan and everyone else or they are not. If they are available, then these reasons, 
whatever they are, can be considered part of the principles of rationality. In that 
case the principles of rationality do fix S1 as the best epistemic standard for 
everyone. If, these reasons are not available to Susan, then even though some 
version of permissivism is still viable, that version is not compatible with 
intrapersonal permissivism about standards. S2 would correspondingly be the best 
standard for Susan. One such version of permissivism is the one offered by 
Simpson according to which epistemic standards vary according to cognitive 
capacities (2017). I shall discuss this account later in the next chapter. 
Summing up, I have argued that, if the principles of rationality, together with any 
other considerations which would bear on the choice of epistemic standards, permit 
for any given agent, more than one standard, the agent’s use of that standard will 
necessarily be arbitrary and therefore irrational. I have argued that the only 
alternatives are to endorse uniqueness or endorse a version of permissivism 
consistent with intrapersonal uniqueness about standards. 
4.1.4 Viewing Alternative Standards as also Rationally Permissible 
To recap, Schoenfield attempts to explain how an agent, Sally, could claim that her 
own epistemic standard was the most truth-conducive, but was just as rational as 
other epistemic standards. Her argument consists of two claims. The first is that the 
principles of rationality are general and do not fix one particular epistemic standard 
as the best. I have just addressed this first claim (4.1.1 - 4.1.3). Schoenfield’s 
second claim is that Sally can simultaneously accept both that S1 is the most truth-
conducive standard and also that Susan can rationally believe that S2 is. I shall 
argue that this is not possible. 
I shall be arguing that there are two possible perspectives from which Sally can 
evaluate Susan’s beliefs and epistemic standards. However, from neither 
perspective can Sally both endorse permissivism and the claim that her own 
standard is the most truth-conducive. Sally endorsing both claims involves a level 
confusion between these two perspectives. To see why, we need to clarify what, on 
Schoenfield’s account, Sally believes about Susan. Sally who uses standard S1 
would have the following beliefs about Susan who uses S2: 
A. Susan’s inferences on the basis of S2 are rational 
B. S2 is not maximally truth-conducive 
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C. It is rational for Susan to believe that S2 is maximally truth-conducive 
D. It would not be rational for Sally to believe that S2 is maximally truth-
conducive 
Claim A follows from the assumption that Sally accepts permissivism. To accept 
permissivism just is to accept that someone who uses some other epistemic 
standard can be rational. B follows from Sally’s belief that her own standard S1 is 
the most truth-conducive. If S2 was maximally truth-conducive, S1 would not be the 
most truth-conducive because it is at best just as truth-conducive as S2. Sally needs 
to believe C because denying C would introduce an untenable asymmetry between 
hers and Susan’s situations. From Sally’s own point of view, her inferences on the 
basis of S1 are rational either because S1 is actually the most truth-conducive or at 
least because she rationally believes that S1 is the most truth-conducive. If Sally 
were to reject C, then from her perspective, neither is S2 maximally truth-conducive 
nor is it rational for Susan to believe so. If S2 is not maximally truth-conducive and if 
it is not rational for Susan to believe that it is, it is unclear why Susan’s inferences 
on the basis of S2 are rational. Sally would have to think that the explanation for 
why Susan’s inferences on the basis of S2 are rational is very different from the 
explanation for why her own inferences on the basis of S1 are rational. However, 
such a belief cannot be sustained. One difficulty involves accounting for why the 
considerations that trump truth-conduciveness for Susan do not do so for Sally. 
Even if Sally can provide such an account, she cannot also account for the intuition 
that reasoning on the basis of S2 when she is in a position to know that S1 is more 
truth-conducive is a serious mistake in reasoning. Given that this asymmetry about 
the explanation for why Sally’s and Susan’s inferences on the basis of their own 
standards are rational is untenable, Sally has to accept C. Sally needs to assert D in 
order for her to avoid the Arbitrariness Objection. If it would be rational for Sally to 
believe that S2 was maximally truth-conducive, why would she object to popping a 
pill that would change her epistemic standards to S2? If she cannot object to 
popping a pill, her reasoning must be arbitrary.  
 Sally, therefore, seems to have good reasons for A-D. However, it seems 
inconsistent for Sally to believe A-D. To see why, consider C and D: On the surface, 
C and D seem consistent with each other. This would be because for Schoenfield, 
the truth-conduciveness of any given epistemic standard can only be evaluated 
relative to that standard (Schoenfield 2014: 202). That means that Sally believes C 
because she believes C*: 
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C*: It is rational relative to S2 to believe that S2 is maximally truth-
conducive 
And similarly, she believes D only because she believes D*: 
D*: It is not rational relative to S1 to believe that S2 is maximally 
truth-conducive. 
Given that Sally can only reason on the basis of S1, there’s no reason for her to 
believe that C* implies C. As far as she is concerned, Susan is using the wrong 
standards. As Simpson (2017) notes, since she can only make epistemic 
evaluations from the standpoint of her own standards, the fact that other standards 
are acceptable from the standpoint of those standards does not matter if, by her 
own lights, they are not maximally truth-conducive. If Sally were to try to assert the 
validity of other standards on the grounds of them being acceptable so long as one 
accepted those standards, she would be rejecting the idea that epistemic 
evaluations can only be made on the basis of one’s own standards.  
Rejecting this allows Sally to accept C and D, but requires her to reject B. To see 
why, we need to examine why we couldn’t tell which standards are more truth-
conducive independently of our epistemic standards. Consider a set of 20 
propositions, 10 of which are true. Ideally, we would wish to have the highest 
confidence in the true propositions and the lowest confidence in the false ones. If 
any epistemic standard S could deliver this result, there would be no question, 
regardless of which other standard we initially accepted, as to whether S was the 
rational standard to accept. However, not only is it unlikely that there is any such 
standard, our evidence is rarely so complete or strong that they conclusively 
indicate the truth of every question we may happen to be interested in. As a result, 
sometimes, we may end up having a high confidence in a falsehood and a low 
confidence in a truth. Between two standards S1 and S2, if S1 delivers a higher 
confidence in more truths and a lower confidence in more falsehoods than S2, then 
there is no question as to which standard is better. However, not all standards can 
be ordered so neatly that there are no trade-offs to be made between them. 
Suppose that instead of S1 being superior to S2 along all dimensions, S2 delivers 
lower confidences in falsehoods at the cost of lower confidences in truths as well. 
Or alternatively, it delivered higher confidences in truths at the expense of higher 
confidences in falsehoods. There seems to be no way, apart from adopting some 
scoring system, of measuring which standard is more truth-conducive.  
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However, there are many possible scoring systems. Some may of course deliver 
results that are obviously absurd35, but there may still be many scoring systems 
which provide different plausible ways of evaluating the overall truth-conduciveness 
of a standard. Each scoring system will select one standard or another as the one 
which is the most truth-conducive. The question of which standard is the most truth-
conducive thus depends on which scoring system we have most reason to adopt. 
However, the reasons we have for choosing one scoring system over the other are 
that they do a better job of identifying which inferences are rational given the 
evidence. This means that which scoring system we adopt is going to depend on 
which epistemic standard we accept.  
Once Sally steps outside of her own standard to assert that S2 is rational for Susan 
but not for Sally, she is not in a position to claim that S2 is not maximally truth-
conducive. Suppose that S2, for instance, generates more moderate confidences 
and fewer extreme ones than S1 given the same propositions and bodies of 
evidence. In the absence of any commitment one way or the other about whether it 
is better to have more or less moderate attitudes, S2 is clearly not superior to S1. 
Sally cannot assert the less than maximal truth-conduciveness of S2 without staying 
within the perspective of S1. However, as I have argued earlier, from within the 
perspective of S1, she cannot regard Susan’s choice of S2 as anything but a 
mistake. Susan would be accepting S2 for what Sally regards as less than the best 
of reasons, namely on the basis of an imperfect scoring system. Outside of the 
perspective of S1, all Sally can say of S2 is that it makes a different set of trade-offs 
than S1, but is not obviously pareto inferior to it. She thus cannot say that S2 is not 
maximally truth-conducive. At most, she can say that it is differently truth-conducive 
without being more or less. 
Once Sally denies that S1 is more truth-conducive than S2, she is vulnerable to the 
Arbitrariness Objection. If for her, S1 is not better than S2, she has no objection to 
changing epistemic standards by popping pills. However, forming beliefs by popping 
pills is arbitrary. Moreover, while Sally could defend accepting S1 on the basis that it 
matches the way she values acquiring truths and avoiding falsehoods while S2 does 
not, this precludes her from permissibly choosing S2.  As I have mentioned earlier, I 
shall address this version of permissivism later in Chapter 6. Also, as I have 
mentioned earlier, if Sally believes that S1 is more truth-conducive than S2, she 
                                                          
35
 For instance, if the accuracy function is convex downwards (i.e. concave upwards), that 
can license believing both a proposition and its negation in a number of cases where the 
evidence is equivocal between the two.  
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cannot believe that it is rational for Susan to reason on the basis of S2. That is, 
Sally must accept uniqueness.  
To be clear, all I have shown so far is that in accepting an epistemic standard, 
agents must accept uniqueness. I have not shown that uniqueness is in fact true. 
The distinction I am driving at was made by Kopec and Titelbaum (2016: 191) and is 
between acknowledged permissive cases and unacknowledged permissive cases. 
The thought here is that all the work in the Arbitrariness Objection and in my 
extension of it relies on the agent believing that a given piece of evidence is 
permissive. However, if the evidence is permissive but no agent believes that it is, 
then it would supposedly be possible for multiple agents to rationally adopt different 
standards, each mistakenly but rationally thinking that their own standard is the best 
and that everyone else is irrational. Then the Arbitrariness Objection would not 
apply since each agent accepts uniqueness and insists that her own standards are 
the correct ones. My only reply to such a move is that such a self-effacing version of 
permissivism commits us to being error theorists about rationality. I shall develop 
this point in greater detail in the next section (4.2).  
If the above arguments are correct, the only way for permissivists to both reject 
uniqueness and avoid the Arbitrariness Objection is to endorse intrapersonal 
uniqueness about standards but suppose that there is some other factor that fixes a 
different epistemic standard as uniquely appropriate for each agent. Before I 
proceed to discussing such accounts of permissivism, I shall argue, in the next 
section, that the Evidence Pointing Problem can also be extended against versions 
of permissivism which are consistent with intrapersonal permissivism about 
standards. 
4.2 Extending the Evidence Pointing Problem 
The crux of the Evidence Pointing Problem argument is the claim that evidential 
support is univocal. The univocal-ness of evidential support can be presumed to be 
grounded in some fact. This fact might be a matter of certain empirical regularities 
that make it the case that the evidence E reliably indicates to some degree that a 
given proposition P is true (Goldman 2011; Ballantyne and Coffman 2011). In some 
cases, it might be a matter of logical entailment, probabilistic entailment36 or some 
other apriori relation (Feldman 1995).  
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 See Ramsey (1931), Jeffreys (1948), Carnap (1950) and Howson (2003, 2007, 2009) for 
attempts at developing an account of logical probability. If logic can ground an account of 
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This point might require some explanation. Consider the following case which I call 
Empty Tank: 
Empty Tank: The fuel gauge in my car indicates that there is no 
petrol in the tank. It has also been two weeks since I last filled up 
petrol. I conclude from my fuel gauge that the fuel tank in my car is 
empty. 
If we were to ask a reliabilist why the fuel gauge reading supports the belief that the 
tank is empty, the reliabilist can point to causal connections between the tank and 
the gauge which make it the case that an empty reading on the gauge makes it 
more probable that the tank is empty. The causal connection between the tank and 
the gauge makes the gauge reading a reliable indicator of the amount of fuel left in 
the tank. This causal process therefore can be said to ground the evidential support 
relation on an indicator reliabilist picture. Given this causal relation, the gauge 
reading cannot support any other belief. 
An evidentialist might deny that the fuel gauge reading alone supports the 
proposition that the tank is empty. Rather an evidentialist might say that the reading 
together with other evidence which indicates that the gauge tends to be accurate 
supports the proposition that the tank is empty.37 For instance, it may be that every 
time the gauge reads empty, I need to fill in more than fifty litres of petrol before the 
tank is full. I may also know that the fuel capacity of my car is between fifty and fifty 
five litres. Moreover, I may observe that my fuel gauge decreases at a rate roughly 
proportional to the distance I drive and that I usually fill up with petrol every two 
weeks. All of these give me good reason to believe that my gauge is roughly 
accurate. This, together with the reading would then entail that the tank is probably 
empty. This entailment itself constitutes the evidential support relation. Given the 
entailment, the evidence cannot support any other belief.  
To generalise, in making the claim that the evidence supports a given proposition, 
we presuppose that there must be some fact in virtue of which the evidence 
supports the proposition. Different accounts of justification will provide different 
accounts of what such a fact may be. The above example illustrates that however 
we conceive of such a fact, this fact ensures that the evidence cannot support any 
                                                                                                                                                                    
probability or be extended to cover probabilistic cases, then there is something like an 
entailment relation that holds between the evidence and propositions in inductive and 
abductive cases. 
37
 Conee and Feldman (2008: 90-91) argue that this way of conceiving evidential support 
prevents double counting. 
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other alternative. Let us call such facts that ground or constitute the evidential 
support relation G.  
To illustrate, suppose, that in Empty Tank, the fact, which makes it the case that the 
fuel gauge reading supports the agent’s belief that the tank is empty, is the causal 
relation between the amount of fuel in the tank and the reading in the gauge. 
Presumably, there is some device in the fuel tank which detects the fuel level and 
sends a corresponding signal to the gauge. Insofar as this device is working 
properly, the fuel gauge reading reliably indicates the level of fuel in the tank. In this 
case, G is the causal relation between the fuel level and the gauge reading. This 
causal relation makes it the case that the fuel gauge reading reliably indicates the 
fuel level. This is what, according to indicator reliabilism, makes the evidence 
support the belief that the fuel tank is empty. If indicator reliabilism is the correct 
account of justification, the evidence could not support any other doxastic attitude 
without the causal relation being different. For instance, the device in the fuel tank 
which detects the fuel level is broken and causes the gauge to read empty 
regardless of how much fuel is in the tank. However, the device cannot be both 
broken and working properly. The facts about what causal mechanism relates fuel 
levels to gauge readings fix whether and to what degree an empty gauge reading 
supports the proposition that the tank is empty. It follows that if the evidence does 
support the belief that the tank is empty, it cannot support any other doxastic 
attitude. 
Another intuition that the Evidence Pointing Problem relies on is that the fact which 
grounds or constitutes the evidential support relation is not indexed to agents. Facts 
which are indexed to agents are things like the agent’s epistemic standards, 
cognitive abilities, values, priors etc. Let me call such facts which ground or 
constitute the evidential support relation and which are not indexed to agents, F. In 
Empty Tank, the fact which grounded whether the gauge reading supported the 
belief that the tank is empty was the existence of the properly working device which 
established a causal mechanism between the fuel level and the gauge reading. This 
particular causal relation exists regardless of who happens to read the fuel gauge. 
Thus, in this case, the fact which grounds the evidential support relation is not 
indexed to persons. Therefore, if the evidence supports the belief that the tank is 
empty for one agent, Sally, that body of evidence supports that same doxastic 
attitude for all other agents who possess that evidence. Generalising from here 
yields uniqueness. If there is some fact that fixes what the evidence supports and 
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that fact is not indexed to persons38, then there is no reason why different doxastic 
attitudes towards a proposition could be justified to people who have the same total 
body of evidence.  
By contrast, suppose that at least some of the facts that grounded the evidential 
support relation were indexed to persons. Suppose, for instance, the question of 
whether a body of evidence supports a proposition depends on whether the agent 
can infer that proposition from the evidence via a reliable process. The question of 
whether a given process is reliable can depend on the cognitive capacities of the 
agent carrying out the process. To see why, consider the following situation. 
Polling: Susan and Sally both possess a large amount of survey data 
regarding the upcoming election. Susan, who knows how to process 
the survey data can reliably infer that Candidate A will win. On the 
other hand, Sally, who does not know how to process the survey 
data cannot reliably infer that Candidate A will win. Therefore, she 
suspends judgment instead. 
In Polling, there is a reliable process by which Susan can infer that Candidate A will 
win. However that process is not available to Sally. Therefore, if the facts that 
ground evidential support are at least partly constituted by the agent’s cognitive 
capacities, then the evidence supports the proposition that Candidate A will win for 
Susan but not for Sally.  It should be clear that even when the fact which grounds 
evidential support, G, is indexed to the agent, evidential support is univocal. If 
Susan has available to her a reliable process whereby she can infer that Candidate 
A will win and this fact makes it the case that believing that Candidate A will win is 
supported by her evidence, then suspending judgment or disbelief is not supported 
by the evidence for her. Likewise, the fact that no such reliable process is available 
to Sally would make it the case that, for Sally, her evidence supports suspending 
judgment about whether Candidate A will win. 
Summing up, the existence of Gs, facts which ground the evidential support relation, 
is compatible with both uniqueness and permissivism. In fact, both permissivists and 
impermissivists are committed to the existence of such facts. To deny their 
existence is to suppose that there is no fact about the matter as to whether the 
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 Contra White (2005), Uniqueness presupposes nothing further than that the facts which 
ground or constitute the evidential support relation are not indexed to persons. While White 
presupposes that such facts are necessary, in principle, Uniqueness would be true even if 
the facts that ground evidential support are only contingent so long as they are not indexed 
to the agent. 
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evidence supports a particular doxastic attitude. Insofar as both permissivists and 
impermissivists are committed to the evidence actually supporting some doxastic 
attitude, there must be some fact which grounds this support relation. The core of 
the permissivist’s disagreement with the impermissivist is whether all Gs are Fs; that 
is, whether any of the facts which constitute or ground the evidential support relation 
are indexed to persons. Uniqueness is true if and only if none of the facts which 
ground evidential support are indexed to persons. 
As with the discussion regarding the Arbitrariness Objection, my targets in this 
section are accounts of permissivism like Schoenfield’s which are consistent with 
intrapersonal permissivism about standards. I shall argue that such accounts cannot 
escape the Evidence Pointing Problem. In order to do this, we first need to settle 
what needs to be true of the facts which ground evidential support in order for 
intrapersonal permissivism about epistemic standards to be true. 
Certainly, if all Gs are Fs, then intrapersonal uniqueness about standards must be 
true. Given that the evidence supports the same proposition for everyone, there is 
only one epistemic standard which would tell agents to believe according to the 
evidence. If only one standard is appropriate for everyone, then that standard is 
compulsory. However, even if some Gs were indexed to persons, this need not 
entail intrapersonal permissivism about standards. 
Suppose that the facts were indexed to an agent’s cognitive capacities. This would 
mean that facts about an agent’s cognitive capacities would ground facts about 
what the evidence supported for her. If so, then this would fix for that agent which 
epistemic standard was appropriate. No other epistemic standard would be suited 
for that agent, given her cognitive capacities. Similarly, if the facts that grounded 
evidential support were indexed to an agent’s values, then the agent’s values would 
ground for that agent what the evidence supported. Then only one epistemic 
standard could tell her to believe what the evidence supported for her. While the 
agent’s values might change at a later point in time, given the values she currently 
has, no other epistemic standard would be appropriate. 
If the facts grounding or constituting evidential support are indexed to certain facts 
about agents, then against this background of facts, only one epistemic standard is 
appropriate for that agent. The only way for intrapersonal permissivism about 
standards to be true is if one of the facts which grounded evidential support was the 
agent’s epistemic standards. If so, then while it would be trivially true that against 
the background fact of the agent’s epistemic standard, only one epistemic standard 
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would be appropriate for her, the question of which epistemic standard an agent 
adopts is not a background fact. 
In the ensuing, I shall argue that the facts which ground or constitute the evidential 
support relation cannot be indexed to the agent’s epistemic standards. For ease of 
presentation, I shall centre my argument on Fs and concomitantly, uniqueness, thus 
ignoring for now the possibility that the facts which ground evidential support could 
be indexed to agents in one way or another. The argument can be easily extended 
to versions of permissivism consistent with intrapersonal uniqueness about 
standards. Ultimately, disregarding this possibility should not matter as I shall be 
showing in subsequent chapters that no such indexing proposal is plausible.  
The first step of the argument involves showing that under Schoenfield’s account, 
agents are committed to the existence of Fs. To see why, recall that for Schoenfield: 
“[We] can just think of a set of standards as a function from bodies of 
evidence to doxastic states which the agent takes to be truth 
conducive. Roughly, this means that the agent has high confidence 
that forming opinions using her standards will result in her having 
high confidence in truths and low confidence in falsehoods.” 
(Schoenfield 2014: 199) 
This means that each agent must believe that her own epistemic standard is the 
most truth-conducive. After all, if she believes that there is some epistemic standard 
other than hers which would allow her to increase the rate at which she has high 
confidence in truths and low confidence in falsehoods but still sticks with her current 
standard, she would be irrational. If she believes her own epistemic standard is the 
most truth-conducive, then she ought to believe that the evidence really does 
support the conclusion that she would obtain by applying her epistemic standard. 
To see why, note that an epistemic standard is a function from bodies of evidence to 
doxastic states. We can think of the epistemic standard as therefore consisting of a 
collection of rules of the form “If your evidence is E, take attitude A towards 
proposition P”. For the sake of simplicity I shall focus on just one such rule. In the 
following case, I shall suppose that there are seven instead of just three doxastic 
attitudes. Apart from suspending judgment, an agent may weakly believe or 
disbelieve, moderately believe or disbelieve or strongly believe or disbelieve in a 
proposition. 
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Suppose that an agent, Sally, accepts an epistemic standard S1 which includes the 
rule: if your evidence is E, moderately believe that P. Since she accepts S1, she 
believes that following the rule will be the most truth-conducive. It follows that she 
ought to think that E in fact moderately supports P. To see why this would be the 
case, suppose we were to deny that she ought to think that E moderately supports 
P and instead she believed that E weakly supports P. Sally would have the following 
combination of beliefs: 
A. Sally ought moderately believe that P in response to E 
B. Moderately believing that P is the most truth-conducive response to E 
C. E weakly supports P 
A is just a restatement of the rule which is a part of S1. Believing that B follows from 
Schoenfield’s account of what it means for Sally to accept S1, namely that she 
believes that her epistemic standards are the most truth-conducive. Once Sally 
accepts A and B, it is difficult to see how she could accept C. It is difficult to see how 
if E only weakly supports P, forming a weak belief that P would not be more truth-
conducive than moderately believing that P. An explanation for why moderately 
believing that P is the most truth-conducive response is that E moderately supports 
P. Where there is a mismatch between claims about what the evidence supports 
and what is the most truth-conducive, there needs to be a further explanation apart 
from the evidence for why that response is the most truth-conducive. There also 
needs to be an account of what evidential support is such that weak support for P 
does not make weakly believing that P the most truth-conducive. However, it is 
unclear if any such account is available. 
It should be noted that the above objection can be made with regards to any similar 
alternative to C. For instance, if Sally believed that E strongly supported P or that E 
supported not-P, there would still need to be some explanation as to why Sally did 
not think that strongly believing that P or disbelieving that P was the most truth-
conducive. Therefore, Sally ought to believe that E moderately supports P. If Sally 
ought to believe that E moderately supports P, then she cannot permissibly believe 
that E supports P to any other degree. Therefore, according to Sally, moderately 
believing that P is the only rational response to E. If for each of her doxastic 
attitudes which are rationally held, she ought to believe that those attitudes are the 
only rational options, then she is committed to uniqueness.  
To be clear, this not only commits Sally to uniqueness, it commits Schoenfield as 
well. To see why, suppose instead that all permissive cases were unacknowledged 
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permissive cases. That is to say, suppose that even though Sally, like all other 
agents, is committed to accepting uniqueness, uniqueness is in fact false. If 
uniqueness were false, then there would be no facts like F which would ground the 
evidential support relation and which would not be indexed to persons. The reason 
for this is that uniqueness is false only if there is no singular fact about what the 
evidence supports simpliciter. There is only what the evidence supports relative to 
people’s epistemic standards, their capacities, values or priors. If there is no fact 
about what the evidence supports simpliciter, then there is no F. If there are no facts 
like F, but agents are committed to there being some facts like F, then they are 
mistaken about the kind of activity they are engaged in when they reason from 
evidence. 
Being wrong about the existence of F is not merely being rationally committed to 
false beliefs. An agent’s commitment to the existence of F goes to the core of what 
it means to make a rational inference on the basis of evidence. Recall that Sally 
thinks that moderately believing that P is the most truth-conducive response to E 
because E moderately supports P. Sally is committed to understanding rational 
inferences on the basis of evidence as being about believing according to what the 
evidence supports simpliciter. If there is no fact of the matter about what the 
evidence supports, then responding to evidence would be like astrology.  
Astrologers, insofar as they are engaged in astrology, are committed to the 
existence of some fact which grounds an astronomical-psychological bridge 
principle. That is, they are committed to a principle that specifies how facts about 
the arrangements of celestial bodies in the night sky influence people’s 
personalities. Insofar as there are no facts which could ground such a bridge 
principle, astrology is a nonsensical activity. By contrast, if there were such 
principles and hence facts grounding such principles, even if everyone tended to get 
these principles wrong, it would be merely difficult, but still not nonsensical. If 
reasoning on the basis of evidence commits us to the existence of F which does not 
exist, then reasoning on the basis of evidence is nonsense. However, surely since 
permissivists like Schoenfield would reject the claim that reasoning from evidence is 
a nonsensical activity, then they are committed to the existence of F and hence 
committed to uniqueness.  
If we wish to deny that accepting an epistemic standard commits an agent to F, we 
need to say that it commits them to facts which are indexed to agents instead. 
Given that Schoenfield’s account of the evidential support relativizes evidential 
90 
 
support to people’s epistemic standards, we might try applying this account to such 
facts. That is to say, suppose that instead of C, Sally believes C* instead. 
C*. E moderately supports P relative to S1 
However, this move makes Schoenfield’s account circular. C* is intended to explain 
A and B. To see why, recall that A is a rule that is extracted from S1 and S1 
explains why E supports moderately believing that P for Sally but not for Susan. B 
explains A in the following sense. If Sally were to be asked why she should 
moderately believe that P in response to E, she cites her belief that doing so is the 
most truth-conducive option. However, when asked why she thinks moderately 
believing that P is the most truth-conducive option, she cannot cite C*. If she were 
to cite C* she would be using C* to explain why C* is the case. If she does so, she 
would be explaining why a standard recommends the attitude it does by appealing 
to the fact that the evidence supports that attitude relative to the standard. But by 
her own lights, the fact that one’s own standard recommends a given response to 
the evidence explains why the evidence supports it, relative to the standard. Thus 
C* would be used to explain C* and that cannot be right. 
Whatever the fact that the truth-conduciveness of an epistemic standard is to be 
grounded in is, that fact cannot be indexed to the standard. We cannot explain why 
a given epistemic standard is truth-conducive by appealing to that epistemic 
standard.  Therefore it has to be grounded either in facts which are not indexed to 
persons or to facts like the agent’s values, priors or cognitive capacities. In the next 
three chapters, I shall discuss each of the latter three indexing proposals and argue 
that each of them face certain distinct problems. For now, all I need to note is that if 
the fact that grounds the truth-conduciveness of the epistemic standard is one like 
the agent’s values, priors or cognitive capacities, intrapersonal permissivism about 
standards cannot be true. As can be seen in the Polling example, if facts about the 
agent’s cognitive capacities ground the degree to which her evidence supports a 
proposition, then only the epistemic standard which requires her to form the 
corresponding doxastic attitude is rationally permissible for her. 
In this chapter, I have argued that the Arbitrariness Objection and the Evidence 
Pointing Problem can be extended to apply to versions of permissivism in which 
more than one epistemic standard is permissible for an agent. As mentioned in the 
previous chapter, a central task of this thesis is to show that for each burden of 
judgment which presupposes permissivism, the disagreement caused by that 
burden is not rational. I argued that the second burden, which essentially claimed 
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that people could rationally disagree because they had different epistemic 
standards, was crucial in making rational disagreement possible because of the way 
in which having different epistemic standards solved the Arbitrariness Objection and 
the Evidence Pointing Problem. In showing that these two objections can be 
extended to versions of permissivism consistent with intrapersonal permissivism 
about epistemic standards, I have closed off one possible route by which the 
second burden of judgment could generate rational disagreement. That is to say, 
people cannot permissibly disagree about the strength of an evidential consideration 
simply because more than one epistemic standard is rationally permissible for a 
given agent. If it is ever permissible for people to disagree about the strength of their 
evidence, this could only be the case if some other burden of judgment made 
different epistemic standards uniquely appropriate for different agents.  The only 
versions of permissivism left are ones which are consistent with intrapersonal 
uniqueness about standards: For any given agent, only one, but not necessarily the 
same epistemic standard is permissible for her. 
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Chapter 5: Permissivism, Cognitive Capacities and Limitations 
Background 
In Chapter 3, I argued that intrapersonal uniqueness is true and that the most 
plausible version of permissivism was one according to which the doxastic attitude 
which was rational for a person was relative to the epistemic standard they adopted, 
provided that the epistemic standard was itself permissible for the agent. In Chapter 
4, I argued that versions of permissivism which are consistent with intrapersonal 
permissivism about epistemic standards are also vulnerable to the Arbitrariness 
Objection and the Evidence Pointing Problem. The only views left are those which 
are consistent with intrapersonal uniqueness about epistemic standards:  for each 
agent there is only one rationally permissible epistemic standard, but not 
necessarily the same one. This raises the question as to why different epistemic 
standards would be uniquely rational for different agents. Any satisfactory answer to 
this must provide some respect in which agents can differ from one another, and 
some account of how this aspect in which they differ makes a difference to which 
epistemic standard they should employ. I shall cover three such proposals: The first 
of which I shall cover in this chapter is that the question of which epistemic standard 
is most truth-conducive for an agent depends on her cognitive capacities. The 
second proposal which I shall cover in the next chapter is that how we measure the 
truth-conduciveness of an epistemic standard depends on how we value the twin 
epistemic goals of pursuing truths and avoiding falsehoods. The third proposal, 
which I shall cover in Chapter 7, is that the epistemic standard we ought to employ 
depends on what doxastic attitudes we have prior to acquiring the evidence.  
5.1 Truth Conduciveness Relative to Cognitive Capacities 
As it is impossible to cover every possible variation in the space I have available, I 
shall cover what I take to be versions representative of the most dominant theories 
in epistemology. One version of permissivism says that people may adopt different 
epistemic standards because they have different cognitive abilities. The existence of 
these different cognitive abilities means that different epistemic standards will be 
maximally truth-conducive for different people. In this chapter, I shall be addressing 
Simpson’s account, which depends on people being cognitively imperfect in one 
way or other. 
Simpson illustrates his account of permissivism with a rather lengthy case he refers 
to as Detective. I shall reproduce the case in full. 
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Detective: “Veronica Mars and Nancy Drew are investigating a crime 
for which X and Y are the prime suspects. After thoroughly reviewing 
the same body of relevant evidence, Mars believes it’s 70% likely X 
is the culprit and 30% likely Y is the culprit, whereas Drew believes 
it’s 30% likely X is the culprit and 70% likely Y is the culprit… 
Suppose firstly that Mars and Drew employ different epistemic 
standards, i.e. they use different methods for assessing and 
interpreting their evidence in order to form their beliefs. Suppose, for 
instance, that they have different methods for evaluating the 
probative force of testimonial evidence, a type of evidence that’s 
often an important part of the data they examine as detectives. Mars 
is excellent at recognizing insincere testimony – she’s very sensitive 
to various subtle verbal and non-verbal tell-tale markers of insincerity 
– and thus she interprets different instances of testimony differently, 
ascribing a different probative force to insincere testimonial evidence. 
Drew is not very good at identifying insincere testimony, but she is 
excellent at making holistic, gestalt assessments of the combined 
probative implications of large bodies of disparate evidence. So 
unlike Mars, Drew doesn’t pre-sort the testimonial evidence, based 
on its sincerity. Where Mars reviews the testimonial evidence in 
sequence, identifying each item’s probative force in its own right, 
Drew reviews all testimonial evidence in the same light, and 
assesses the probative force of the testimonial data as a set. Mars 
applies her standards because she’s cognitively well-equipped to 
apply them. She has the kind of perceptual and attentional abilities 
that enable her to accurately judge the sincerity of testimony. In a 
similar way, Drew is cognitively well-equipped to apply her standards. 
She has a particular imaginative facility that enables her to formulate 
credible explanatory narratives, based on gestalt interpretations of 
diverse bodies of evidence... Although Mars and Drew are working 
together for the first time, they have a long track-record of working 
independently on other cases. And in light of their track-records, both 
of them have good reason to believe that when they apply their own 
epistemic standards, in forming beliefs about cases relevantly similar 
to the case at hand, they are very likely to get the answer right. In 
short, each of them is in the position of (i) having a combination of 
cognitive abilities and epistemic standards which reliably generates 
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accurate beliefs, and (ii) having good reason to believe that this is the 
case.” (Simpson 2017) 
Simpson argues that this case provides an example of how people with different but 
equally reliable cognitive capacities could adopt different epistemic standards. If 
Simpson is correct, people who have different cognitive capacities could adopt 
different standards and therefore have different responses to the evidence which 
were nevertheless still rational. Simpson’s account relies on the presumption that 
the epistemic standard best suited for each person is maximally truth-conducive for 
that person. If Nancy Drew were to try to apply Veronica Mars’ standards she would 
do less well because she would do badly at evaluating the sincerity of the testimony. 
Similarly, Veronica Mars would also perform sub-optimally if she applied Nancy 
Drew’s standards, as she is prone to make mistakes when trying to assess the 
probative force of the evidence as a whole. Both standards play to their respective 
agents’ strengths and mitigate their weaknesses. 
However, it is this aspect of the situation which undermines the rationality of both 
detectives’ responses. Both Nancy Drew and Veronica Mars fail to respond perfectly 
well to all their evidence because both have weaknesses: parts of the evidence 
which they are unable to reliably assess well. To see why, consider an 
amalgamation of Nancy Drew and Veronica Mars: Nancy Mars. Nancy Mars has 
both Nancy Drew’s and Veronica Mars’s weaknesses: she is unable to reliably 
assess the sincerity of testimony and evaluate the evidence as a whole. Nancy 
Mars is clearly less reliable than both Nancy Drew and Veronica Mars. Nancy Mars 
is less reliable than Veronica Mars due to the reason that she is unable to reliably 
assess the sincerity of testimonial evidence; hence, she tends to overestimate the 
probative force of testimony from insincere people and underestimate the force of 
testimony from those who are sincere. Since Nancy Mars differs from Veronica 
Mars in just this one respect, the former is clearly less reliable than the latter. 
Plausibly, to over or underestimate the strength of a given piece of evidence is, by 
definition, to make a mistake in reasoning. If reasoning well necessarily involves 
forming beliefs in proportion to the strength of the evidence, then forming beliefs 
that deviate from what the evidence points to is going to be a mistake. As I shall be 
arguing in the following sections, if a belief can only be formed on the basis of a 
mistake, then it is not rational given the evidence. 
Since Veronica Mars is just as reliable as Nancy Drew, Nancy Mars must be less 
reliable than Nancy Drew. The only difference between Nancy Mars and Nancy 
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Drew is that the latter evaluates her evidence as a whole, whereas the former 
evaluates her evidence piece by piece. Since evaluating the evidence piece by 
piece is less reliable than evaluating it as a whole, evaluating it piece by piece must 
involve in at least some cases mis-estimating the strength of the evidence as a 
whole. The assumption here is that to evaluate one’s evidence properly is to 
evaluate it in a maximally truth-conducive manner. I shall evaluate this assumption 
later in this chapter, but, for now, if it is true, then Nancy Mars must make at least 
some mistakes in reasoning by evaluating her evidence piece by piece rather than 
as a whole. 
If evaluating one’s evidence piece by piece results in a mistake in a given case, 
then Veronica Mars would make a mistake in reasoning in that case. Similarly, if 
failing to account for the sincerity of testimony is a mistake, then Nancy Drew also 
makes a mistake whenever she applies her epistemic standards. As such, since 
they both make mistakes in reasoning, their disagreement cannot be rational. 
Notably, they must be substantive mistakes because they involve misestimating the 
overall strength of the evidence. The doxastic attitude they end up with arguably 
does not fit the evidence. If, on the other hand, they were to properly evaluate the 
evidence by both reliably assessing the sincerity of testimony and evaluating the 
evidence as a whole, there seems to be no particular reason why they would 
disagree. 
Resisting this argument requires showing that evaluating the evidence piece by 
piece and failing to assess the sincerity of testimony are not mistakes in reasoning; 
or even if they are mistakes, do not render the resultant belief irrational. However, if 
they are not mistakes then it would be permissible for Nancy Drew and Veronica 
Mars to adopt Nancy Mars’s epistemic standard. Yet if more than one epistemic 
standard was permissible for any agent, it would, as discussed in Chapter 4, be 
arbitrary as to why she uses one standard rather than another. Moreover, as 
discussed in the same chapter, the facts which ground evidential support cannot 
include the agent’s epistemic standard. If so, more than one epistemic standard 
cannot be permissible for any given agent. What is implicit in Simpson’s argument is 
the claim that Nancy Drew can permissibly not assess the sincerity of testimony 
because she is not able to reliably do so. Similarly, Veronica Mars can permissibly 
assess the evidence piece by piece because she is incapable of assessing it as a 
whole.  
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What is implicit in the Detective case is the idea that the reason why people can 
have different epistemic standards when they have different cognitive capacities is 
that they can permissibly lower their epistemic standards in response to their own 
cognitive limitations. Thus, since Nancy Drew cannot reliably assess the sincerity of 
testimony, she ought to adopt an epistemic standard according to which she should 
ignore all evidence pertaining to sincerity. If, on the other hand, people’s epistemic 
standards need not be lowered in response to cognitive limitations, there would be 
no reason to think that a standard according to which Nancy Drew need not assess 
the sincerity of testimony is appropriate for her just because she cannot reliably 
assess the sincerity of testimony. Likewise, there would be no reason to think that a 
standard according to which the agent need not evaluate the evidence as a whole is 
permissible for Veronica Mars. 
5.2 Difficult Questions and Cognitive Limitations 
Simpson’s account of how different cognitive capacities make appropriate different 
epistemic standards ultimately boils down to a variation of the claim that people can 
rationally disagree because they have limited cognitive resources or capacities. This 
claim is made explicitly by Gaus (2011) and Rosa (2012; 2016), and is also implicit 
in Rawls’s (1993) account of the first, third and fifth burdens of judgment.  
Recall that according the first burden of judgment, people can rationally disagree 
because “the evidence… bearing on the case is conflicting and complex and thus 
hard to assess and evaluate” (Rawls 1993: 56). Similarly, according to the fifth 
burden, “there are different kinds of normative considerations of different force on 
both sides of an issue and it is difficult to make an overall assessment” (ibid: 57). As 
I argued in Chapter 2, both the first, third and fifth burdens claim that because it is 
difficult to evaluate the overall normative force of one’s evidential or moral reasons, 
disagreement about these issues, even given the same total body of evidence, can 
be rational. 
My claim, in this section, is that disagreement that comes about because the overall 
normative force of our reasons is difficult to assess would be rational only if agents 
should lower their epistemic standards because of their cognitive limitations. While 
Rawls himself says little on this topic, Gaus’s (2011) account of reasonable 
disagreement provides a plausible account linking the difficulty of an issue to the 
rationality of disagreement about that issue. Gaus’s argument consists of three 
claims.  
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A) People have limited cognitive resources.  
B) Avoiding errors in reasoning can in some cases require large 
amounts of cognitive resources. 
C) There is a point beyond which people are not obligated to use their 
cognitive resources to avoid errors in reasoning. 
These three claims together imply that when matters are difficult to assess, 
disagreement can be reasonable. In order to show why this is the case, I shall 
elaborate on each claim in turn. 
Gaus’s first claim is that people have limited cognitive resources. Reasoning 
requires time and effort and people only have a finite amount of time and effort that 
they can spend on reasoning. People cannot continue reasoning indefinitely; they 
eventually have to act on the beliefs that they have reasoned about so far (ibid: 246-
247). Gaus’s account is concerned with how much reasoning an agent does, that is, 
how much of an agent’s system of beliefs or evidence she looks through to identify 
supporting and defeating considerations. Apart from identifying a consideration, we 
might suppose that cognitive resources are also expended in assessing the strength 
of that consideration. It takes at least some effort for an agent to make herself 
aware of her biases and screen them off when assessing how significant a given 
piece of evidence is. We may also think that correspondingly that the amount of 
effort a person can continuously exert over a given period of time is limited as well.  
In addition to the claim that cognitive resources are limited, Gaus’s second claim is 
that avoiding errors in reasoning can consume large amounts of cognitive 
resources. Consider that when we casually examine a piece of evidence, we are 
prone to hastily over or underestimate the strength of that consideration. For 
instance, as Kornblith notes, we are often prone to drawing conclusions about a 
population on the basis of a very limited sample size. He points to the common 
tendency to draw conclusions about consumer products on the basis of a single 
person’s bad experience (Kornblith 1983: 42-44)39. This tendency seems to indicate 
that refraining from hastily forming beliefs on inadequate inductive evidence takes 
more effort than many among us are willing to expend. Gaus notes that the amount 
of reasoning one has to engage in so as to take into account all the relevant 
considerations found in an agent’s system of beliefs exceeds the capabilities of 
ordinary reasoners. He says that “only ideally rational agents, capable of scanning 
                                                          
39
 To be sure, Kornblith (1983) does try to argue that such inferences are justified in 
situations where we cannot obtain better evidence. However, he notes that these inferences 
still run afoul of what he calls rules of ideal reasoning. 
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their entire belief system for lurking defeaters” could completely avoid errors in 
reasoning (Gaus 2011: 146). We need not agree with Gaus in thinking that every 
question will require us to scan through our entire system of beliefs in order to avoid 
errors in reasoning. Perhaps in particularly simpler cases, it is fairly obvious what 
the evidence regarding the proposition can be, and scanning through this set of 
beliefs is within the grasp of most ordinary agents. For instance, splitting the dinner 
bill equally between two persons is something that most ordinary agents are 
capable of and does not require anyone to scan through their entire system of 
beliefs. Other questions might require more reasoning and this would mean that the 
agent had to scan more of her system of beliefs to identify the relevant 
considerations.  Summing up, reasoning well requires cognitive resources, and 
cases which require more reasoning or more careful reasoning require more 
cognitive resources. Given that people have limited cognitive resources, questions 
which use up most of if not more cognitive resources than a person may have 
available will be difficult to assess without committing some kind of error in 
reasoning. Therefore, the normative force of an agent’s reasons would be difficult to 
assess only because of her cognitive limitations.  
If the difficulty of assessing the normative force of one’s reasons can render the 
resulting disagreement rational, this can only be because people, due to their 
cognitive limitations, ought to accept epistemic standards which are constituted by 
relatively less demanding epistemic norms. If agents could not permissibly lower 
their standards in this way, then, they ought to reason according to the more 
demanding epistemic norms even though they are cognitively limited. If so, the fact 
that they are cognitively limited and the reasons are therefore difficult to assess 
would play no role in making any resulting disagreement rational. Therefore, in 
order for the first and fifth burdens to be sources of rational disagreement, it must be 
permissible for agents to employ less demanding epistemic standards in response 
to their cognitive limitations.  
This must similarly be the case for the third burden of judgment, according to which 
people rationally disagree because their concepts to some degree or another are 
vague and subject to borderline cases. Williamson explains the existence of vague 
predicates by appealing to cognitive limitations that prevent us from clearly 
identifying whether a given borderline case falls under the predicate. As I suggested 
in Chapter 2, these cognitive limitations are of the same sort that could make 
inferences when the evidence is conflicting and complex subject to rational 
disagreement. If so, it must also be the case that in order for the third burden of 
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judgment to generate rational disagreement, it must be permissible for agents to 
employ less demanding epistemic standards in response to their cognitive 
limitations. 
As mentioned earlier, cognitive limitations also play a crucial role in Simpson’s 
account. Indeed in reference to Detective, Nancy Drew is unable to reliably assess 
the sincerity of testimony and Veronica Mars similarly cannot assess the evidence 
as a whole, and has to proceed piece by piece. Their disagreement is rational only if 
it is permissible for each to employ epistemic standards which are less demanding 
in ways that correspond to those respects in which they are cognitively limited. 
5.3 Limitation of Epistemic Obligations by Cognitive Capacity  
It is precisely this last claim which is defended by Gaus. According to the third claim 
made by Gaus, there is some point beyond which people are not obligated to use 
their cognitive resources to avoid errors in reasoning. Gaus, for instance, endorses 
the following account of when individuals have sufficient reason to hold a particular 
doxastic attitude. Let’s call this principle Provisionally Sufficient Reasons: 
Provisionally Sufficient Reasons: “Alf has (provisionally) a sufficient 
reason R40 if and only if a ‘respectable amount’ of good reasoning by 
Alf would conclude that R is an undefeated reason” (ibid: 250) 
Provisionally Sufficient Reasons implies that people do not need to engage in a 
more than respectable amount of reasoning in order to rationally hold a particular 
doxastic attitude towards a proposition. After all, if a given, “respectable” amount of 
reasoning is sufficient for the resulting doxastic attitude to be rational, then a more 
than sufficient amount of reasoning cannot be obligatory. We might, in addition, 
think that apart from the amount of reasoning, there could also be some 
“respectable” amount of effort we put into reasoning beyond which there is no 
further obligation to ensure that we do not under or over-estimate the strength of a 
given piece of evidence.  
There are different ways in which we could determine what level of cognitive 
resources we have to commit in order to have engaged in a respectable amount 
and quality of reasoning. For instance, it could be that people have an obligation to 
use all their available cognitive resources. If people have different amounts of 
cognitive resources available, what counts as a respectable amount of reasoning 
                                                          
40
 In case it is not already clear, I will take the elocutions “A has sufficient reason to believe 
P” and “It would be rational for A to believe P” to be interchangeable. 
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would differ between them. Or, it could be that people ought to expend some fixed 
fraction of their total cognitive resources in reasoning, but no obligation to expend 
more than that. Alternatively, there could be some fixed amount of resources that 
people are obliged to expend. People who have very little in the way of cognitive 
resources would be obliged to expend all or most of their cognitive resources while 
those who are much wealthier in terms of cognitive resources need to spend only a 
small fraction of their resources before they have satisfied their epistemic 
obligations. I shall discuss these different accounts later in this chapter. Suffice it to 
say that for any of these accounts, it will sometimes be the case that a more than 
the obligatory amount of cognitive resources needs to be expended in order to avoid 
errors in reasoning. 
Suppose that in a given case, a more than obligatory amount of resources is 
necessary in order to avoid erroneous reasoning. Alfred and Betty share a body of 
evidence which contain two pieces of evidence, R1 and R2 which pertain to whether 
P. Suppose that after a “respectable” amount of reasoning, Alfred uncovers within 
his evidence R1 which supports a belief in P, but not R2. Betty, who shares the 
same body of evidence uncovers after a “respectable” amount of reasoning R2 
which supports disbelief in P. Since the amount of reasoning required to account for 
all the considerations, R1 and R2, relevant to P exceeds the amount of reasoning 
that Alfred and Betty are obligated to put in when considering whether P, we can 
treat this as being a case in which the question of whether P is difficult to assess. 
Moreover, since Alfred and Betty have both put in a respectable amount of 
reasoning, according to Provisionally Sufficient Reasons, they would have sufficient 
reason and are therefore rational in their corresponding beliefs. This example 
should make clear at least one way in which a proposition being difficult to assess 
creates room for rational disagreement. We can generate other examples whereby 
the amount of cognitive resources required to completely avoid errors in reasoning 
exceeds the amount which agents are obligated to expend in reasoning. In any such 
case, the fact that the cognitive cost of completely avoiding errors is so high, 
combined with the supposed fact that people may permissibly expend fewer 
resources, makes it the case that rational disagreement is possible.  
It is difficult to dispute that the cognitive costs in completely avoiding errors in 
reasoning can be very high in some cases. The more questionable assumption in a 
view like Gaus’s is that it is sometimes epistemically permissible to make errors 
while reasoning about a proposition. In order to argue that difficulty in assessing 
whether a proposition is true does not give rise to rational disagreement, I submit 
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that making an error in reasoning is always irrational. In addition, I shall argue that it 
is always an error to believe that P, when I have at least as strong a reason not to. 
Let us call the combination of these claims the Naïve account of epistemic 
rationality. We can contrast the Naïve account with what I call a Forgiving account 
according to which there are some cases in which I rationally hold a given doxastic 
attitude even if I make an error in reasoning or there are some cases where I do not 
make an error even though I believe that P even though I have at least as strong a 
reason not to. I shall first sketch out an argument for the Naïve account, followed by 
some objections to it. I shall subsequently reply to these objections to show that the 
Naïve account is in fact true. 
5.4 The Naïve Account 
Intuitively, if I make a mistake in reasoning my way to a particular belief, I have 
formed that belief in a rationally defective way. If I have formed a belief P in a 
rationally defective way and nothing further has changed, then I am not rationally 
believing that P. That is to say, my belief that P is not doxastically justified. 
According to Turri (2010: 315), doxastic justification pertains to an evaluation of the 
performance of an agent. On the more traditional view of doxastic justification, a 
belief is doxastically justified only if it has been formed on the basis of evidence 
which supports it (Swain 1979; Pollock and Cruz; 1999; Korcz 2000; Feldman 2002; 
Kvanvig 2003). Here too, doxastic justification is an evaluation of the process by 
which the belief is formed. Either way, insofar as there are performance errors, then 
we cannot evaluate the performance as being without defect. That is to say, if there 
are performance errors in the process of acquiring a belief, that belief is not 
doxastically justified.  
A quick objection to this argument is that while it is true that a performance error 
entails that the process by which the belief was formed was defective in some way, 
the question we are interested in is another sense of justification which has more to 
do with whether the belief is consistent with or fits the evidence. That is to say, 
permissivism is not a claim about whether two people who disagree are both 
doxastically justified in their beliefs, it is a claim about propositional justification. 
However, this objection is ultimately unsuccessful. To see why, I shall first briefly 
survey what I take to be the dominant accounts of propositional justification. 
The traditional view of propositional justification is that a proposition, P is 
propositionally justified for an agent, Alice, if and only if she has sufficient epistemic 
reasons R to believe P (Swain 1979; Pollock and Cruz 1999; Korcz 2000). Turri 
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(2010) presents a series of cases where intuitively, a belief which has been formed 
on the basis of one’s evidence is not doxastically justified. In one case, a juror, 
Improper, looks at her tea leaves and concludes that the tea leaves say that the 
evidence supports a guilty verdict. In fact, the evidence does in fact support a guilty 
verdict. In another case, an agent, Lacy, could use modus ponens to infer that R 
from his evidence, but instead infers that R by using a different invalid inference 
rule. These cases, according to Turri, indicate that doxastic justification is more than 
just a matter of believing on the basis of evidence, but is irreducibly about reasoning 
well from the evidence (ibid). Turri then defines propositional justification in terms of 
doxastic justification: P is propositionally justified for Alice if and only if there were 
some way of reasoning to a belief that P which is available to her and which if she 
took, she would be doxastically justified in believing that P (ibid).  
While there is considerable disagreement about the relation between doxastic and 
propositional justification, everyone agrees that if an agent is doxastically justified in 
believing that P, P is propositionally justified for her. This is because on the 
traditional view, if a belief is doxastically justified, it has to be propositionally justified 
and based on the evidence in virtue of which it is propositionally justified. On Turri’s 
view, a belief that P is propositionally justified for an agent if and only if she has 
available to her some path of reasoning which would result in her having a 
doxastically justified belief that P. When she actually has a doxastically justified 
belief that P, she clearly has a path of reasoning available to her which would result 
in her being doxastically justified in believing that P. Either way, doxastic justification 
entails propositional justification. It follows that if P is not propositionally justified for 
an agent, then her belief that P is not doxastically justified. To see why the Naïve 
account is true, let me introduce an initially plausible account of propositional 
justification which I shall call the Simple view: 
Simple: A proposition P is propositionally justified for an agent Alice if 
and only if her total body of evidence supports P.  
Simple seems to cover the main instances of when we think propositions are or are 
not justified for someone. Typically, when we suppose that a proposition is justified 
for someone, we think that this is so because it is supported by their evidence. And 
similarly, where it is not justified for someone, we think it is not because it is not 
supported by their evidence. Consider again the case where Alfred and Betty share 
a total body of evidence consisting of R1 and R2 where R1 supports P and R2 
supports not-P respectively. Suppose R2 is stronger than R1. The evidence as a 
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whole therefore supports not-P. Given that Alfred’s evidence consists of R1 and R2, 
P is not propositionally justified for him while not-P is. Therefore, believing that P 
cannot be doxastically justified for him. Simple therefore seems to imply that Alfred’s 
failure to take into account R2 is an error in reasoning.  
As noted earlier, the first, third and fifth burdens cause disagreement when a matter 
is difficult to assess. When matters are difficult to assess, disagreement arises 
because limited cognitive resources make it such that agents fail to consider some 
of their reasons or because they mis-estimate the strength of their reasons. When 
either of these occur, the resultant belief will not match what the evidence supports 
except by coincidence. For instance, normally if I were to overestimate the strength 
of one piece of evidence, my overall assessment of the strength of the evidence will 
likewise be skewed. It is of course possible for one mis-estimation to perfectly 
cancel out another, but we cannot count on such lucky accidents occurring. Other 
than these coincidental cases, any belief subject to the first, third and fifth burdens 
will not be propositionally justified. Therefore they cannot be doxastically justified 
either.  
The only explanation for this is that there must have been some error in reasoning 
which led to the agent having a belief that was not supported by the evidence. This 
error in reasoning would be some inferential step that was taken or omitted which 
led to a conclusion that differed41 from what is supported by the evidence as a 
whole. For instance, by failing to take into account R2 which was part of his 
evidence, Alfred believed that P instead of not-P. This failure to account for R2 is 
therefore a reasoning error on Alfred’s part and this error explains why his belief that 
P is not doxastically justified. 
To sum up, on the Naïve view, the first, third and fifth burdens generate errors in 
reasoning. These errors in reasoning suffice to make it the case the resultant belief 
is not doxastically justified. These errors in reasoning also cause the resultant belief 
to differ from what would be supported by the evidence. The reason for this is that 
on the first, third and fifth burdens, cognitive limitations can cause agents to fail to 
consider all of their evidence or to mis-estimate the strength of their evidence. Since 
the resultant belief is not supported by the evidence, as per Simple, it is not 
                                                          
41
 I am not committing to whether any similar inferential step which would not make a 
difference counts as an error. I leave open both the possibility that Betty makes a mistake by 
failing to take into account R1 and the possibility that she does not just because R1 is weaker 
than R2. 
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propositionally justified either. This means that the first, third and fifth burdens 
cannot be sources of rational disagreement.  
5.5 Forgiving Accounts 
Arguing against the Naïve account will necessarily involve denying Simple. So long 
as Simple is true, any inferential step which is taken or omitted due to cognitive 
limitations is going to count as an error in reasoning and will not result in a 
propositionally justified belief. For instance, Rosa (2016) defends permissivism on 
the basis that propositional justification does not amount to “sheer evidential 
support” (ibid: 96). Rosa takes propositional justification of P to be a matter of 
whether an agent could be doxastically justified in believing that P. He explicitly 
references Turri’s account of propositional justification according to which: 
Propositional Justification (PJ): “Necessarily, for all S, p, and t, if p is 
propositionally justiﬁed for S at t, then p is propositionally justiﬁed for 
S at t because S currently possesses at least one means of coming 
to believe p such that, were S to believe p in one of those ways, S’s 
belief would thereby be doxastically justiﬁed.” (Turri 2010: 320) 
According to PJ, propositional justification of P for an agent is dependent on 
whether she could in fact come to be doxastically justified in believing that P. For 
Rosa, the question of whether P is propositionally justified for someone depends on 
whether she is capable of becoming doxastically justified in believing that P. That is 
to say, Rosa endorses a “may” implies “can” principle42 for epistemic justification. If 
cognitive limitations preclude an agent from believing that P without making a 
mistake along the way, P would not be propositionally justified for her even if her 
evidence did in fact support P. On Rosa’s account, each agent’s cognitive 
capacities set the threshold for how demanding the requirements of rationality are. 
An agent is obligated at most to expend those cognitive resources she has in 
reasoning from her evidence, not more. Kornblith (1983; 2001) endorses a similar 
view whereby what an agent ought to believe in light of the evidence is informed by 
her cognitive capacities. The thought here is that it should not be impossible for us 
to infer in those ways we are epistemically entitled to.  
                                                          
42
 Actually Rosa calls it a “can” implies “can” principle (2016: 97) where the first “can” refers 
to permission and the second “can” refers to capacity. My formulation of it removes the 
ambiguity about the word can. 
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One consequence of such a view is supposed to be that there are a number of 
cases in which our evidence supports a proposition, but we are permitted to 
suspend judgment. Rosa (2016) points out that for any highly complicated 
mathematical theorem that is beyond our abilities, there is no performance error 
involved in failing to evaluate whether it is true or false, even if we already justifiably 
accept the axioms and the theorem follows logically from those axioms. For 
instance, everyone’s evidence, according to Kornblith, supports the proposition that 
mathematics is incomplete (Kornblith 2001: 233-234). However, it took Gödel to 
establish this, and intuitively most who have not heard of his proof may permissibly 
suspend judgment about it since we are not capable of working out that 
mathematics is incomplete. Kornblith also points out (ibid) that this is not limited just 
to esoteric mathematical theorems, but even to empirical questions where only a 
genius could recognise the connection between the evidence and the supported 
proposition. Intuitively, if we are not capable of making the inference, we ought to 
suspend judgment. That is to say, suspending judgment seems doxastically justified 
in these cases. More strongly, it seems obligatory for those of us unable to 
recognise these evidential connections. However, if we ought to suspend judgment, 
then P cannot be propositionally justified to us even if it is supported by our 
evidence. Therefore, or so the argument goes, Simple must be false. 
However, this view, according to which less demanding epistemic norms apply to 
agents who are more cognitively limited, is not without theoretical costs. One 
significant cost is that people with very limited cognitive abilities would get away with 
very bad reasoning. That is to say, the epistemic standards appropriate for 
someone with very limited cognitive abilities would not resemble, to any significant 
degree, any plausible picture of what good reasoning looks like. Turri (2010) brings 
up the example of Ron, who is psychologically incapable of believing that the US 
should not invade Iran. He knows that invading Iran would be catastrophic and 
knows that if it is catastrophic, the US should not do it. It intuitively seems that the 
proposition that the US should not invade Iran is propositionally justified for Ron. 
However, since Ron is psychologically incapable of believing that the US should not 
invade Iran, he lacks the means to become doxastically justified in believing it. 
According to PJ, this seems to mean, that believing that the US should not invade is 
not propositionally justified for Ron. Depending on exactly how extensive Ron’s 
psychological incapacities are, Ron could be propositionally justified in believing all 
sorts of things so long as his reasoning capacities are severely bad. For instance, if 
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he were incapable of applying modus ponens, or the disjunctive syllogism, there are 
many beliefs Ron may justifiably have despite glaring failures to reason adequately. 
It is by no means the case that no one is unwilling to bite this bullet. Rosa (2012; 
2016) for instance presents the following case as one in which an agent can 
rationally suspend judgment.  
Virus: “Suppose Amanda justifiably believes both:   
(i) If I clicked the wrong link, my e-mail has a virus now.  
(ii) My email has no virus now.” (Rosa 2012: 574-575) 
According to Rosa, Amanda, who is unable to carry out modus tollens, is justified in 
suspending judgment about whether she clicked the wrong link.  
Nevertheless, this still seems implausible as both Amanda and Ron appear severely 
intellectually disabled. It is a banal observation that most of us do not reason to the 
absolute best of our ability. If what is justified for us depends on our cognitive 
capacities, then those whose cognitive capacities are the most limited are the most 
rational. These would be people whose cognitive capacities are so limited that they 
are currently already reasoning to the best of their capacity; they do not have room 
to underperform. However, it is absurd to think that the reasoning of those who are 
least able to reason is rated the best among all of us. Yet, such a cost is 
unavoidable, if we peg the demandingness of an agent’s epistemic standards to her 
cognitive capacities. 
One way to get around this objection is to peg our epistemic standards to people’s 
average cognitive capacities. Then, we are still able to say of the average person, 
that she may suspend judgment when she encounters complicated cases like the 
Gödel’s incompleteness theorem because the average person is not able to work 
out that Gödel’s incompleteness theorem is true. On the other hand, we can say of 
people like Ron and Amanda, that they are not justified in suspending judgment in 
their relatively simpler cases, because the average person, given the same 
evidence, is capable of working out that the US should not invade Iran and that 
Amanda did not click on the link.  
One significant objection to the second proposal is that even though pegging 
epistemic standards to the average capacity of agents manages to avoid some 
counterintuitive results, there are still some cases which it will find difficult to handle.  
The key case here involves people with far higher than average cognitive ability 
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(Turri 2010). Consider what the average ability account says about what is justified 
for someone like Gödel. As a genius, Gödel was able to work out that the 
incompleteness theorem was true. However, the average person is not. If we peg 
epistemic standards to the average human cognitive capacity, then the theorem is 
not justifiable to Gödel, even though it clearly has to be. This is because, as per the 
standard pegged to the average cognitive capacity, Gödel ought to suspend 
judgment about the incompleteness theorem. However, this is absurd! If Gödel is 
indeed capable of soundly reasoning his way to seeing that the theorem is true, it 
cannot be impermissible for him to believe it when he has done the reasoning 
correctly. 
Perhaps the problem lies instead with the claim that Gödel ought to suspend 
judgment. Perhaps the average-capacity-standard only permits him to suspend 
judgment. It could also permit him to believe the theorem is he has done the 
reasoning correctly. However, this violates intrapersonal uniqueness. As discussed 
in Chapter 3, the solution to White’s Arbitrariness Objection was to claim that only 
one attitude was justified given the evidence relative to a particular epistemic 
standard. By relativizing justification to an epistemic standard, the agent finds it 
inappropriate to acquire beliefs by flipping a coin or popping a pill. However, if even 
relative to the average-capacity-standard, Gödel was permitted to either suspend 
judgment or believe the incompleteness theorem, then there is no reason for him to 
prefer reasoning on his evidence to acquiring beliefs by randomly popping a pill. 
Therefore, more than one attitude towards the theorem cannot be permitted for 
Gödel given the average-capacity-standard. Given that standard, Gödel ought to 
suspend judgment and as we discussed in the previous paragraph, this is absurd. 
Turri (ibid) solves this problem by adopting a heterogeneous account. For people of 
average and below average ability, what they ought to believe is limited to what 
people on average are capable of. For those with above average cognitive 
capacities, what they ought to believe, given the evidence, is limited only by their 
own cognitive capacities, accommodating therefore, three sets of intuitions. The first 
is the intuition that people of normal cognitive ability may permissibly suspend 
judgment in complicated cases. The second intuition is that people of below 
average cognitive ability may not permissibly suspend judgment in relatively simpler 
cases even when those are still beyond their personal ability to reason through. The 
third intuition is that people with extremely high cognitive ability would be justified in 
believing what is supported by their evidence even in complicated cases. 
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Even if this accommodates all three intuitions about cases, this third heterogeneous 
account is not without its set of problems. Note firstly that both the second and third 
accounts lack adequate justification. Recall that limiting an agent’s obligations to her 
own cognitive capacities was justified by a plausible principle: “ought” and “may” 
imply “can”. The principle is grounded in the intuition that it is incoherent to demand 
of someone, something which they are incapable of doing. However, on both the 
average ability and heterogeneous accounts, we are demanding of people with 
below average cognitive capacities that they perform beyond their capacities. If we 
take “ought” implies “can” seriously, then neither of the latter two accounts of 
epistemic duty are coherent. However, if we give up “ought” implies “can”, it is 
unclear what reason we have, apart from our intuitions, about cases to support 
either of the two latter accounts.  
If we take fitting-ness with our intuitions about cases to be sufficient reason to select 
one conception of epistemic obligation over another, then the heterogeneous 
account seems better since it fits most of our intuitions about cases. However, this 
account seems too ad-hoc. There is no adequate explanation as to why those of 
below average cognitive capacities ought to reason more and better than they are 
capable of but those of average capacities have no such obligation. This suggests 
that there is no coherent principle that could explain all three intuitions. If so, we 
have to give at least one of them up. 
It is absurd to think that the most rational among us are those who are least capable 
of reasoning. It is equally absurd that the most capable reasoners among us are not 
justified in believing the conclusions that they have reasoned impeccably towards 
and which are supported by their evidence. It is, however, not so absurd to think 
that something has gone wrong when we suspend judgment about a proposition 
even when our evidence supports it just because the connection between evidence 
and proposition is too complicated. To admit, at least, that our cognitive capacities 
or resources are limited is to concede that we are imperfect reasoners. Insofar as 
we are imperfect, we cannot, when those imperfections affect our cognition, regard 
our beliefs as fully justified. Distinguishing praiseworthy or blameworthy cognition 
from justified or rational cognition goes some way towards ameliorating the 
incongruity of saying that people are not justified in suspending judgment when the 
evidence becomes too complicated. Of all the intuitions which we should give up on, 
it seems that we should concede that it is not fully rational to suspend judgment in 
cases where our evidence supports a proposition, but our cognitive capacities or 
resources are too limited to determine that it does. 
109 
 
If the above considerations are right, there is no plausible Forgiving account of 
rationality. Therefore, we should accept Simple and hence the Naïve account of 
epistemic duties. Recall that on Simpson’s account, Nancy Drew may permissibly 
ignore the sincerity of testimony because assessing it is not within her cognitive 
capacities. Similarly, Veronica Mars may permissibly assess her evidence piece by 
piece because evaluating it as a whole is beyond her capabilities. Their 
disagreement, on Simpson’s account, counts as rational because they may 
permissibly fail to take account of certain considerations within their purview. If the 
Naïve account is true, then their disagreement does not count as rational and is 
therefore not an instance of permissive disagreement. 
To sum up, Simpson’s account of how different agents can have different epistemic 
standards relies on each agent finding it difficult to respond optimally to all of their 
reasons. It is for that reason that their response does not count as rational given our 
commitment to full rationality. Naturally, actual moral agents are limited, however, 
our concern is not with what would be the wisest course of action when deciding 
how to assess their evidence, but with what reasons they have and what their 
reasons require.  Assessing what their reasons require means assessing what all of 
their evidence implies with regards to a given proposition. Epistemic standards 
which are indexed to the agent’s cognitive capacities would not deliver rational 
responses to the evidence, unless the agent can reliably respond well to all aspects 
of the evidence. However, there is no reason to think, on Simpson’s picture, that 
flawless agents will have different epistemic standards. Therefore, Simpson’s 
account of permissivism does not succeed.  
Taking a step back, the claim that the first, third and fifth burdens of judgment were 
sources of rational disagreement ultimately relied on the claim that people could 
permissibly lower their epistemic standards in response to their limited cognitive 
capacities. In showing that they could not permissibly do so, I have shown that the 
first, third and fifth burdens of judgment could not possibly be sources of rational 
disagreement. In doing so, I have also closed off one possible avenue by which 
people can have different epistemic standards and hence shown that one potential 
way in which the disagreement generated by the second burden rational. All that is 
left are two ways in which people having different backgrounds could be a source of 
rational disagreement. In the next chapter, I shall discuss a version of permissivism 
according to which the epistemic standard that is appropriate for an agent depends 
on the relative extents she values acquiring truths and avoiding falsehoods. 
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Chapter 6: Indexing Epistemic Standards to Agent’s Valuations of Their 
Epistemic Goals 
Background 
In the previous chapter, I discussed the possibility that the epistemic standard that 
was appropriate for a given agent depended on her cognitive capacities. I argued 
that such an indexing proposal was not successful because it presupposed that 
people could permissibly lower their standards just because they were unable to 
reliably respond to their evidence. An alternative indexing proposal is that which 
epistemic standard is appropriate for a given agent depends on how she might 
value any given epistemic or pragmatic goals. This view, which I shall call epistemic 
instrumentalism, treats epistemic rationality as just another species of instrumental 
rationality43. Whether it is rational to believe a proposition given the evidence is a 
matter of how much the agent desires believing the truth about the proposition, and 
how much she desires avoiding falsity; or for that matter, how much she desires 
achieving any other goal by believing or not believing the proposition in question. To 
illustrate, consider the following example: 
Religion: Sally and Susan have heard all the arguments for and 
against the existence of God. Sally has been raised to value avoiding 
false beliefs more than she values acquiring true beliefs and 
suspends judgment about whether God exists. Susan has been 
raised to value acquiring truths more than avoiding falsehoods and 
therefore believes that God exists.  
Since Sally values avoiding falsehoods much more than acquiring truths, she 
suspends judgment. By contrast, Susan values acquiring true beliefs more than 
Sally does, and hence forms a belief that God exists. As per my discussion of the 
fourth burden in Chapter 2, one way in which people’s different backgrounds is 
supposed to generate rational disagreement is by them valuing acquiring truths and 
avoiding falsehoods differently. In Religion, it is these different valuations which 
                                                          
43
 William James (1896) offers an account of instrumentalist permissivism in his argument 
for the religious hypothesis. Kelly (2014), Kvanvig (2014) and Levinstein (2017) seem to 
suggest that at least some version of this Jamesian permissivism might be plausible even if 
they stop short of a full endorsement. See also Pettigrew (2016) for a formalisation of this 
Jamesian approach, and Horowitz (2018) for an argument against the Jamesian approach. 
Horowitz’s argument is that only fully proper scoring rules are consistent with updating 
beliefs by Bayesian conditionalization and all fully proper scoring rules recommend the same 
doxastic attitude given the same evidence and priors. Whereas Horowitz’s argument relies 
on the assumption that we ought to update credences by conditionalization on our priors, the 
argument I offer here makes no such assumption. 
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supposedly give rise to rational disagreement between Sally and Susan. Notably, 
what is presupposed in such an account of permissivism is that these different ways 
of valuing these goals are rationally permissible. If only one way of valuing truths 
and falsehoods is permissible or of the different permissible ways of valuing these 
goals they all recommended the same doxastic attitude, then at least one of Susan 
or Sally must be making a mistake and hence be irrational.  
The argumentative strategy of this chapter is to show that only certain ways of 
valuing these goals can be permissible and these ways of valuing these goals all 
give rise to the same epistemic standard. If this is right, even if agents’ different 
backgrounds made them value acquiring truths and avoiding falsehoods differently, 
that would not render their resulting disagreement rational. If the argument in this 
chapter succeeds, then this will also illuminate whether other pragmatic goals can 
permissibly affect how much the agent values believing the truth about a given 
proposition and not being wrong about it. To be clear, instrumentalism has 
traditionally been defended and critiqued as an account of the source of epistemic 
normativity44 (Cote-Bouchard 2015: 339). I shall not be focusing on the disputes 
regarding the normative force of epistemic reasons. Rather, my focus shall be on 
whether instrumentalism could ground a version of permissivism and I shall not 
address whether this has any further implications for instrumentalism. 
6.1 Instrumentalist Permissivism 
To start with, I shall focus on the value of the twin epistemic goals. The 
instrumentalist case for permissivism relies on two claims. The first claim is that 
there are different permissible ways in which we could value two distinct epistemic 
goals: believing truths and avoiding falsehoods. The second claim is that each 
permissible way of valuing these goals licenses a different epistemic standard. I 
shall explain the second claim before I discuss the first claim.  
Recall that for Schoenfield, “the agent has high confidence that forming opinions 
using her standards will result in her having high confidence in truths and low 
confidence in falsehoods” (Schoenfield 2014: 199). As I have discussed in the fourth 
chapter (4.1.4), agents have to make trade-offs between having high confidence in 
truths and low confidence in falsehoods. For instance, if one is comparatively 
“bolder” and tends to form higher confidence in propositions based on the evidence, 
                                                          
44
 For recent defenders of instrumentalism, see Foley (1987), Kornblith (1993, 2002), 
Laudan (1990a; 1990b), Maffie (1990), Nozick (1993) and Papineau (1999). For some 
recent criticisms see Kelly (2003), Leite (2007), Lockard (2013) and Berker (2013). 
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one risks not only having a very high confidence in false propositions but also 
having similarly high confidence in truths. On the other hand, if one is more 
“cautious”, one will have more centrally distributed confidences. One might have 
fewer very high confidences in truths, but might also have much fewer very high 
confidences in falsehoods. Different ways of weighting these epistemic goals will 
license different epistemic standards. As I have suggested in the second chapter, 
one way in which, according to the permissivist, people’s different backgrounds 
might be a source of rational disagreement is that those different backgrounds make 
it permissible for agents to weight these epistemic goals differently. Perhaps valuing 
avoiding falsehoods is a norm in the culture one was raised in, or is a cognitive 
disposition prevalent at one’s workplace. Only if these different weightings are 
appropriate for the agent would it likewise be that the resultant epistemic standards 
are rationally permissible. The task in this and the next sections (6.1 and 6.2) is to 
show that while some of these weightings of these epistemic goals are appropriate, 
all of them result in the same epistemic standard. The section that follows that (6.3) 
will extend the argument to pragmatic goals. 
As Schoenfield explains in a footnote (2014: 214), truth-conduciveness is measured 
by a scoring rule, which in turn is just a function that assigns an epistemic utility 
value to the doxastic attitudes of propositions when they are true or false. An 
agent’s scoring rule represents the way in which she values the twin epistemic goals 
of acquiring truths and avoiding falsehoods. We can represent a scoring rule as a 
function, v(A,S). “A” is a variable representing the agent’s doxastic attitude towards 
a given proposition while S is a variable representing the state of the world or truth 
value of that proposition. If our doxastic attitudes consisted of just belief, disbelief 
and suspension of judgment, A would take on one of three possible values B, D and 
Sj respectively. Likewise if our doxastic attitudes were represented by credences, A 
would take on some value between 0 and 1. S takes on the value T when the 
proposition is true and F when it is false. An agent acquires truths to a greater 
degree if she has a higher confidence in a true proposition. She avoids falsehoods 
to a greater degree by not having a low confidence in a true proposition. In forming 
a higher confidence in a given proposition, an agent thereby risks failing to avoid a 
falsehood in order to acquire a truth. By contrast, in forming a more moderate 
attitude, the agent avoids falsehoods while giving up the chance to acquire truths. 
On the instrumentalist picture, which attitude is rational will depend at least in part 
on the relative extents to which the agent values avoiding falsehoods and acquiring 
113 
 
truths. That is to say, the question of which attitude is rational depends at least in 
part on the scoring rule v(A,S). 
The function, v(A,S), maps A and S onto a real number. That is to say, for each 
state of the world, it assigns a numerical value to a doxastic attitude. Following 
Greaves and Wallace (2006: 459), I shall suppose that v(A, S) increases as the 
doxastic attitude approaches truth and moves away from falsehoods45. The degree 
to which an agent values acquiring truths and avoiding falsehoods will affect the 
scoring rule. For instance, suppose we were to set the value of disbelieving a true 
proposition v(D,T) to 0. Then, if an agent, Sally, assigns 10 units of value to 
acquiring truths and 30 units to avoiding falsehoods, then v(Sj,T) = 30 and v(B,T) = 
40 for her. This is because, when she suspends judgment, she has avoided 
falsehood, but not acquired truths. When she believes a true proposition, she has 
both avoided a falsehood and acquired a truth. By contrast, suppose Susan assigns 
10 units of value to avoiding falsehoods and 30 units to acquiring truths, then v(Sj,T) 
= 10 and v(B,T) = 40 for her.  In both cases, v(A,T) increases as the doxastic 
attitude approaches truth and moves away from falsehoods. However, the 
differences in the value of suspending judgment may license different doxastic 
attitudes under certain circumstances. To see why, let us extend the Religion case 
and consider how Sally and Susan might decide between believing and suspending 
judgment about the existence of God.  
To make such a choice, on the instrumentalist picture, agents apply decision rules. 
For instance, one decision rule is to maximise the expected epistemic utility of a 
doxastic attitude E(A). 
E(A) = L·v(A,T) + (1-L)·v(A,F) 
The expected epistemic utility of a doxastic attitude A is the value of A when the 
proposition is true, v(A,T), multiplied by the likelihood, L, that it is true, added to the 
value of A when it is false, v(A,F) multiplied by the likelihood, 1-L, that it is false. 
This rule assumes that the agent weights losses as much as gains in epistemic 
utility. Agents with different appetites to epistemic risk may adopt different decision 
rules. To simplify the presentation of my argument, I shall assume that maximising 
expected epistemic utility is the correct decision rule. Nothing I say in my argument 
                                                          
45
 There are alternative conventions about scoring rules. For instance, Pettigrew (2016) uses 
an inaccuracy score. The further an attitude is away from the truth and the closer it is to 
falsehood, the larger the inaccuracy score. In such a case, desirable states of affairs have 
low inaccuracy scores and the goal, correspondingly is to minimise expected inaccuracy.  
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hangs on whether this, or some other decision rule, or a plurality of decisions rules 
is correct.  
Returning to the Religion case, suppose that the overall evidence only slightly 
supported the proposition that God exists. To provide some illustration of the degree 
of evidential support, let us stipulate that propositions which are supported only 
slightly tend to be true about 60% of the time. Therefore, for this case we can set L 
at 0.6. For Sally and Susan, the value of believing a true proposition, v(B,T), is 40 
and that of believing a false one, v(B,F), is 0. For Sally, the value of suspending 
judgment about a true proposition v(Sj,T) should be the same as suspending 
judgment about a false one v(Sj,F) and is set at 30. Likewise for Susan, the value of 
suspending judgment v(Sj,T) = v(Sj,F) = 10. We can now calculate the expected 
values of believing or suspending judgment about the existence of God for Sally and 
Susan. For Sally, the expected value of suspending judgment E(Sj) is 30 while the 
expected value of believing that God exists E(B)  is 24. Therefore, for Sally, since 
E(Sj) > E(B), she should suspend judgment. For Susan, E(Sj) = 10 and E(B) = 24. 
Therefore, since E(B) > E(Sj) for Susan, she should believe that God exists.   
We can attempt to generalise the link between the valuing of various epistemic 
goals and the scoring rule. For Sally, who valued avoiding falsehoods more than 
acquiring truths, v(A,T) rose sharply at first then gradually later. By contrast, for 
Susan, v(A,T) rose gradually initially and then more sharply later. We might 
generalise beyond the coarse grained account of doxastic attitudes and consider 
any three adjacent doxastic attitudes Ak, Ak+1 and Ak+2 where Ak represents a 
lower degree of confidence than Ak+1 and Ak+2 respectively.   
Whenever an agent values avoiding falsehoods more than acquiring truths, 
 v(Ak+1,T) – v(Ak,T) > v(Ak+2,T) – v(Ak+1,T).  
If an agent values avoiding falsehoods just as much as acquiring truths,  
 v(Ak+1,T) – v(Ak,T) = v(Ak+2,T) – v(Ak+1,T).  
Likewise, if she values avoiding falsehoods less than acquiring truths,  
v(Ak+1,T) – v(Ak,T) < v(Ak+2,T) – v(Ak+1,T). 
We can also see from this how different ways of valuing the twin epistemic goals 
ultimately generate different epistemic standards. Sally’s scoring rule is determined 
by the values she attaches to the twin epistemic goals. That scoring rule, together 
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with her evidence, determines the expected value of suspending judgment or 
believing. On the instrumentalist picture, rationality is just a matter of maximising 
expected value. This generates a set of epistemic norms which dictate which 
attitude is justified given the evidence. 
The above account of permissivism presupposes that people can permissibly value 
the twin epistemic goals differently. I shall argue that, for all but one of the possible 
epistemic standards formed on the basis of instrumental considerations, these 
standards commit the agents who adopt them to two inconsistent beliefs. 
To see why, consider what it takes, on the instrumentalist account for an agent to 
pick one doxastic attitude rather than another. An epistemic agent who is an 
instrumentalist needs, for each attitude, A, towards a proposition, the value of that 
attitude when the proposition is true, v(A,T) and its value when it is false, v(A,F). 
She also needs an attitude-independent assessment of the likelihood of the 
proposition being true or false. The first of these requirements is satisfied with 
assigning some real number to each attitude when the proposition is true and 
another for when the proposition is false. A mere ordering of attitudes is insufficient 
as it is true of any plausible valuation that a higher confidence in a proposition is 
preferable to a lower one if the proposition is true but not otherwise. A more precise 
specification is needed of how much more preferable one attitude is to another. 
To illustrate, consider again the Religion case where we were determining which 
doxastic attitude was rational for Sally. If we did not assign numerical values to 
v(Sj,T), v(Sj,F), v(B,T) and v(B,F), we could not determine which of E(B) or E(Sj) 
was higher. If it was indeterminate as to which attitude had a higher expected value, 
then it would not have been possible to determine that Sally should suspend 
judgment about the existence of God. However, for the instrumentalist, given a 
scoring rule and decision rule, it cannot be indeterminate as to which attitude is 
rational for an agent. 
The second requirement is satisfied only by some numerical specification of 
probability. By a numerical specification of probability, I mean that the likelihood 
should be specified by a number between 0 and 1 like 0.8 or 0.9 or perhaps an 
interval of such numbers [0.8, 0.9]. Suppose that agents instead used non-
numerical vague descriptors like “very likely” or “somewhat unlikely”. Those agents 
would not be able to determine which attitude had the highest expected epistemic 
value. To see why, consider again what it takes for Sally to rationally suspend 
judgment about the existence of God. If all we can say about the proposition that 
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God exists is that it is somewhat more likely than not, the question of whether, given 
her epistemic standards, believing or suspending judgment is rational for her is 
indeterminate. For instance, if the likelihood is 0.6, then the expected value of 
suspending judgment is higher. If the likelihood is 0.76, the expected value of 
believing is higher. Even if the likelihood itself was imprecise, that would still give a 
determinate answer as to what the rational attitude was. However, the same claim 
cannot be made when the likelihood is spelled out in non-numerical form. There are 
many numerical specifications of likelihood that might be equivalent to “somewhat 
more likely than not”. Not all such specifications, even if imprecise, recommend the 
same response. If the likelihood was [0.6,0.7], suspending judgment would still have 
a higher expected value. On the other hand, if the likelihood were [0.66,0.76], some 
imprecise attitude [Sj,B] might be required instead.  
Non numerical specifications of likelihood are too ambiguous to pick out one 
doxastic attitude given an epistemic standard.  In short, what is required is a 
numerical representation of the likelihood of some sort or another. If no numerical 
likelihood is provided, this might seem to license both suspending judgment and 
believing that God exists.. However, this violates intrapersonal uniqueness; given an 
epistemic standard, at most one doxastic attitude towards a proposition would be a 
rational response to the evidence. Therefore, both suspending judgment and 
believing cannot be licensed by the evidence, given Sally’s   epistemic standard. 
Intrapersonal uniqueness therefore requires that the likelihood be given a numerical 
value.  
However, if agents are committed to attributing a numerical likelihood to a 
proposition, they will, in all but at most one case, be committed to attributing another 
likelihood to the same proposition. This would be because doxastic attitudes can be 
associated with probabilities as well. Take an agent, Sally, who suspends judgment 
about whether God exists. Sally is committed to associating some probability with 
suspending judgment. The reason for this is that it can always be asked of Sally 
how often she expects propositions, about which she suspends judgment, to be 
true. If the likelihood is really low, she would be surprised if the proposition turns out 
to be true. If the likelihood is high, she would be surprised if it turns out false. It 
seems generally true that we expect propositions which we have a higher 
confidence in to be more likely to be true than those which we have a lower 
confidence in. It is hard to see why it could be permissible to attribute an equal or 
higher chance to a proposition we had less confidence in. Similarly, more imprecise 
doxastic attitudes should also elicit imprecise chance attributions from us. If the 
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foregoing is correct, then there is some likelihood associated with suspending 
judgment and a different likelihood associated with believing a proposition. Suppose 
that Sally and Susan expect propositions they suspend judgment about to be true 
roughly half the time. To be somewhat more precise, let us suppose that they 
expect propositions which they suspend judgment about to be true between 35% to 
65% of the time, and propositions that they believe to be true more than 65% of the 
time. Associated with her doxastic attitude, Sally is committed to attributing a 
likelihood between 0.35 and 0.65 to the existence of God while Susan is committed 
to attributing a likelihood between 0.65 and 1 to the same proposition. Moreover, 
both Susan and Sally are committed to attributing a likelihood 0.6 to the proposition 
that God exists. While these two attributions are consistent for Sally, Susan’s are 
not. It cannot be that the likelihood of God’s existence is both 0.6 and between 0.65 
and 1. Since the way Susan values her epistemic goals commits her to attributing 
inconsistent likelihoods to the proposition that God exists, her valuation of the 
epistemic goals must be impermissible. 
To generalise, Sally, on the basis of her epistemic standard S1, forms attitude A1 
about a proposition P in response to the evidence. Given instrumentalism, she is 
able to do this because she antecedently attributes a numerical likelihood L to P 
being true. Given her attitude A1, she is also committed to a certain likelihood L1 of 
P being true. L1 may or may not be identical to L. If L is different from L1, then she 
is committed to inconsistent beliefs about the likelihood of P. She can assign either 
L1 or L to P being true, but she cannot rationally assign both L1 and L to the truth of 
P. The only way to escape irrationality is for L1 to be identical to L. From this, we 
can see why uniqueness has to be true. 
I shall assume that different epistemic standards, S2 to Sn, recommend different 
attitudes, A2 to An. It follows that the associated probabilities L2 to Ln will be 
different from one another and from L1. Therefore, among all the likelihoods L1 to 
Ln, at most one of them would be identical to L. All other epistemic standards would 
commit Sally to some likelihood other than L in addition to L. Therefore, at most one 
epistemic standard would yield a rational doxastic attitude. 
It is important to emphasise that on the instrumentalist picture, Sally could not 
assign any likelihood to P other than L. Suppose that instead of 0.6 there was some 
other numerical likelihood 0.8 that Sally could assign to the likelihood that God 
exists.. It is clear that Sally could not permissibly choose between 0.6 and 0.8. Or 
else, choice of 0.6 or 0.8 would be arbitrary. It is equally clear that given that Sally 
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permissibly accepts 0.6, there is no reason why anyone else like Susan would have 
any basis for choosing 0.8 over 0.6. It cannot be because they have different 
epistemic standards. According to the instrumentalist, an agent’s epistemic 
standards arise from her scoring rules, i.e. how she values particular attitudes 
towards propositions when they are true or false, and her decision rule, i.e. how she 
accounts for the risk of those propositions being false. If the rationality of a doxastic 
attitude is to be sensitive to the evidence, then L should be generated in some way 
by the evidence, independently of the agent’s epistemic standards. If the 
assignment of a likelihood L is prior to her epistemic standards, then any scenario in 
which Sally is able to choose between L and another likelihood L* is subject to the 
Arbitrariness Objection. After all, Sally could just as easily come to a different belief 
that was equally consistent with one’s own epistemic standards by popping a pill as 
by adopting L* instead of L. Therefore, at most only one of L or L* is appropriate for 
Sally to adopt. If the choice of L or L* is independent of which epistemic standards 
the agent accepts, then at most one of L or L* is appropriate for everyone to adopt. 
If assigning L to P being true was dependent on epistemic standards, then 
epistemic standards cannot be a matter of scoring rules and decision rules. Given 
that the correct decision rule is to maximise expected utility, there is at most one set 
of scoring rules which generates doxastic attitudes which commit an agent to L. 
Other scoring rules will commit her to different likelihoods of P being true as well as 
L. More generally, the only acceptable combinations of scoring and decision rules 
will be those that generate doxastic attitudes that commit an agent to L. Since we 
differentiate between epistemic standards only by whether they generate different 
doxastic attitudes, these different combinations of scoring and decision rules still 
amount to the same epistemic standard. Therefore, if epistemic standards are to 
determine which of L, L* or any alternative is to be assigned to P being true, 
epistemic standards cannot be determined by scoring rules and decision rules. That 
is to say, epistemic standards cannot be determined by the extent to which we value 
acquiring truths and avoiding falsehoods or how cautious or daring we are in risking 
being wrong about a proposition. 
6.2 Deciding Without Presupposing a Likelihood 
The above argument relied on the premise that in order for an agent to choose 
between doxastic attitudes towards a proposition P, she was committed to 
attributing some numerical likelihood L to whether P. The reason for this rested on 
the claim that any possible decision rule has to presuppose some likelihood of P. 
119 
 
However, strictly speaking, this is not true. At least some decision rules under 
conditions of uncertainty (where probabilities are unavailable) do not presuppose 
any given likelihood that P. The most obvious examples are the maximin and 
maximax decision rules. 
To explain these decision rules, I shall return to the earlier discussed Religion case 
whereby Sally is choosing between suspending judgment and believing that God 
exists. In this example, given her epistemic standard, suspending judgment had a 
value of 30 regardless of whether it was true or false and believing that God exists 
has a value of 40 when true and 0 otherwise. On the maximin rule, Sally should 
choose the attitude which maximises the prospects of the worst outcome. 
Therefore, on this rule, she suspend judgment since the worst outcome for 
suspending judgment, 30 units of value, exceeds the worst outcome for believing, 0. 
On the maximax criterion, Sally should choose the attitude in which the best 
outcome has the highest value.  This means that she should believe that God exists 
instead since the best outcome for belief is worth 40 units of value while the best 
outcome for Suspending judgment is 40. The maximax and maximin decision rules 
do not presuppose any given likelihood of the proposition that God exists since they 
deliver the same verdict regardless of which likelihood we may assume to be the 
case. For instance, if the evidence suggests that the likelihood of God’s existence is 
0.99 instead of 0.6, the maximin rule would still require Sally to suspend judgment 
while the maximax rule would still require her to believe.  
It should be clear enough that if we fix the decision rule, no plausible scoring rule 
would yield a different decision. If God exists, then the attitude believing is closer to 
the truth than suspending judgment. That is what explains why the value of 
believing is higher than the value of suspending judgment when the proposition in 
question is true. Any plausible scoring rule will value believing more than 
suspending judgment about a true proposition. The maximax decision rule will 
therefore always pick belief over suspension of judgment. Since belief is closer than 
suspending judgment to the truth if God exists, the reverse must be the case if He 
did not. Therefore, on any plausible scoring rule, suspending judgment would be 
better than believing given that the proposition in question is false. The maximin 
decision rule will always pick suspending judgment over believing regardless of 
which scoring rule the agent accepts. If fixing the decision rule is sufficient to fix 
which attitude the agent ought to pick, then given either of these two decision rules, 
the epistemic standard of an agent cannot depend on the agent’s scoring rule. That 
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is to say, if there is only one correct decision rule, then only one epistemic standard 
is rationally permissible. 
The permissivist must therefore claim that agents can have different epistemic 
standards because they have different decision rules. The maximin rule represents 
a maximally risk averse disposition. This is because when applying the maximin 
rule, the agent pays attention only to the worst outcome. By contrast, the maximax 
rule represents a maximally risk loving disposition. Only someone who is not 
concerned about any outcome other than the best outcome would apply the 
maximax rule. Like this, we are able to set up a permissive case: One agent, Sally is 
maximally risk averse and uses the maximin rule. Therefore she employs epistemic 
standard S1 and suspends judgment in response to her evidence. Susan, another 
agent, is maximally risk loving and adopts the maxixmax decision rule. Therefore 
she employs standard S2 and believes that God exists in response to her evidence. 
The problem with this picture of permissivism is that it faces a dilemma. Either 
agents are permitted to be implausibly insensitive to the evidence or there are 
possible situations in which the range of permissible doxastic attitudes is implausibly 
gappy.  
The first horn of the dilemma is especially obvious when the only two doxastic 
attitudes available to the agent are suspending judgment and believing a 
proposition. As mentioned in the case where Sally suspends judgment about the 
existence of God because she adopts the maximin decision criterion, she would 
suspend judgment about the existence of God regardless of how likely it was given 
her evidence that God exists. Moreover, this would be true for all the propositions 
that she would consider. Suspending judgment is always the least risky option. But 
this seems implausible. It cannot be permissible for Sally to suspend judgment 
about all propositions regardless of how well supported they are. Likewise, when 
Susan applies the maximax decision rule, she will believe or disbelieve all 
propositions that she considers and will never suspend judgment. However, it is 
implausible that it would be permissible for an agent to never suspend judgment. 
Surely there are at least some cases where the evidence for and against a 
proposition are so exactly balanced that suspending judgment becomes the only 
rational response.  
When the available doxastic options are so coarse grained, adopting doxastic 
attitudes on the basis of the maximin and maximax rules seems unduly insensitive 
to the evidence. However, this changes when more doxastic attitudes become 
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potentially available46. Suppose that instead of just believing or suspending 
judgment, agents could suspend judgment, moderately believe or strongly believe a 
proposition. Then, if the evidence was somewhat stronger, perhaps only moderately 
and strongly believing a proposition might be available to the agent. Sally, who 
applied the maximin rule, would moderately believe the proposition while Susan, 
who applied the maximax rule, would strongly believe the proposition. By contrast, if 
the evidence was somewhat weaker only suspending judgment and moderately 
believing the proposition would be available to the agent. In this case, Sally, who 
applied the maximin principle, would suspend judgment while Susan, who applies 
the maximax principle would moderately believe the proposition. In this case, unlike 
when only suspending judgment and believing are available, Susan’s and Sally’s 
doxastic attitudes exhibit some significant degree of responsiveness to the 
evidence.  
However, this opens up the possibility that the range of doxastic attitudes that are 
permissible for someone or another, given the evidence, is gappy. To see why, 
consider the following version of the Religion case. 
Religion II: Susan and Sally are considering whether God exists. 
Their evidence favours the proposition to some degree. Available to 
them are three doxastic attitudes, suspending judgment, moderately 
believing and strongly believing. Sally was raised by sceptics who 
are are highly averse to epistemic risk and applies the maximin rule. 
Therefore, she suspends judgment. Susan was raised by Jamesian 
pragmatists who have a large appetite for epistemic risk and applies 
the maximax rule. As a result, she strongly believes that God exists.  
If the maximax and maximin decision rules were the only rationally permissible 
decision rules, then of the available doxastic attitudes, there would be a gap 
between the permissible doxastic attitudes. Strongly believing and suspending 
judgment about God’s existence would be permissible, but moderately believing that 
God exists would not.  
However, it is implausible that there could be such gaps in the set of permissible 
doxastic attitudes. A key permissivist intuition is that it is implausible, especially with 
regards to inductive and abductive inferences, that it can be rational to have a 
                                                          
46
 Presumably, not every possible doxastic attitude an agent may adopt is available to her. 
For instance, if the evidence favours a proposition to some degree or other, disbelief is 
closed off to her. 
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certain degree of confidence in a proposition given a body of evidence, but not 
rational to have a slightly lower or higher confidence. Kelly (2014: 299-300) argues 
that intuitively, especially with respect to more fine grained doxastic attitudes, it 
cannot be that just one and only one attitude is rational given the evidence. Rather, 
it must be the case that there is a range of permissible attitudes which are mutually 
exclusive and adjacent. Moreover, whereas permissivists (ibid) are willing to 
concede that at least some cases are not permissive, it is less clear that they may 
accept that there can be cases in which the range of permissible doxastic attitudes 
is gappy.  
In order to resist the claim that there are gaps in the range of permissible doxastic 
attitudes, it needs to be the case there are permissible decision rules which reflect a 
risk appetite between maximal risk aversion and being maximally risk loving. 
Moreover, it needs to be the case that at least some or other of these intermediate 
decision rules will recommend doxastic attitudes that will fill in these gaps. However, 
such a decision rule may not be available in every case. This is ultimately because 
any intermediate decision rule must presuppose some likelihood, L, that the 
proposition in question is true.  
To see why this could be the case, consider the Hurwicz criterion which Pettigrew 
(2016) employs in his formalisation of James’s claims. For our purposes, we might 
define the Hurwicz criterion as a decision rule which requires us to maximise the 
value of a function H(A) where H(A) is the weighted sum of the v(A,T) and v(A,F). 
If v(A,T) > v(A,F): 
H(A) = (1-λ)·v(A,T) + λ·v(A,F) 
While if v(A,T) ≤ v(A,F): 
H(A) = λ·v(A,T) + (1-λ)·v(A,F) 
The λ symbol is the coefficient of pessimism. It weights the value of the worst 
outcome and represents the degree to which the agent is risk averse. When λ=1, 
the agent is maximally risk averse while when λ=0, she is maximally risk loving. 
Consider the Hurwicz criterion: When λ=1, the criterion reduces to the maximin 
decision rule, whereas when λ=0, it reduces to the maximax rule. Considering the 
way in which the Hurwicz criterion seems to be a generalised decision rule for 
decision-making under conditions of uncertainty, it might seem that the Hurwicz 
criterion does not presuppose any particular likelihood of P. However, this would be 
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mistaken. The Hurwicz criterion implicitly claims that P is just as likely as not-P. To 
see why this is the case, consider first the explicitly risk neutral expected utility 
criterion.  
E(A) = L·v(A, T) + (1-L)·v(A,F) 
The agent’s weighting of the two utilities by their corresponding likelihoods cannot 
be taken to be a departure from risk neutrality. Abstracting from the value of L, the 
agent who employs the “maximise expected utility decision rule” cares just as much 
about the worst outcome as the best outcome. That is to say, implicit in the 
expected utility calculation is a λ-value of 0.5. Similarly, abstracting from the 
weighting of the utilities in the Hurwicz criterion by λ, there must be an implicit L-
value of 0.5 as well.  
Secondly, consider that since each of L and λ is an independent consideration we 
might decide to weight the relevant epistemic utilities by, we could generate a 
criterion where the utilities are weighted by both L and λ. Consider, for instance, the 
Risk Weighted Expected Utility criterion (RWE): 
RWE(A) = (1-λ)·L·v(A, T) + λ·(1-L)·v(A,F) 
Consider the decision rule that maximises RWE. If we set λ to 0.5, it becomes 
equivalent to the risk neutral maximising expected utility rule. When we set λ to 0, it 
reduces to the maximax rule and to the maximin rule when λ is set to 1. This is a 
consequence of the fact that when the other term disappears, the value of L (or 1-L) 
becomes irrelevant to the rule. Crucially, when we set L to 0.5, the maximise RWE 
rule becomes equivalent to the Hurwicz criterion. This suggests, strongly, that the 
Hurwicz criterion presupposes that likelihood of P is 0.5. If this is right, then any 
decision rule that represents some intermediate appetite towards risk presupposes 
some value of L.  
It follows that the only permitted intermediate decision rules are those, which in 
combination with the agent’s scoring rule would recommend a doxastic attitude 
which is associated with a likelihood consistent with L. To illustrate this point, let us 
return to the Religion II example. In Religion II, Sally applied the maximin rule and 
suspended judgment about the existence of God. Susan applied the maximax rule 
and had a strong belief that God exists. This left a gap wherein a strong belief and 
suspending judgment were permissible, but moderate belief was not. 
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If that gap can be filled, it is possible that there is some other agent, Sharon, who 
adopts the maximise RWE rule at some given intermediate value of λ. For 
illustrative purposes, let us suppose that L = 0.6 in this case. In order to determine 
which attitude is rational for Sharon, let us stipulate Sharon’s scoring rule and λ 
value in the following way. Let the value of suspending judgment, both when the 
proposition is true, v(Sj,T), and when it is false v(Sj,F) be 30. The value of a strong 
belief in a true proposition v(Sb,T) is 40 while the value of that same attitude when 
the proposition is false v(Sb,F) is 0. The value of a moderate belief in a true 
proposition v(Mb,T) is 36 while the value of that moderate belief when the 
proposition is false is 20. Let the value of λ be set to 0.4. Calculating Sharon’s RWE 
for each available doxastic attitude, RWE(Sj) = 15.6, RWE(Mb) = 16.16 and 
RWE(Sb) = 14.4. Therefore, a moderate belief in the existence of God maximises 
RWE. 
However, it does not follow that a moderate belief is permissible for Sharon. 
Suppose that Sharon expects propositions which she has a moderate belief in to be 
true somewhere between 65% to 85% of the time. This commits her to attributing a 
likelihood to the existence of God that is between 0.65 and 0.85. However, she is 
also committed to attributing a likelihood of 0.6 to the proposition that God exists. 
These two attributions are not consistent with each other. Therefore, a moderate 
belief cannot be rational.  
If, on the other hand Sharon was slightly more risk averse and had a λ value of 0.5, 
her RWE(Sj) would be 15, RWE(Mb) would be 14.8 and her RWE(Sb) would be 12. 
Therefore, suspending judgment would maximise RWE. Given that she expects 
propositions she suspends judgment about to be true somewhere between 35% to 
65% of the time, she is committed to attributing a likelihood to the existence of God 
that is between 0.35 and 0.65. Sharon’s doxastic attitude therefore counts as 
rational. However, there is still a gap. Sharon and Sally permissibly suspend 
judgment while Susan permissibly has a strong belief.  
It seems that no one can permissibly have a moderate belief in the existence of 
God.  The reason for this is that any decision rule which would recommend a 
moderate belief must presuppose some value of L, which in this case is 0.6. 
However, this is inconsistent with the range of probabilities associated with having a 
moderate belief. 
To be clear, if the evidence was such that L was 0.7, then there would be no gap. 
Any intermediate decision rule which recommended a moderate belief would be 
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rational since there would be no inconsistency between the two likelihood 
attributions. However, the point here is not that it is impossible to fill a gap; only that 
there must be some situations where there is a gap in the set of permissible 
doxastic attitudes.  
Summing up, with regards to the maximin and maximax decision rules, when the 
only available doxastic attitudes are suspending judgment or belief, forming 
attitudes on the basis of these decision rules is implausibly insensitive to the 
evidence. On the other hand, when the available set of doxastic attitudes expands, 
the set of permissible attitudes is gappy. Given that both results are implausible, the 
only way to avoid either horn of the dilemma is to regard the maximin and maximax 
decision rules as impermissible. 
This reflects the thought that the possibility of anyone adopting the epistemic 
standards corresponding to maximal risk aversion and risk lovingness is merely 
theoretical. It is doubtful that anyone is so risk averse in their epistemic outlook that 
they disregard completely the possibility that they may get things right. Similarly, it is 
doubtful that anyone is so comfortable with epistemic risk that they disregard 
completely the possibility that they may be wrong. Attitudes towards epistemic risk 
that are this extreme typically fall into the category of epistemic vices. Cassam 
(2016) in his discussion of epistemic vice mentions gullibility as an epistemic vice. 
Disregarding completely, the possibility that one might be wrong seems to be akin to 
some version of gullibility, rashness or arrogance. Similarly, the extreme degree of 
risk aversion represented by the maximin rule plausibly entails extreme cowardice 
on the part of the agent. If this is right, then since such extreme attitudes towards 
epistemic risk are characteristic of epistemic vices, the corresponding decision rules 
cannot be permissible. 
Without the maximin and maximax decision rules, all that remains are more 
moderate decision rules. As I have discussed in this section, applying any such 
decision rule presupposes some likelihood L. Insofar as a decision rule, in 
combination with the agent’s scoring rule recommends doxastic attitudes that are 
associated with likelihoods inconsistent with L, that combination of decision and 
scoring rule is impermissible. Since there is only one doxastic attitude which is 
associated with likelihoods consistent with L, all permissible combinations of scoring 
and decision rules will, given the same total body of evidence recommend the same 
doxastic attitude. That is to say, all permissible combinations of scoring and 
decision rules generate the same epistemic norm. Given that epistemic standards 
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are to be distinguished from each other only insofar as they are constituted by 
different epistemic norms, all the permissible combinations of scoring and decision 
rules will generate the same epistemic standards. If so, then even if different 
backgrounds cause people to have different scoring rules and decision rules, either 
the combination of scoring and decision rules generates the same epistemic 
standard, or said combination is not rationally permissible. 
Summing up so far, on the indexing proposal discussed in this chapter, the 
epistemic standard that is appropriate for an agent depends on the extent to which 
she values the twin goals of acquiring true beliefs and avoiding false beliefs. I have 
argued that for all except at most one epistemic standard, agents would be 
committed to inconsistent attributions of likelihood of the proposition under 
assessment.  
6.3 Pragmatic Goals 
The above argument also allows us to examine why different pragmatic goals would 
not make rational disagreement possible. Pragmatic considerations can work in a 
number of ways. For instance, they may affect the stakes involved in having a true 
or false belief about a proposition. Consider the following case: 
Foetal Personhood: Sally and Susan are considering whether a 
foetus at 16 weeks of gestation is a person. Sally, who was raised in 
a feminist household, is especially sensitive to the moral risk of 
unduly restricting women’s autonomy. Given that classifying a foetus 
as a person will make it inappropriate for a woman at that stage of 
her pregnancy to have an abortion, Sally believes that a 16 week old 
foetus is not a person. Susan, who was raised in a religious 
household is especially sensitive to the moral risk of killing a person. 
Given that classifying a foetus as a non-person will make it 
appropriate to abort it, Susan believes, given the same total body of 
evidence, that a 16 week old foetus is a person 
In addition to the way in which the agent values acquiring truths and avoiding 
falsehoods, an agent’s background could also affect the way in which they weigh 
moral and prudential risk. As we saw in Foetal Personhood, different ways of 
weighing the moral risks results in valuing truly or falsely believing that a foetus is a 
person differently.  
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Arguably Susan and Sally in Foetal Personhood are not so much reasoning, as 
engaging in wishful thinking. This seems to be an inevitable risk when the moral 
stakes in question are closely tied to the proposition under deliberation. Insofar as 
there is a dearth of plausible cases where different weighing of the moral stakes 
licenses different doxastic attitudes, this emphasises how implausible it is that 
people’s doxastic attitudes towards moral claims might permissibly be influenced by 
the moral stakes at hand. Be that as it may, for the sake of argument, we might 
proceed as if Foetal Personhood or some other case presented an intuitively 
plausible instance of moral stakes affecting what it is rational to believe. 
To see how practical considerations affect the rationality of disagreement, consider 
a simpler case, namely the following version of the Bank case discussed in Chapter 
4. 
Bank: Sally needs to urgently deposit a cheque into the bank. If she 
fails to deposit the cheque by the end of the day, she will lose her 
house. Her memory, which she knows is fairly, but not perfectly, 
reliable tells her that the bank will close at 7:30 pm. However, since 
she cannot afford to be wrong about when the bank closes, she 
suspends judgment about whether the bank will close at 7:30 pm and 
checks the internet again. Susan does not need to urgently deposit a 
cheque into the bank. She will lose nothing of significance if cannot 
go to the bank by the end of the day. Her memory which she knows 
is fairly, but not perfectly reliable (in fact just as reliable as Sally’s) 
tells her that the bank will close at 7:30 pm. Since she can afford to 
be wrong about when the bank closes, she believes that it will close 
at 7:30 pm.  
In Bank, Sally and Susan do not in general have different attitudes towards 
epistemic risk nor do they in general value acquiring truths and avoiding falsehoods 
differently. However, Sally’s practical circumstances make it such that she happens 
to value not falsely believing that the bank will close at 7:30 pm much more than she 
values truly believing that it will. As a result, her expected epistemic value if she 
suspended judgment is higher than her expected epistemic value if she believed 
that the bank would close at 7:30 pm. That is what should make suspending 
judgment rational for Sally. Likewise, the opposite is true for Susan. Notice, 
however, that in order for it to be true that the expected value of Sally believing that 
the bank would close at 7:30 pm is lower than the expected value of her suspending 
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judgment, there needs to be some likelihood L that is assigned to the proposition 
that the bank will close at 7:30 pm. Without that likelihood, the expected values of 
believing and suspending judgment would be indefinite. There are also likelihoods 
associated with suspending judgment and believing. Presumably Sally and Susan 
expect propositions that they suspend judgment about to be true roughly as often as 
not. Likewise, they must expect propositions which they believe to be true 
significantly more often than not. However, if the likelihood of the bank closing at 
7:30 pm is L, the proposition that the bank will close at 7:30 pm cannot be both 
significantly more likely to be true than not and roughly just as likely to be true as 
not. Therefore, either Sally, Susan or both must be attributing inconsistent 
likelihoods to the proposition that the bank will close at 7:30 pm. It follows that any 
epistemic standard which requires them to attribute such inconsistent likelihoods is 
not rationally permissible. 
Having dealt with the simpler case, Bank, we can return to somewhat more 
complicated cases like Foetal Personhood. If it is not rational to suspend judgment 
about the time the bank closes just because of the high stakes of getting the timing 
wrong, it similarly cannot be rational to believe that the foetus is a person just 
because of the high moral stakes of falsely believing that it is not. Likewise it cannot 
be rational to believe that the foetus is not a person just because of the high moral 
stakes of falsely believing that it is.  
To generalise, for any putative pragmatic goal, the pragmatic goal could possibly 
affect which attitude it would be rational to have about a proposition only by 
changing how valuable it is to acquire that belief if true or avoid it if false. For the 
same reasons47 as with our discussion of the twin epistemic goals, in all but at most 
a few of the ways of valuing these pragmatic goals, this results in the agent being 
committed to attributing inconsistent likelihoods to the same proposition. This 
cannot be rational. Therefore, any disagreement that arises from valuing various 
goals differently cannot be a rational one. 
If this is correct, then this closes off one of the ways in which, according to the fourth 
burden, difference in people’s backgrounds are sources of rational disagreement. 
More specifically, even though different backgrounds give rise to different ways of 
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 I shall ignore those pragmatic goals the value of which is not sensitive to whether the 
proposition in question is true. For instance, if an evil demon threatened to kill everyone 
unless an agent believed that grass was purple, preventing everyone from dying may be 
some sort of pragmatic goal which does not require the agent to presuppose some L. 
However, that would clearly be the wrong kind of reason to believe that grass is purple. 
Whatever other virtue such a belief may possess, it is not epistemically rational.  
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valuing various practical and epistemic goals, this does not licence different doxastic 
attitudes towards a proposition when the evidence is shared. In addition, in showing 
that epistemic standards cannot vary on the basis of how agents value the twin 
epistemic goals or any other pragmatic goal, I have also closed off one more 
potential route by which the second burden of judgment could generate rational 
disagreement. In this thesis, I have, thus far, shown that the first, third and fifth 
burdens cannot be sources of rational disagreement. I have also shown that, with 
regards to the fourth burden, rational disagreement cannot arise because people’s 
different backgrounds cause them to value acquiring truths and avoiding falsehoods 
differently. All that is left is to show that people cannot rationally disagree because 
their different backgrounds cause them to have different prior doxastic attitudes.  In 
the next chapter, I shall discuss this indexing proposal according to which the 
epistemic standard that is appropriate for an agent depends on her prior doxastic 
attitudes.  
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Chapter 7: Epistemic Conservatism and Permissivism 
I have so far discussed two accounts according to which epistemic standards might 
vary from person to person. The first is because people differ in terms of their 
cognitive capacities. The second is because people differ with regards to how much 
they value acquiring truths and avoiding falsehoods. I have argued that neither 
account is successful. I shall now discuss a third account according to which people 
can have different epistemic standards because they have different doxastic 
attitudes prior to encountering the evidence. To illustrate, consider the following 
case: 
Abortion: Susan comes from a conservative religious background 
and happens to believe that abortion is impermissible. Sally comes 
from a secular background and happens to believe that abortion is 
permissible. Perhaps this is because they each have at most 
encountered evidence and arguments supporting their own side. 
When they both enter the university, they encounter all the 
arguments and evidence that pertain to the permissibility of abortion. 
It turns out, however, that the balance of reasons is insufficient for 
either Sally or Susan to change their views. However, Sally’s belief 
about the permissibility of abortion adds just enough justification that 
she remains justified in believing that abortion is permissible. 
Likewise, Susan’s belief that abortion is impermissible adds just 
enough justification to her balance of reasons that she remains 
justified in believing that it is impermissible.  
In Abortion, after going to the university, both Sally and Susan have the same total 
body of evidence. However, since they initially start off having different beliefs, they 
are permitted to maintain their beliefs because the mere fact that they happen to 
believe a proposition confers some degree of justification on that proposition. This 
last claim is called epistemic conservatism. Some version of conservatism, together 
with the agent’s initial set of beliefs, gives rise to epistemic norms that prescribe for 
each agent which doxastic attitudes are permitted for them given their evidence. 
That is to say, an agent’s prior beliefs, in combination with more general principles 
about belief revision generate epistemic standards. 
My aim in this chapter is to address forms of permissivism grounded in epistemic 
conservatism. In showing that no plausible account of permissivism can be 
grounded in epistemic conservatism, I shall show that even if people’s different 
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backgrounds cause them to start off with different beliefs, as long as their total body 
of evidence is the same, these different starting points do not permit them to 
disagree. To start off with, let me first explain what I mean by epistemic 
conservatism. 
7.1 Epistemic Conservatism 
Epistemic conservatism is the claim, roughly, that an agent acquires some 
justification for a proposition simply by virtue of her believing it. The amount of 
justification provided by merely believing it need not be very much. Nevertheless, as 
with Abortion, we can construct permissive cases48 whereby two agents Sally and 
Susan share the same evidence, where the strength of the evidence is just short of 
justifying belief in a given proposition.  
As seen from the Abortion case it seems that so long as there is a justificatory 
asymmetry between maintaining a belief and adopting a belief, a permissive case 
can seemingly be constructed. Conservatism can generate permissive cases in 
other ways as well. Consider the following variation on Abortion. 
Abortion II: Suppose, as per the fourth burden of judgment, two 
agents Susan and Sally have different backgrounds. Susan was 
raised in a religious conservative environment and Sally in a more 
secular environment. Due to their different backgrounds Sally initially 
has a high confidence in the proposition that abortion is permissible 
while Susan has a low confidence in the same. Later they both enter 
the university where they encounter all the arguments and evidence 
pertaining to the permissibility of abortion. Their initial doxastic 
attitudes nevertheless have some “pull” on their final doxastic 
attitudes. After encountering all the evidence, Sally’s confidence in 
the proposition that abortion is permissible is still higher than 
Susan’s. 
The most prominent view according to which the doxastic attitudes an agent has 
before she encounters the evidence influences the doxastic attitude she has 
                                                          
48
 Gaus appeals to a version of epistemic conservatism when he defends the possibility of 
reasonable disagreement. He appeals to the claim that we need more reason to adopt a 
belief than to retain it (2011: 240). While this is not strictly speaking a matter of belief 
conferring justification, it is still a version of conservatism that is vulnerable to the same 
objections as the standard account. 
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subsequent to it is Bayesianism. I shall briefly explain this view before explaining 
how a certain permissive version of Bayesianism is related to conservatism. 
For the following discussion, I shall assume that doxastic attitudes can be 
adequately represented by numerical probabilities. Regarding a proposition A, I 
shall use Pi(A) to represent the agent’s initial doxastic attitude towards A before 
encountering the body of evidence in question and Pf(A) to denote the doxastic 
attitude towards A after encountering the evidence in question. I shall use P(A|B) to 
denote the conditional probability of A given B. Following Kolmogorov (1956), I shall 
define49 conditional probabilities in the following way: 
Conditional Probability: P(A|B) = P(A and B) / P(B) 
Bayesians can be thought of as endorsing the idea that when they encounter a body 
of evidence E, the attitude towards A, Pf(A), that they ought to form is to be related 
to their initial assessment of the conditional likelihood of A given E, Pi(A|E), by the 
following principle called Conditionalization: 
Conditionalization: Pf(A) = Pi(A|E) 
Recall that epistemic norms either are, or imply rules of the form “form doxastic 
attitude A towards proposition P in response to evidence E”. Combining 
Conditionalization with a sentence like “Pi(A|E1) = 0.8” gives us an epistemic norm 
which tells us that we should form a confidence of 0.8 towards proposition A when 
we encounter a body of evidence E1. Given Conditional Probability, Pi(A|E) can be 
re-written as: 
Pi(A|E) = Pi(E|A) · Pi(A) / Pi(E) 
This makes explicit how an agent’s epistemic standards depend on her initial 
doxastic attitudes and her initial assessment of how likely the evidence would be if 
the proposition had been true. These initial attitudes and probability assessments 
are an agent’s priors. Given Conditionalization, we can see that since Pi(A|E) is 
proportional to Pi(A), Pf(A) is proportional to Pi(A) as well. This can explain how, in 
Abortion II, Susan’s and Sally’s initial credences about the permissibility of abortion 
have a “pull” on their final credences after they encounter all the evidence.  
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 Notably this is not the only way to define conditional probabilities. For instance Cox uses 
conditional probabilities as a primitive and defines unconditional probabilities in terms of 
conditional ones. 
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Trivially, when people have different priors, their epistemic standards50 will be 
different and the doxastic attitude that is rationalised by their evidence would be 
different. Different priors result in different values for Pi(A|E). Combined with 
Conditionalization, these different priors will generate different epistemic norms. 
Given that epistemic standards are constituted by epistemic norms, when the 
epistemic norms differ, the epistemic standards are different. 
The permissivist’s claim then is that there are at least some cases in which agents 
can have different priors. There is one sense in which everyone thinks that agents 
can have different priors. If, prior to encountering E, they had previously 
encountered different evidence, they can permissibly have different priors. However, 
in cases like these, people have different total evidence. Uniqueness is compatible 
with people having different total evidence rationally disagreeing. The 
disagreements that matter for our purposes are disagreements when people have 
the same total evidence. Therefore, the cases that are of interest to us are those in 
which people’s priors permissibly differ without there being differences in their total 
body of evidence. With reference to the Abortion II case, what concerns us is 
whether Sally and Susan can have different priors while having the same total 
evidence. To answer the purely causal question, people having different priors 
without having had different total evidence might be, as suggested by the fourth 
burden of judgment, a result of them having different  backgrounds. The epistemic 
question that concerns us is whether these different priors could be rationally 
permissible. Therefore, we must look at whether people can differ with respect to 
what I will call ur-priors.  
Ur-priors are those priors an agent can be said to have had before encountering any 
evidence at all. To be clear, I am not claiming that people are ever actually in a 
position where they have to pick one set of ur-priors over another. Children, on 
average, are presumed to be capable of forming beliefs between 1.5-2.5 years of 
age. However, they clearly have subjective experiences well before then. This 
means that actual agents can plausibly be said to encounter evidence well before 
they are capable of forming beliefs about various propositions. Hence, actual 
                                                          
50
 It is a mistake to think of the epistemic norm just consisting of Conditionalization. If the 
epistemic norms consisted of just Conditionalization and Conditional Probability, people with 
the same set of epistemic norms could have different priors, and therefore rationally 
disagree. Clearly, given that epistemic standards are taken to fix which doxastic attitudes are 
rational for an agent given the evidence, the priors themselves must be part of the epistemic 
norms. Since the priors themselves do not constitute any given epistemic norm, the norm 
must be constituted by a combination of the priors, Conditional Probability and 
Conditionalization. 
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agents’ earliest doxastic attitudes are formed in some sense as a response to 
evidence. It seems that, in principle, these earliest responses to an agent’s 
evidence can be evaluated.  
Bayesians therefore seem committed to positing the existence of ur-priors. In 
principle, if rationally permissible ur-priors exist, then either the agent’s doxastic 
attitudes could have been formed by conditionalization on those priors or they could 
not. If they could have been formed that way, then they can be rational. If they could 
not have been formed by conditionalization on those ur-priors, the attitudes cannot 
be rational. A corollary to this is that we can project backwards from people’s 
current doxastic attitudes and total evidence and determine what ur-priors, if 
rationally permissible, could rationalise an agent’s current attitudes. Our current 
attitudes are rational only if the ur-priors that would rationalise them are themselves 
rationally permissible. Moreover, Conditionalization makes it clear that the priors fix 
what doxastic attitude is rationalised by the evidence. It follows from this that 
rational disagreement given the same total evidence is possible, if and only if, there 
is more than one set of rationally permissible ur-priors. 
Subjective Bayesians, those who believe that more than one set of ur-priors is 
permissible, have some difficulty accounting for how people could rationally accept 
ur-priors. Clearly, ur-priors are subject to rational appraisal. Even the most 
extremely permissive Bayesians will require that ur-priors are to be probabilistically 
coherent. The difficulty is in figuring out what other constraints can be imposed on 
the “choice” of ur-priors. Meacham (2014: 1192-1193) notes, for instance, that 
chance-credence principles like the Principal Principle which requires agents to form 
credences that match their beliefs about objective probabilities impose some 
constraints on which ur-priors are rationally permissible. By doing this, the range of 
permissible ur-priors is narrowed. However, as Meacham notes (ibid), chance-
credence principles are not so strong that only one sent of ur-priors is permissible. 
What is notable about the strategy of Meacham’s argument is the implicit claim that 
a given set of priors acquires some degree of justification as long as there are no 
principles that rule them out. However, this just is epistemic conservatism. Part of 
what supposedly makes an agent’s ur-priors justified for her is that they are hers51. 
By contrast if only one set of ur-priors was rationally permissible, then, for an agent 
who has those ur-priors the fact that those ur-priors are hers does not contribute in 
                                                          
51
 This has to be the case or else permissive Bayesianism is subject to the Arbitrariness 
Objection. An agent who did not prefer her own priors would have no epistemic objection to 
having her ur-priors changed for her by the press of a button if such was indeed possible. 
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any way to their rational permissibility. Addressing permissivism that is grounded in 
this justificatory asymmetry between one’s own doxastic attitudes and other 
attitudes requires us to discuss epistemic conservatism in greater detail. 
While epistemic conservatism has been subject to some recent criticism (Foley 
1983; Christensen 1994; Vahid 2004), it has been endorsed by many philosophers 
including Quine (1951), Sklar (1975), Chisholm (1980) and more recently by 
McGrath (2007), McCain (2008), Poston (2012) and Podgorski (2016) in various 
forms. Some of these may be weaker than others. My argument in this section will 
be that the stronger versions of conservatism are implausible while the weaker 
versions do not pose any significant threat to uniqueness. In the following, I shall 
present what seems to be the standard version of epistemic conservatism as well as 
what seems attractive about epistemic conservatism.  
Vahid describes the standard version of epistemic conservatism as follows.   
Standard Conservatism52: “Beliefs acquire positive epistemic status 
merely in virtue of being believed in so far as there is no good reason 
against them” (Vahid 2004: 107) 
 In clarification of the above, I shall take positive epistemic status to mean some 
degree of justification. On a stronger account, the epistemic status in question could 
be full justification. On a weaker account, the epistemic status may not even survive 
contact with evidence (Poston 2012).  
By no good reason, I mean no good positive reason (Harman 1986: 39; Vahid 2004: 
109).  Conservatism would be entirely toothless if the fact that there was no positive 
reason for a belief counted as a good reason against that belief. As Harman and 
Vahid note, in order for propositions I believe to have any advantage over those that 
I do not, it must be permissible for me to hold onto a belief until I have positive 
reason to abandon it, and not just if I lack positive reason to maintain it. With these 
clarifications in mind, we should have some grasp of what beliefs are permitted by 
Standard Conservatism. I shall now proceed to explain why epistemic conservatism 
might be attractive. 
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 This is basically identical to how Chisholm (1980: 551-552) describes it. Foley follows 
Chisholm in formulating epistemic conservatism.  
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7.2 Motivating Conservatism 
There are three53 canonical sorts of motivations for conservatism. The first sort of 
motivation relates to cognitive efficiency. The second relates to issues pertaining to 
memory retention. The third relates to evidential under-determination and sceptical 
worries. I shall describe each sort of motivation in turn. With regards to the first 
motivation, on one view, changing one’s doxastic attitudes is cognitively costly and 
epistemic conservatism is supposed to make our doxastic decisions sensitive to 
these costs (Lycan 1988; Podgorski 2016). Relatedly, one can also avoid 
intellectual clutter by not having to keep track of the justifications for all of one’s 
beliefs (Harman 1986). Since conservatism provides some occasions where beliefs 
can be retained when they otherwise could not be without having to keep track of 
the evidence, conservatism provides a boost to the cognitive efficiency of agents.  
Crucially, conservatism is a view that is invoked in response to the cognitive 
limitations of actual agents. If we were not cognitively limited, we would not need to 
be sensitive to the cognitive costs of changing one’s doxastic attitudes. Similarly, 
intellectual clutter would not be a problem and we would always be able to keep 
track of all our evidence all the time. These are similar types of considerations to 
those that are supposed to operate in the first, third and fifth burdens of judgment. 
According to the first and fifth burdens, people rationally disagree because the 
evidence or the subject matter is too complex. The complexity of the evidence or 
subject matter cannot cause disagreement unless people have limited cognitive 
capacities. Likewise, as per the third burden of judgment, the vagueness in the 
concepts we use is a result of our limited cognitive capacity to infer from our 
evidence whether a predicate applies in borderline cases. To the extent that, as I 
have argued in Chapter 5, limitations to an agent’s cognitive capacities do not affect 
what is rational for her to believe, some of the motivation for epistemic conservatism 
is undermined. I shall discuss this more extensively later in this chapter.  
The second sort of motivation for conservatism relates to memory retention. The 
core case is one in which we retain a belief even after we have forgotten the 
reasons for that belief. For example, suppose I were to have originally believed that 
all the Moai on Easter Island face inwards on the basis of reading a particular article 
from National Geographic magazine. I reason that given that National Geographic is 
generally reliable about such matters, I have good reason to believe that the Moai 
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 I am excluding Poston’s argument (2012) for conservatism based on the perspectival 
nature of reasoning at least partly because Poston offers little in the way of positive 
argument for it. 
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all face inward. Suppose I were to retain this belief but forget how I arrived at this 
belief. There is supposed to be an intuition that it is rational for me to retain this 
belief even when I have forgotten my reasons for the belief. According to McGrath 
(2007), conservatism does a better job of explaining the intuition that it is rational to 
retain the belief, than competing explanations like evidentialism or preservationism 
for both this case and other similar cases.  
Preservationism is the view according to which memory preserves the rationality of 
a belief (Burge 1993). Hence, according to preservationism, barring the introduction 
of new evidence, a retained belief is rational, if and only if the belief was rational 
when originally formed. However, as McGrath argues, there can be cases where the 
belief was originally formed irrationally but retaining the belief is rational. McGrath 
sketches out one such case. In his example, he supposes a case where an agent 
believes some fact like ‘Hannibal fought in the third Punic war’, on the basis of 
testimonial evidence she has good reason to believe is unreliable (McGrath 2007, 
p4). The original acquisition of the belief is irrational since the source of the 
testimony is someone who the agent has good reason to think is unreliable about 
such facts; for instance, a six year old child. Suppose that the agent were to forget 
how she acquired the belief. Perhaps she remembers that someone told her, but not 
who. McGrath argues that retaining her belief after she has forgotten her evidence 
is rational because the rationality of retaining her beliefs is dependent only on her 
current epistemic situation. Since her current epistemic situation is identical to 
someone who rationally acquired her belief but forgot her evidence, it is rational for 
her to retain her beliefs (ibid). McGrath’s argument is that since preservationism 
cannot explain the rationality of a retained belief which was acquired irrationally, 
preservationism cannot be true. 
The second competitor to conservatism is what McGrath calls evidentialism. By 
evidentialism, he means a view according to which retained beliefs are justified 
because even though we lack the original evidence for the belief, we possess some 
other evidence for the belief (ibid: 8). McGrath’s objection to evidentialism is that 
there is no plausible version of evidentialism which could justify memory beliefs. I 
shall not discuss the details of McGrath’s arguments here. If they are right, then 
since preservationism is also off the table, according to McGrath, conservatism is 
the only account by which memory beliefs can be justified. 
The third motivation for conservatism is how conservatism handles evidence under-
determination and scepticism. I shall consider evidence under-determination first. 
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Suppose, a scientist accepts a theory on the basis of a body of evidence, and then 
encounters another theory which fits the evidence just as well as the one she 
believes. Conservatism permits her to maintain her acceptance of that first theory. It 
thus solves one type of under-determination problem: Whenever someone already 
accepts one theory which fits the evidence, one need not reject a theory just 
because another one which equally fits the theory is introduced (Sklar 1975: 381-
383). We can see how conservatism addresses sceptical problems as well. Our 
evidence is equally consistent with the proposition that we are brains in vats54 or 
that we are deceived by an evil Cartesian demon and the proposition that we are 
not. Conservatism entails that we need not lower our confidence in the existence 
and character of the external world just because we become aware of alternative 
sceptical scenarios which equally fit the evidence. 
7.3 Objections to Conservatism 
Given the range of upshots of conservatism, we would expect it to be less 
controversial than it is.55 However, a common criticism of conservatism is that it 
proves too much. Epistemic conservatism, or at least the standard version of it, is 
subject to a range of counterexamples where conservatism seems to license 
intuitively rationally defective beliefs. I shall review two types of related canonical 
objections to conservatism, firstly the bootstrapping objection and subsequently the 
extra boost objection. Foley (1983: 174-175) brings up the case in which an agent 
considers whether there are an even number of grains of sand on a given beach. 
She fails to notice that she lacks sufficient reason for this proposition and believes it 
anyway. Foley’s objection is that conservatism seems to permit the agent to 
continue to maintain the belief since it now has some epistemic merit in virtue of 
being believed and there are no positive defeaters for it. People thus seem to be 
able to illicitly bootstrap their way into having rational beliefs when their evidence is 
lacking.  
Related to the bootstrapping objection, suppose that an agent has enough evidence 
to justify just barely believing a proposition. Having formed the belief, conservatism 
seems to give the proposition some extra boost over and above the existing 
evidence. This extra boost licenses the agent to adopt an even higher confidence 
(Huemer 1999: 348; McGrath 2007: 19-20). Like the bootstrapping, this extra boost 
is illicit. It seems odd to think that we would get an extra boost to our justification 
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 See Harman (1973) 
55
 See Foley (1983), Christensen (1994), Vahid (2004) 
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whenever our other reasons are strong enough to justify belief. If we were to get 
that extra boost, barely believing any proposition would never be justified. Every 
time our reasons for belief are just strong enough to justify barely believing a 
proposition, an extra boost would justify an even stronger belief. Moreover, the 
reason that this attitude would never be justified would be simply because it is the 
weakest doxastic attitude that still counts as belief. But surely that is not a good 
reason to think a doxastic attitude is always irrational. 
7.4 Weakening Standard Conservatism 
It is clear that the above two objections apply at least to Standard Conservatism. If 
believing a proposition confers some degree of justification to it, then agents can 
illicitly bootstrap themselves into having rational beliefs which were not rational for 
them to form.  They would also gain an extra boost to any proposition which gained 
this degree of justification simply on the basis of being believed. If these objections 
applied to epistemic conservatism as a whole, they would be a devastating 
objection to epistemic conservatism. That is why recent attempts at defending 
epistemic conservatism have involved a weaker version of conservatism than 
Standard Conservatism (Sklar 1975; McGrath 2007; McCain 2008; Poston 2012; 
Podgorski 2016). I shall show that those accounts of conservatism that can 
successfully avoid the objections pose no threat to uniqueness. I will start from the 
least recent account and proceed in chronological order. 
7.4.1 Differential Conservatism 
In considering Sklar’s account of conservatism, his objection to Standard 
Conservatism is on the grounds that it allows illicit bootstrapping (Sklar 1975: 376-
377). Instead, he endorses the following principle which, following Vahid, I shall call 
Differential Conservatism (Vahid 2004: 102). 
Differential Conservatism: “If you believe some proposition, on the 
basis of whatever positive warrant may accrue to it from the 
evidence, apriori plausibility, and so forth, it is unreasonable to cease 
to believe the proposition to be true merely because of the existence 
of, or knowledge of the existence of, alternative incompatible 
hypotheses whose positive warrant is no greater than that of the 
proposition already believed.” (Sklar 1975: 378) 
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If Differential Conservatism is true, then there is a straightforward way to construct a 
permissive case. Two agents can have the same evidence, but rationally accept 
different propositions because each of them happen to have encountered their own 
proposition first. For instance, Differential Conservatism licenses different attitudes 
in the Abortion case. Suppose the evidence regarding the permissibility of abortion 
fits the proposition that abortion is permissible just as much as it fits the proposition 
that abortion is not. Then Susan, who encounters the proposition that abortion is not 
permissible first because of her background, is justified in believing so. Similarly, 
Sally who encounters the proposition that abortion is permissible because of her 
background is justified in believing that abortion is permissible. However, Sklar’s 
account of conservatism is at least as implausible as Standard Conservatism 
because it presupposes the latter. 
While Sklar denies that Differential Conservatism commits him to Standard 
Conservatism (ibid), this denial is implausible. As Vahid has argued (Vahid 2004:  
104), Sklar appeals to Standard Conservatism when trying to justify Differential 
Conservatism. Sklar considers a permissive case one in which, one person believes 
a proposition while another who shares the same evidence believes an incompatible 
one which is equally supported by the evidence. He draws an analogy to cases 
where people with different evidence reasonably disagree and argues that while 
their evidence does not differ, their total states do (Sklar 1975: 384-385). However, 
this move presupposes that the difference in total state, i.e. the fact that each agent 
believes a different proposition, provides some justification, akin to that provided by 
evidence, to the respective propositions believed by each agent. However, the only 
difference in state between the agents is that one of them happens to believe one 
proposition and the other agent happens to believe another proposition. That is to 
say, Sklar presupposes Standard Conservatism in his defence of Differential 
Conservatism. 
Of course, it is hard to see how Sklar could avoid appealing to Standard 
Conservatism. It is incoherent to claim both, that I should not stop believing a 
proposition just because I encounter another equally well supported but 
incompatible one, and that believing a proposition does not confer any justification 
for that proposition. After all, when asked why it is wrong to stop believing in a 
proposition when I encounter another evidentially equivalent but incompatible one, 
the only answer that would suffice is that the first proposition is more justified to me. 
If we say that the other proposition is just as justified as mine, it would not seem 
wrong to switch. However, if it is permissible to switch, then believing on the 
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evidence is just as good as believing by popping a pill or flipping a coin. On the 
other hand, if it is wrong to switch, it can only be because my proposition is more 
justified than the other. However, the only difference between the two is that I 
believe one, but not the other. Therefore nothing else, but the fact that I believe it 
makes up that difference in justification. However, this just is Standard 
Conservatism, which as we saw, is implausible. 
7.4.2 Defeating Conditions 
Another way in which Standard Conservatism can be weakened is by adding more 
defeating conditions. McGrath (2007) and McCain (2008) both try to weaken 
Standard Conservatism by introducing more robust defeating conditions. I shall 
discuss each proposal in turn. McGrath is keenly aware that Standard Conservatism 
is vulnerable to the bootstrapping and extra boost objections because the defeating 
conditions are too thin. McGrath takes Standard Conservatism to consist of 
something like the following: “if S believes that P, then S is rational in retaining the 
belief that P provided and only provided that, (i), S lacks defeaters for her belief; (ii), 
S lacks the materials for constructing such a defeater56” (McGrath 2007: 20). He 
tries to confine conservatism to forgotten evidence cases (ibid: 21) by introducing 
another defeating condition: “(iii) S lacks special information about her past 
evidence” (ibid: 20). 
However, it is unclear if the third defeating condition suffices to prevent 
bootstrapping cases. To see why, suppose an agent forms a belief on insufficient 
evidence without noticing that the evidence is insufficient. Conservatism, even with 
McGrath’s third condition permits the agent to maintain that belief even when the 
agent remembers the evidence she used to originally form the belief. The only thing 
that speaks against her having the belief is the fact that her evidence is insufficient. 
However, this is not a positive defeater, only a negative one. Similarly, there are no 
materials that could be used to construct a positive defeater. The question of 
whether McGrath’s version of conservatism permits the agent to maintain her belief 
in this case hangs on the third defeating condition. Since the agent does not notice 
that she formed her belief on insufficient evidence, she does not count as having 
special information about her past evidence. Therefore, McGrath’s version of 
conservatism permits the agent in this case to retain her belief. However, insofar as 
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 McGrath distinguishes between having a defeater and the material for the defeater being 
available in the following way. An agent has a defeater only if she believes that she believes 
the defeater. She has the material to construct the defeater, so long as she can infer the 
defeater from the other information she does have.  
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Conservatism rationalises carelessly formed beliefs, it allows illicit bootstrapping 
that we found to be objectionable.  
McGrath could of course continue to create more defeating conditions (ibid: 21) and 
it is worth making explicit what it would take to ensure that conservatism applied 
only to forgotten evidence cases. In order to rule out everything but the forgotten 
evidence cases, the defeating condition would have to be something like the 
following: ‘(iv) S lacks the material to construct special information about her past 
evidence’. Moreover, ‘special information about past evidence’ would have to be 
interpreted broadly to include the fact that the belief lacks sufficient evidence. If 
special information does not include the negative claim that the evidence was 
insufficient for the belief, then conservatism would still permit illicit bootstrapping. 
Therefore the 4th defeating condition must specify, both, that the material for the 
special information to be constructed is unavailable, and that the special information 
include the fact that the belief was originally formed on the basis of inadequate 
evidence. 
However, once we introduce the 4th defeating condition, there is pressure to regard 
forgotten evidence cases, in which the original evidence was inadequate, as illicit 
bootstrapping. To see why, consider why we would think the 4th defeating condition 
was appropriate. We would think that the 4th defeating condition was appropriate 
only because we would think it important that our beliefs be formed on the basis of 
sufficient evidence. If we think it important that our beliefs are formed on the basis of 
sufficient evidence, then it should not matter whether we currently believe that they 
are, only that they actually are. Even if we were to justifiably believe that our beliefs 
are formed on the basis of sufficient evidence, if that belief is nevertheless incorrect, 
then our other beliefs have at least one rational defect: They are formed on the 
basis of insufficient evidence. Therefore, even if we have forgotten our evidence, it 
is still a fact that the beliefs were formed on the basis of insufficient evidence. It 
would be one thing if we were to subsequently get other evidence which would then 
justify our beliefs. At least then even if the belief was not originally well formed, we 
are now in a position to justify that belief because we have more information. When 
our evidence was already insufficient to justify the belief, it seems absurd that taking 
that evidence away would render the belief justified. Therefore, if we think that the 
4th defeating condition is appropriate, we have reason to think that permitting belief 
retention in forgotten evidence cases in which the belief was originally improperly 
formed also involve improper bootstrapping. However, as McGrath pointed out, 
taking the retention of a person’s belief as irrational when she formed it irrationally 
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but forgot her original evidence violates the principle by which the rationality of a 
belief supervenes on the agent’s current state.  
It is true that if we do regard forgotten evidence cases in which the original evidence 
is improperly formed as involving bootstrapping, we are forced to give up the 
principle that rationality supervenes on the current state of the believer (Huemer 
1999: 352; McGrath 2007: 4). However, any plausible conservatism should give up 
this principle anyway. Conservatism is most plausibly regarded as a principle 
regarding diachronic rationality, that is, about the rationality of belief revision 
(McGrath 2007; Podgorski 2016). Moreover, we care about diachronic rationality 
only because we care about more than merely whether people’s beliefs fit their 
evidence; we care about how they formed their beliefs. If we cared only about 
whether agents’ beliefs fit their current evidence, conservatism is dead in the water. 
The reason for this is that if we cared only about an agent’s current evidence, we 
would have no reason to care about special information about the agent’s original 
evidence. However, eliminating the third and fourth defeating conditions would 
make conservatism vulnerable to the bootstrapping objection. Therefore, epistemic 
conservatives should care about how people formed their beliefs. Insofar as we do 
care about how people formed their beliefs, rationality is not going to supervene on 
the agent’s current total state. To see why, consider two agents who share the 
same evidence, Proper and Improper. 
Proper examines the evidence carefully and forms a belief on the basis of sufficient 
evidence. Improper jumps to the same conclusion which just so happens to fit the 
evidence. Intuitively, we regard Improper’s belief as being doxastically irrational 
while the same belief in Proper is rational. However, their current total state is the 
same. They have the same evidence and the same beliefs. Any difference between 
them is not current. Since one of them is rational but the other is not, doxastic 
rationality does not supervene on their current total state. To sum up, epistemic 
conservatism commits us to caring about how people originally formed their beliefs 
on pain of the bootstrapping objection. Caring about how an agent formed her 
beliefs commits us to rejecting the principle whereby rationality supervenes on an 
agent’s current state. Therefore, epistemic conservatism commits us to rejecting the 
supervenience of an agent’s rationality on her current state. If so, then, if 
conservatism permits retaining beliefs when they were improperly formed even 
though the evidence was forgotten, then, it is vulnerable to the bootstrapping 
objection. 
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It is unclear, however if, on this version of conservatism, a permissive case can be 
constructed. After all, the only circumstances in which the conservative principle 
applied would be forgotten evidence cases and even then, only when the belief was 
originally formed on the basis of sufficient evidence.  
The reason why permissive cases cannot be constructed is that these cases all 
involve forgetting one’s evidence and forgetting one’s evidence seems like a rational 
defect. Even though Harman (1986), Lycan (1988) and Podgorski (2016) all 
acknowledge that allowing people to forget their evidence improves cognitive 
efficiency, this consideration is not fully epistemic. Consider that the way it improves 
cognitive efficiency is by allowing us to concentrate our limited cognitive resources 
to the task at hand or by reducing clutter. The implication here is that our limited 
cognitive resources, mental clutter and other sorts of cognitive limitations prevent us 
from responding well to all our reasons. Conservatism is a principle that permits us 
to fail to respond to some of our reasons so that we do a better job of responding to 
other reasons we have. The principle does not set a criterion for evaluating whether 
a given set of reasons have been fully responded to. This already concedes that in 
those forgotten evidence cases in which conservatism applies, agents are not fully 
responding to their reasons. After all, when an agent forgets her evidence but still 
retains the belief that was justified by the evidence, she is not responding to the 
evidence she has.  
In this respect, conservatism, insofar as it is a strategy employed in order to cope 
with cognitive limitations, resembles the first, third and fifth burdens of judgment. 
The first and fifth burdens pertained to the difficulty of assessing the issue. While 
the third burden pertained more specifically to the difficulty in assessing whether a 
predicate applied to an object in a borderline case. This stemmed from the fact that 
we have limited cognitive capacities and resources. If we had infinite cognitive 
capacities, we would not make mistakes in reasoning and we would always be able 
to resolve the vagueness in our concepts. Similarly, if we had infinite cognitive 
resources, we would respond well to our reasons in spite of mental clutter, or our 
mind would have so much space it would not be cluttered. As with our earlier 
discussion of the first, third and fifth burdens, the fact that cognitive capacities are 
limited cannot justify lowering our epistemic standards. 
Moreover, since an agent’s evidence, E, can be taken to be something that she 
justifiably believes or knows, if she currently knows (or justifiably believes) a set of 
propositions E, she has very good reason to believe E at a later time. This is 
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because E entails itself and inferring what is entailed by my evidence is always a 
rational inference. There might be pragmatic reasons to not make trivial 
inferences57, but these do not impugn the epistemic character of those inferences. 
Something therefore goes wrong, epistemically speaking when an agent stops 
believing E even though she has not acquired any defeaters for E.  States in which 
an agent has forgotten evidence therefore are decidedly epistemically imperfect 
states which involve in one way or another, a failure to respond fully to one’s 
reasons. This is doubly true of cases where an agent initially forms a belief on the 
basis of inadequate evidence and then at a later point forgets this evidence but 
retains her belief. The agent improperly responds to her reasons initially and then 
compounds this by losing access to those reasons while not adjusting her beliefs 
accordingly. However, as I have argued in Chapter 5, our concern is with whether 
people respond fully to the reasons they have. The conception of rationality we are 
working with is one according to which people respond fully to their reasons as a 
whole. If forgetting one’s evidence involves a failure to respond to one’s reasons, 
then forgotten evidence cases cannot be used to construct permissive cases. This 
would be because permissive cases need to be cases whereby two parties who 
share the same evidence are fully responding to their reasons but still disagree. 
Forgotten evidence cases therefore cannot be permissive cases. If so, then we can 
disregard alleged permissive cases based on forgotten evidence because they are 
not genuine permissive cases. Having dealt with McGrath’s version of conservatism, 
I shall now proceed to address McCain’s. 
McCain’s version of conservatism, which he calls properly formulated epistemic 
conservatism (PEC) can be defined in the following way: 
“PEC: If S believes that p and p is not incoherent, then S is justiﬁed 
in retaining the belief that p and S remains justiﬁed in believing that p 
so long as p is not defeated for S.” (McCain 2008, p186) 
McCain proposes two defeating conditions. The first Defeating Condition (DC1) is 
defined as follows: 
“DC1: If S has better reasons for believing that ∼P than S’s reasons 
for believing that p, then S is no longer justiﬁed in believing that P.” 
(ibid) 
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 For any belief P that we may have, we can always infer P or I am the king of the world. 
The inference may be extremely silly, but that would be for pragmatic reasons, not because 
the inference is itself epistemically defective. 
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The second defeating condition (DC2) is: 
“DC2: If S has reasons for believing that ∼P which are as good as 
S’s reasons for believing that P and the belief that ∼P coheres 
equally as well or better than the belief that P does with S’s other 
beliefs, then S is no longer justiﬁed in believing that P.” (ibid) 
McCain’s defeating conditions are much stronger than McGrath’s. In fact, McCain’s 
defeating conditions are so strong, it is unclear if any permissive cases can be 
constructed. In order to construct a permissive case, there needs to be two people 
who have the same evidence, one of whom already happens to believe a 
proposition while the other does not.. Conservatism is supposed to generate 
permissive cases by making the extra boost provided by believing a proposition 
make up for the shortfall in evidence. However, in this instance, if the evidence for a 
proposition P is insufficient to justify P to someone who does not already believe P, 
that must be because the reasons for P are just as good as or worse than the 
reasons for not-P. After all, if for S, the reasons for P were better than the reasons 
for not-P, then P would be justified for S even if S did not already believe that P. 
However, if the reasons for P are as good as or weaker than the reason for not-P, 
then at least one of DC1 or DC2 would be satisfied. In that case even for someone 
who already believes that P, P is not justified for them.  
Perhaps this is an oversimplification. Suppose two agents S1 and S2 have identical 
evidence for P and their evidence for P is just as good as their evidence for not-P. 
However, for S1, P coheres with her non-evidential beliefs better than not-P. For S2, 
not-P coheres with her non-evidential beliefs better than P. Presumably then, since 
DC1 and DC2 are not triggered, P is justified for S1 and not-P is justified for S2. 
Supposedly, this might be a permissive case since different agents who share the 
same evidence are justified in holding different attitudes towards the same 
proposition. However, it is unclear whether this is genuinely a permissive case.  
One reason to doubt that this is genuinely a permissive case is that there seem to 
be non-evidential beliefs. That is to say, there are beliefs which could cohere or 
conflict with P while not providing reasons to believe P or not-P. The only way such 
beliefs could exist but not generate reasons is, if these beliefs are themselves 
insufficiently supported by the evidence. After all, if they are supported by sufficient 
reasons, they would provide additional reasons to believe P or not-P and would 
therefore be evidence. If so, then S1 and S2 would not have the same evidence for 
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P. In order for them to have the same evidence, these other differing beliefs which 
could be relevant to whether P would have to be unjustified.  
If these other beliefs were unjustified, then when S1 and S2 respond properly to 
their reasons, they will not retain these beliefs. If they drop these beliefs, then the 
only beliefs that they retain are the justified ones; i.e. the ones that make up their 
evidence. Given that they have identical evidence, and they do not differ in their 
non-evidential beliefs, S1 and S2 have no grounds to believe differently from each 
other. Therefore, this is not a permissive case. To sum up, it seems doubtful that 
McCain’s defeating conditions permit the construction of permissive cases. Even 
cases which initially seem permissive are in fact really not, since, when people 
respond fully to their reasons, there are no beliefs apart from an agent’s evidence 
which could cohere or conflict with the proposition in question.  
Weakening Standard Conservatism by introducing more defeating conditions does 
not seem to be a promising strategy to construct permissive cases. The key 
difficulty seems to lie in the fact that it is hard to construct a permissive case which 
does not involve illicit bootstrapping or an illicit extra boost. Let us look at other 
ways of weakening Standard Conservatism to see if they are any more successful. 
7.4.3 Mere Beliefs 
A third way of weakening conservatism is to weaken the positive epistemic status 
conferred on a proposition by believing it. On Poston’s (2012) view, conservatism 
applies only to what he calls mere belief (ibid: 520). A mere belief, by Poston’s 
definition, is a belief about which there is no evidence, one way or another (ibid). 
For Poston, the conservative principle says that if an agent merely believes that P 
she justifiably believes that P (ibid). On this view, believing a proposition does not 
give it an extra boost over and above that provided by its evidence. Rather, when an 
agent encounters evidence regarding a proposition she initially merely believes, she 
subsequently no longer merely believes it since she has acquired evidence 
regarding that proposition. In that case, Poston’s principle does not apply. Since it is 
not a mere belief, it is no longer justified simply in virtue of being believed58. 
Poston’s principle is sufficiently odd that I will split my discussion of it into two parts. 
The first part will address cases in which there is no evidence regarding the 
proposition and the second part will address cases in which there is at least some 
evidence regarding the proposition.  
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 Arguably an alternative way of characterising Poston’s approach is as a way of narrowing 
the enabling conditions for a belief to be justified. 
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When there is no evidence regarding a proposition, Poston’s principle is too strong 
a version of conservatism. Poston wishes to limit the application of conservatism to 
just certain framework beliefs (ibid), i.e. beliefs like ‘induction is reliable’ or that ‘the 
external world exists’. However, his principle also permits certain obvious cases of 
illicit bootstrapping. Consider Foley’s beach case. In that case, an agent happens to 
believe that there is an even number of grains of sand in a beach on the basis of no 
evidence at all. Since this is a mere belief, it is justified under Poston’s principle. 
However, it is absurd that if someone arbitrarily forms a belief on the basis of no 
evidence at all, it is justified. Before having the belief, it is clearly irrational, even by 
Poston’s standards, to form the belief. After, forming the belief, Poston’s principle 
classifies the belief as rational. The principle thereby seems to license an illicit 
bootstrapping of the rational status of one’s beliefs without a corresponding change 
in either one’s belief or evidence.  
The problem here is that Poston is unable to restrict the application of his principle 
to framework beliefs only. If he could restrict the application, we would be less 
willing to regard such cases as illicit bootstrapping. Even if he could restrict his 
principle to just framework beliefs, such beliefs are unlikely to give rise to permissive 
cases. It is doubtful that anyone outside of a philosophy classroom seriously denies 
that induction is reliable or that the external world exists. If so, then we cannot 
construct a permissive case since everyone shares these beliefs. To sum up, in no 
evidence situations, Poston’s principle is either too strong or, if suitably 
circumscribed, incapable of generating permissive cases.  
Let us now turn to cases in which there is at least some evidence. Of such cases, 
there are two things we might say. Firstly, we might say that no permissive cases 
could arise once there is at least some evidence regarding a proposition. To see 
why, consider two agents Sally and Susan. Sally has a mere belief that P, while 
Susan has a mere belief that not-P. According to Poston’s principle, they can 
justifiably retain their respective beliefs only while they have no evidence regarding 
P. If they were to acquire some evidence regarding P, then they would not have 
mere beliefs anymore and hence, according to the principle, those beliefs would not 
be justified; at least not without the evidence itself supporting one or the other. 
Since the P and not-P are not merely believed by Sally and Susan respectively, 
there is no extra boost provided by their initial attitudes. Therefore, Sally is not 
entitled to form a higher confidence in P than Susan is. Hence, no permissive case 
can be constructed once we introduce some evidence about the proposition in 
question. 
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The second thing we might say is that Poston’s principle which applies to mere 
beliefs is the closest we come to discussing ur-priors. Like mere-beliefs, ur-priors 
are those credences we can be presumed to form about various propositions when 
we have no evidence concerning them. This makes it tempting to extend Poston’s 
principle to cover more fine grained attitudes.  
Mere Attitude: For any set of doxastic attitudes that are merely held, 
so long as they are probabilistically coherent, they are justified.  
Here I stipulate that to merely hold an attitude towards a proposition, the attitude 
towards the proposition must be held in the absence of any evidence about the 
proposition. However, Mere Attitude would not be of any help to permissive 
Bayesians. That would be because Bayesians update by conditionalizing on their 
priors. If Susan’s prior probability for a proposition P is low while Sally’s prior 
probability is high, Sally’s posterior probability for P will be higher than Susan’s, all 
else equal. On a Bayesian picture, an agent’s priors continue to exert some effect 
on their posterior probabilities. Overwhelming amounts of evidence might be able to 
reduce the size of this effect, but will never be able to eliminate it entirely. However, 
on Poston’s view, the introduction of evidence is supposed to eliminate any effect 
that the initial belief had because it ceases to be a mere belief. Similarly according 
to Mere Attitude, the initial attitudes that people have should have no effect on their 
final attitudes once they receive any amount of relevant evidence. There might be 
some other updating rule that could accommodate this principle, but if there is, it 
would not be permissive as people who have the same evidence could not rationally 
update to different attitudes just because they have different priors. 
To sum up, Poston’s principle is too strong in certain cases and licenses illicit 
bootstrapping. In other situations, it is too weak to generate permissive cases. In 
addition, the sharp discontinuity between how Poston’s account of conservatism 
treats beliefs with and without evidence make it unsuitable to justify permissivism 
based on different ur-priors. 
7.4.4 Dynamic Conservatism  
Instead of defining conservatism as a principle which picks out certain propositions 
as being justified for an agent merely in virtue of the doxastic state she happens to 
be, epistemic conservativism can be expressed as a set of principles about belief 
revision. On Podgorski’s account, which he calls dynamic conservatism, the 
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justification of any belief under consideration supervenes on the agent’s evidence. 
More specifically, he accepts the following principle: 
“Evidence Restriction (ER): The only considerations that, from the 
perspective of epistemic rationality, contribute to P’s being worth 
believing are evidential— they bear positively on the belief’s truth.” 
(Podgorski 2016: 355) 
ER seems antithetical to any version of conservatism. After all, ER seems to just be 
a re-statement of Evidentialism according to which:  
Evidentialism: “Doxastic attitude D towards proposition P is 
epistemically justified for S at t if and only if having D towards P fits 
the evidence S has at t” (Feldman and Conee 1985: 15) 
Podgorski denies this and distinguishes a belief being worth believing and it being 
rational. However, even if the two were conceptually distinct, it seems natural to 
suppose something like the following belief-worthiness-rationality bridge principle 
would be true. 
State Oriented Worth Believing (SWB): “It is irrational to believe 
something that is not worth believing (from one’s 
perspective).”(Podgorski 2016: 359) 
SWB seems to be intuitively obvious. It is hard to see how it could ever be 
epistemically rational to believe something that is not worth believing. However, 
according to Podgorski, the reason why standard forms of conservatism are 
vulnerable to the bootstrapping objection is that epistemic conservatives tend to 
accept SWB but reject ER. According to Podgorski, this should be reversed. He 
claims that SWB is too strong and should be weakened further to the following: 
Dynamic Worth Believing (DWB): it is irrational to conclude 
consideration of whether P by forming or reaffirming the belief that P 
if P is not worth believing (from one’s perspective). (ibid: 363) 
DWB is weaker than SWB in that it is entailed by SWB but does not in turn entail it. 
DWB opens the way for a version of conservatism by permitting agents to retain a 
belief P that is not worth believing so long as they have not considered whether P. 
This means that so long as an agent permissibly fails to consider whether P, she 
can permissibly believe that P even when the evidence does not support it. The 
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question then is: What are the circumstances in which an agent can permissibly not 
consider whether P? Podgorski supposes that there might be some circumstances 
in which we can permissibly not consider whether P even if we already believe it 
and our evidence is insufficient. He supposes the following: 
“Inconsiderate:  One  is  not  always  rationally  required  to  initiate  
consideration whether P when one believes that P and one’s 
evidence does not make P worth believing (from one’s perspective).” 
(ibid) 
If Inconsiderate is true, someone may rationally acquire a belief, later receive 
disconfirming evidence but still maintain belief in P because she has permissibly not 
considered whether P since receiving the disconfirming evidence. This also allows 
us to see how a permissive case could be constructed. Two agents who possess 
the same evidence could rationally disagree about a proposition if it was worth 
considering for one of them but not the other. If such permissive cases can indeed 
be constructed, uniqueness is falsified. 
I offer two arguments against this sort of permissive case. The first argument is that 
permissive cases cannot arise in political disagreement because in political 
disagreement, there are at least two conditions that make it worth considering your 
belief. The second argument is that the normative property we care about is the 
belief worthiness of a proposition, not necessarily its rationality in Podgorski’s sense 
of the term. I shall discuss each argument in turn. 
In the context of politics, there are at least two conditions which can make it worth 
considering our beliefs. The first condition is that of acknowledged disagreement. 
The second condition is political or interpersonal justification. For the first condition, 
while I may not be required to consider whether my beliefs are true just because 
someone out there might disagree with me, this changes when I actually meet 
someone who does so. Consider the following principle: 
Acknowledged disagreement: When we meet someone whom we 
believe disagrees with us about a proposition, we ought to consider 
whether our own beliefs are true.   
When we see someone, who in the face of disagreement, does not even pause to 
consider whether they might be wrong, we are inclined to think that they are 
dogmatic and arrogant. This intuition supports the idea that permitting people to not 
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consider their beliefs in the face of disagreement would permit an unacceptable 
level of dogmatism.  
However, it may seem that this requirement is too strong. Surely if I meet twenty 
people in succession, each five minutes apart and all of whom disagree with me, I 
am not obligated to reconsider my belief twenty times in the span of a few hours! 
After all, after re-examining my belief the first time, nothing could have changed 
after I last checked whether I had good enough reasons for my belief. I am unlikely 
to have gained any new evidence, apart from the bare fact of disagreement that 
bears on the issue. Moreover, surely I am not required to re-examine my beliefs 
right at the very instant I encounter disagreement. Intuitively, I should be allowed at 
least some time to re-examine my beliefs. We might fruitfully modify Acknowledged 
Disagreement without giving up entirely the requirement to re-examine one’s beliefs 
in the face of disagreement. Firstly, we need to read Acknowledged Disagreement 
as permitting some, but not too long a time lag between meeting someone who we 
know disagrees with us and re-examining our beliefs. Secondly, we can exempt 
ourselves from examining our beliefs repeatedly if we meet someone else who 
disagrees with us before we even have a chance to re-examine our own beliefs 
after the first meeting. Thirdly, we can exempt ourselves from reconsidering our 
beliefs if we have already just done so thoroughly and the results of said re-
examination are still fresh in our minds. With all these caveats and exemptions in 
place, Acknowledged Disagreement still has enough bite that when we meet others 
who disagree with us, we trigger re-consideration of our beliefs and end up believing 
according to the evidence.  
It might be that if two people who disagree with each other live in their own corner of 
the world isolated from each other, they may be able to live their lives without 
having to reconsider their beliefs. However, in the context of democratic politics, the 
question of which candidate is the best or which policy is the best is front and 
centre. For instance, Susan and Sally each have to reconsider their own beliefs 
about abortion because they come to know of people who disagree with them about 
abortion. Suppose that a policy regulating abortion providers is on the ballot or up 
for vote in parliament. For Susan, who supports the policy, the mere fact that the 
regulation was previously not in place suggests that there is disagreement about the 
topic. After all, if everyone agreed that abortion ought to be regulated as per the 
policy, it is unlikely that it would only be going up for a vote now. Similarly, for Sally 
who opposes the policy, the fact that people are advancing a policy she opposes 
means that there are people who disagree with her on that topic. Given 
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Acknowledged Disagreement or any similar principle, Susan and Sally now have to 
reconsider their own beliefs about abortion. 
Crucially, in a political liberal context the need to engage in political or interpersonal 
justification can also trigger considering our beliefs. The public justification 
requirement requires that laws be justifiable to all reasonable persons if they are to 
be legitimate. In practice, achieving this will require us to, firstly, consider whether 
we have good reasons for our policy preferences and, secondly, try to convince 
disagreeing others about the merits of our preferred laws and policies. Only when 
we discover that those who disagree with us have different and sufficient reasons of 
their own for their different policy preferences would it make sense for us to 
conclude that the policy cannot be justified to everyone.  When deliberating about 
questions of policy or when attempting to justify or resist particular policy positions 
to others, we cite to ourselves or others our moral beliefs as reasons for our 
position. When we do that, we no longer merely passively believe those 
propositions, but are actively considering whether they are true. For instance, 
suppose I were to deliberate about whether to criminalise abortion, one reason I 
might invoke in favour is my belief that foetuses have a right to life. However, once I 
invoke that reason, I am not merely passively believing it, but actively considering it. 
Therefore, I am not permitted to continue believing that foetuses have the right to 
life if my evidence does not support it. To generalise, we might suppose that the 
following is a condition that justifies re-examining our beliefs. 
Supporting Premise: If I ought to consider whether a given belief is 
true, I also ought to consider whether any of the premises employed 
in the relevant arguments for or against that belief are true. 
If Supporting Premise is true, then, anytime someone claims to be able to 
reasonably reject a law because she accepts some conflicting belief, she ought to 
consider whether that belief is true. Similarly every time someone wishes to impose 
a law, she ought to consider whether the moral beliefs she invokes to justify the law 
are true. Insofar as both the person imposing the law and the person the law is 
being imposed upon ought to consider whether a given belief is true, that is not a 
permissive case.  
To sum up, there seems to be at least two conditions in cases pertaining to political 
disagreement which make people’s beliefs worth considering. Firstly, when people 
encounter disagreement with others during political campaigns, petitions and 
elections, it would be unacceptably dogmatic for them to continue on without ever 
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re-examining their beliefs to see if they fit the evidence. More importantly, when 
attempting to justify policies and laws to others or when attempting to justify why a 
proposed policy is unjust, people invoke their beliefs as sources of reasons. When 
doing so, this also triggers the need to re-examine those beliefs.  
Notably, under Podgorski’s account of conservatism, Susan and Sally in the 
Abortion case could not rationally disagree. Consequently, prior to coming to the 
university they may permissibly disagree since they may not be actively considering 
whether abortion is permissible. However, once at the university, when they 
encounter the various arguments for or against the permissibility of abortion, 
abortion not only becomes worth considering, Susan and Sally are actively 
considering whether abortion is permissible. Given Susan’s and Sally’s evidence, 
either it is worth believing that abortion is permissible, it is worth believing that 
abortion is not permissible or it is not worth believing either. Whichever of these 
three options turns out to be the case, Susan and Sally cannot rationally disagree. 
Any permissive case that could be based on Podgorski’s account of conservatism 
has to involve at least one of the disagreeing parties permissibly retaining a belief 
against the evidence because she permissibly fails to consider whether her beliefs 
are true. However, no such case that would be relevant to the political context 
appears to be possible. 
The second argument against such permissive cases rests on the observation that 
on Podgorski’s view, there are two distinct normative questions that attach to a 
proposition. One question is whether a proposition is worth believing while the other 
is whether it is rational to believe it. We have hitherto assumed that rationality 
supervened on or was identical to belief-worthiness. However, given the rejection of 
SWB, there is a question as to which normative question we ought to care about vis 
a vis uniqueness.  
Our concern with uniqueness arises from a concern about whether people who 
respond fully to their epistemic reasons can disagree given that they have the same 
total body of evidence. As I have argued in the fifth chapter, this is due to the fact 
that rationality is about responding perfectly to one’s epistemic reasons. 
Inconsiderate permits people to sometimes not respond to their epistemic reasons. 
Notably, since, in Podgorski’s view, people can be rational without necessarily 
responding to their epistemic reasons, Podgorski’s sense of the term rationality is 
not the normative question we wish to answer. On the other hand, ER indicates that 
belief-worthiness supervenes on the agent’s epistemic reasons. Therefore, given 
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that we are concerned about responsiveness to epistemic reasons, a situation 
counts as a permissive case only if between two people who have the same 
evidence, a proposition is worthy of belief for one of them but not for the other. 
However, there is no reason to think that any such case can be constructed. 
It seems then that even on Podgorski’s account of conservatism, we cannot 
construct a permissive case. As I have argued, other accounts of conservatism in 
the literature are either too strong, and therefore vulnerable to the bootstrapping 
objection, or they are too weak to construct a permissive case. If this is right, there 
is no plausible version of epistemic conservatism which would license permissivism.  
With this, I have closed off the second way in which having different backgrounds 
could potentially be a source of rational disagreement without being a source of 
different evidence. Therefore, as far as the fourth burden of judgment is concerned, 
it cannot generate rational disagreement except by causing people to have different 
total bodies of evidence. In addition, by showing that people cannot have different 
epistemic standards arising from different initial beliefs, I have closed off the last 
way in which, as per the second burden of judgment, people can rationally disagree 
because they have different epistemic standards. If people cannot permissibly have 
different epistemic standards, then permissivism is false. The only way in which 
people could rationally disagree is if they had different total bodies of evidence.  
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Chapter 8 - Conclusion 
To sum up, I have shown that while the standard account of political liberalism 
presupposes permissivism, permissivism is false. In the first chapter, I described 
what I take to be the standard account of political liberalism and showed how it 
related to reasonable disagreement and the burdens of judgment. I also argued that 
reasonable disagreement entailed rational disagreement. In the second chapter, I 
argued that the first, second, third, fifth and, to some extent, the fourth burdens of 
judgment presuppose epistemic permissivism.  
In the subsequent five chapters, I proceeded to argue that permissivism is false by 
arguing for uniqueness. In my counterarguments in favour of the uniqueness thesis, 
in the third chapter, I have distinguished between intrapersonal and interpersonal 
uniqueness and argued that any plausible account of permissivism must be 
consistent with intrapersonal uniqueness. In the fourth chapter, I have argued that 
any account of permissivism which denies intrapersonal uniqueness about 
epistemic standards is subject to the same objections as versions of permissivism 
that deny intrapersonal uniqueness.  
In the fifth through seventh chapters, I have presented three different indexing 
proposals for how an epistemic standard that is appropriate for an agent, could vary 
from agent to agent. I showed, for each indexing proposal, that no such account 
was successful. However, some way of indexing different epistemic standards to 
agents needs to be successful in order for versions of permissivism consistent with 
intrapersonal uniqueness about epistemic standards to be true. While the three 
accounts I present are by no means exhaustive of all such possible accounts, they 
cover the most obvious ones. Given these arguments, the burden is now on 
permissivists to account for how permissivism could be true. However, since it is 
unclear as to how such an argument would be shaped, we can be justified in being 
highly confident that permissivism is false. 
What then follows from this? At the very minimum, the account of the burdens of 
judgment, that is, the causes of rational disagreement among reasonable persons 
requires extensive revision. Of the six burdens, the last burden is not a source of 
reasonable disagreement because it is ultimately not a source of disagreement at 
all. People, may, as a practical matter choose to make different trade-offs between 
their values even if they agreed on all their moral and religious doctrines. Of the 
remaining five, four of them presuppose permissivism which, as I have argued, is 
false. Of the remaining burden, the fourth burden, two of the three ways in which 
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people’s different backgrounds could generate disagreement presuppose 
permissivism. The revised account of the burdens of judgment would contain only 
one item: people reasonably disagree because they have different bodies of 
evidence.  
Presumably, this will severely limit the scope of reasonable disagreement. Far fewer 
claims are subject to reasonable disagreement. If the scope of reasonable 
disagreement is severely limited, much of the intuitive appeal of the political liberal 
project goes away. Intuitively, public reason is necessary because there is 
reasonable disagreement about a great many questions. If much fewer questions 
are subject to reasonable disagreement, then the perceived need for public reason 
is greatly reduced. 
A contrary view is that apart from the specifics about the burdens of judgment, 
nothing much changes. While it is true that four of the six burdens of judgment 
presuppose epistemic permissivism, since not all of them do, the structure of 
political liberal theory would remain largely intact. The implicit claim is that 
reasonable persons can rationally disagree even if permissivism is false. The 
reason that they can do so is because reasonable persons can have different 
evidence about the propositions which justify laws and public policies. For instance, 
someone who has a degree in economics will possess evidence about the effects of 
wage or trade policies that someone who does not have said degree is not likely to 
have. Climate scientists will have evidence about global warming that lay persons 
may not have. We might generalise and say that for many empirical propositions 
which are relevant to public policy, people will have different evidence.  
However, would the same thing be true of more basic moral propositions? If it can 
be shown that we share all the relevant evidence about some important basic moral 
doctrines, then, given that permissivism is false, reasonable disagreement about 
these doctrines is not possible. If so, then, at the very least, the core political liberal 
claim that certain illiberal laws are illegitimate because they are justified on the basis 
of moral or religious doctrines subject to reasonable disagreement is falsified. 
Relatedly, if empirical propositions are the only ones subject to reasonable 
disagreement, it does not seem illegitimate to impose a policy on people when they 
rationally disagree with the policy only because they lack certain pieces of empirical 
evidence. The intuition here is that only rational disagreement about basic moral 
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questions matters for legitimacy59. If this is right, then the distinction between 
policies that are legitimate and those which are objectively correct seems to 
disappear. Working out whether basic moral propositions are subject to reasonable 
disagreement and if not, what the implications are for political liberalism is the 
subject of future work. One potentially fruitful line of enquiry is to attempt to 
formulate a version of political liberalism that does not rely on an account of 
reasonable disagreement.  
  
                                                          
59
 See for instance, Mill (1859) who argues that we may permissibly stop a man from 
crossing an unsafe bridge if the only reason he is trying to cross is that he does not know 
that the bridge is unsafe. The implication is that the public justification requirement for 
legitimacy applies primarily to normative disagreements. I take this to be the dominant view. 
For a contrary view, see Kappel (2017) who argues that imposing such policies on those 
who disagree with them because they lack access to the empirical evidence is illegitimate. 
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